740A.5/9–2051: Telegram
The Chargé in Ireland (Huston) to the Secretary of State 1
58. Re Deptel 27 rptd London unn Sept 13.2 Fol discussion of another subj with FonMin Aiken today, I referred to our conversation Sept 4 (Embtel 40, Sept 4, rptd Paris 2 pouched London3) and said subsequent review of info available Emb and consultations with service attachés had confirmed my initial reaction to Irish Govt’s desire purchase US arms, i.e. availabilities probably extremely limited as US resources are heavily committed to priorities established under regional mutual security arrangements.
I then said according my own purely personal analysis there exist three conceivable gen procedures for procurement US arms: (a) special or negot allocation arms under bilateral agreement or defense alliance; (b) adherence collective defense group viz. NATO; or (c) simple purchase surplus or commercially available arms. First (a) probably was not possibility in reality I continued, as bilateral arrangement wld be incompatible with concept of collective defense North Atlantic area and collective mutual aid responsibilities assumed by NATO signatories and it seemed highly improbable US wld consider benefits such arrangement sufficient to warrant deviation from mutual assistance principles embraced by all NATO signatories. Ireland, on other hand, had not wished to avail itself of (b), having indicated in 1949 it could not participate in NATO as long as partition existed. This, as I saw it, left only (c). While I felt certain US Government naturally wld view sympathetically any Irish endeavor or request obtain US arms through purchase of items either commercially available or surplus to US–NATO and other priority commitments, items in which Ireland interested are either extremely limited or nonexistent in open market and, as US stocks and current production heavily committed, it was doubted if much could be acquired by this means, particularly as any surplus could probably not be disposed of without approval other countries [Page 532] concerned. While NATO countries have pooled their defense efforts on entirely voluntary basis and it obviously for Ireland to decide whether it desires participate in joint effort, US believes its willingness welcome Ireland as NATO member shld not be weighed lightly against considerations which so far have deterred Ireland from joining. When invitation was extended, US like all other NATO members did not nor does it now concede relevance partition to question Irish membership. When in Washington last May, I added, I gained impression—and had reason to believe it was still valid—opinion existed in Dept that if Ireland sincerely interested in membership question or assumption positive role in Eur defense it shld be possible for Ireland and UK perhaps at Irish initiative work out naturally [mutually] satisfactory means excluding partition issue from Irish NATO membership.
Aiken said assuming worst i.e., that nothing can be done about partition for moment, Ireland must do what it can to strengthen its defenses, adding “we have buying mission in Sweden and recently succeeded in purchasing some anti-tank weapons in Belg and will dig up what we can elsewhere”. Referring again to 1935 De Valera statement Ireland wld never be base of attack on UK, he said coalition govt had done nothing about Ireland’s defenses, which must be built up as rapidly as possible by present govt. His fear in event war is Russian airborne landings; Germans made big mistake in not coming this way in last war and it too much to hope USSR wld make same mistake. He accordingly feels it important Ireland not be mil vacuum, but have enough modern arms particularly light machineguns and anti-tank weapons to enable Irish mil and civilian defense forces prevent success of landing. Machine tools to make possible Irish manufacture light equipment such as machineguns wld be particularly useful. He concluded by saying “Please tell your people—not formally of course—we feel it very important Ireland be enabled to purchase arms even if in limited quantities for training and morale purposes”.
Conversation ended with discussion of partition which will be reported separately.4
- Repeated to London and Paris.↩
- Supra.↩
- Document 232.↩
- Despatch 207, September 21, not printed. The discussion was largely an exposition of what Huston called Aiken’s, and ostensibly his government’s, views on partition. These views, which Huston said were already familiar to the U.S. Government, involved proposals for ending partition by leaving to Northern Ireland its present degree of autonomy while shifting from London to Dublin the central powers presently exercised by the British Government. Aiken’s statements followed generally the lines of informal remarks made to Huston on June 29 by the Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Timothy O’Driscoll, which were reported in despatch 857, June 29. Despatches 207 and 857 are in file 740A.00.↩