665.001/8–151
The Department of State to the French Embassy 1
Memorandum
The Department of State has given full consideration to the Aide-Mémoire of the French Embassy of August 1, 1951,2 as supplemented by its Note of August 23, 1951,3 concerning the Italian Peace Treaty. The Department of State agrees that Italy should be in a position to meet aggression and to contribute to the common defense under its NATO obligations. The French Government’s proposal for a joint declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers at the next meeting of the Allied Council does not, [Page 659] however, appear sufficient to accomplish that objective and de facto revision of certain parts of the Peace Treaty would seem necessary. The issuance of the declaration transmitted with the Embassy’s note of August 23 would leave our relations with Italy unchanged as far as the substance of the Treaty is concerned and in the long run would give rise to strong criticism and disappointment because of its failure to accomplish practical revision. Moreover, the Department of State considers that the issuance of such a tripartite declaration would place the Western Powers in the untenable legal position of assuming responsibility for the initiative in the violation of the Treaty by the Italian Government.
The urgent need to complete the agreed plans for mutual defense requires that positive action be taken to permit Italy to exceed the military limitations of the Treaty. The Department of State does not consider that a declaration which in effect would not constitute revision would provide Italy a sound basis on which to ignore the military clauses of the Treaty. In reality it would not relieve our governments from legal responsibility. In addition, the demands in Italy for removal of the restrictions of the Treaty, which stand in marked contrast to the terms of the Japanese settlement, make it necessary to secure de facto revision of the Treaty itself.
With regard to the French Government’s concern over the Trieste question and Italian-Yugoslav relations, the Department of State considers that Yugoslav uneasiness would be allayed if action on the Treaty should be so handled as to bring about, if possible, a settlement of the Trieste question. Marshal Tito has stated that he would not oppose revision, if the Trieste question and Italian reparations received prior settlement. The British and the United States Governments are seeking actively to promote Italian-Yugoslav negotiations toward an agreed solution. The Yugoslav conditional opposition to revision does not seem insurmountable when viewed in this light, and certainly should not be allowed to paralyze our action. The French, British and United States Governments can impress on Yugoslavia the fact that the external threat facing it is the same as that facing Italy and that a strong Italy playing its full part in a common defense against Soviet aggression would be greatly to Yugoslavia’s advantage. If Yugoslav-Italian agreement can be reached, the Department of State would be in agreement with a suggestion which has been advanced by the British Government that Italy make a statement assuring the Yugoslav Government that there are no territorial issues outstanding between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Department would propose that in addition a similar statement be sought from the Yugoslav Government, in order that the Western Powers would not be charged with showing favoritism towards either side. The Department considers [Page 660] that the issuance of such statements would meet the French Governments’s suggestion that formal assurances be sought from the Italian and Yugoslav Governments not to use force to settle these matters. It is clear that it would be advantageous to have these declarations and a Trieste settlement, if reached, announced simultaneously with the other agreements having the effect of revising the Peace Treaty.
In its aide-mémoire of June 22, 1951,4 the Department requested agreement on procedures to secure to Italy an opportunity to carry out its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. Those procedures envisaged an approach by Italy to NATO signatories of the Peace Treaty, agreement among them to support Italy’s action and approach by Italy to non-NATO signatories. Since those proposals were made, events have moved with increasing rapidity due to the discussions of the Japanese and German settlements, and the declarations of the Italian Government that it considers actions should be taken to permit it to carry out its NATO obligations and to be freed from the punitive spirit of the Treaty. In view of these circumstances, the Department considers that a more expeditious procedure should be followed and suggests therefore that without delay the Italian Government address previously agreed communications to all the signatories of the Treaty calling on them to recognize that the spirit of the Peace Treaty no longer reflects the position occupied by Italy and asking for release from certain provisions of that Treaty.
The Italian note would express:
(1) a readiness to negotiate bilateral agreements with any country in order to base relations with Italy on the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty rather than that of the Peace Treaty;
(2) a desire to revise the military clauses (Articles 46–70) which limit Italy’s ability to defend itself;
(3) a desire to revise certain political clauses and the Preamble, which are no longer needed since the democracy they were designed to assure is no longer in question.
This step by Italy should be preceded by adequate diplomatic preparation, with French, United Kingdom and United States support, to assure immediate friendly responses, at least from Italy’s Allies and from as many other signatories as possible. The replies should endorse the position expressed in the Italian Note. Since the Notes themselves can constitute the revision on a bilateral basis, the negotiation of a further document, may not in all cases be necessary.
[Page 661]It is believed these exchanges with Italy should be published simultaneously in so far as the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States are concerned, and that efforts should be made to induce as many other friendly nations as possible to take simultaneous action. By this method the widest possible endorsement of Italy’s action would be secured.
It is considered imperative that all action be completed before the German settlement is signed. If the German and Japanese settlements are concluded without parallel action on the Italian Treaty, our interests will be adversely affected and later action rendered more difficult.
It is suggested further that NATO signatories of the Italian Treaty should simultaneously with their replies to Italy formally and publicly communicate to the USSR copies of their replies, urging the USSR to follow suit.
As a further method of securing public endorsement, the Department suggests that the public actions enumerated above be completed before the General Assembly convenes in Paris on November 6. Since it would be desirable to have the United Nations note with satisfaction the steps taken to revise the Treaty, a statement of agreement by the friendly signatories including the settlement of the Trieste question should be brought before the General Assembly under Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Drafted by Colladay and Byington and cleared with Haselton of BNA, Furman of L, Higgs of EE, and Mangano of UNA. It was noted on the source text that a copy of this memorandum was given to a representative of the French Embassy on September 10.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 1, Document 290.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Attached to Document 282.↩