Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 164

751.5/4–1851: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Paris, April 18, 1951—7 p.m.

6304. Eyes only for Acheson, Perkins and Cabot; pass ECA eyes only for Foster and Bissell; pass White House eyes only for Harriman. The tension between the US and French Govts over the amount and method of Amer assistance to the French rearmament program for the period ending June 30, 1951, has now reached a point where, in my opinion, a little more strain could bring about a very damaging crisis in French-American relations.

Schuman told me Sunday that the French Cabinet is puzzled and resentful over the situation and that Cabinet discussions with difficult and unfortunate implications are already scheduled on the subject. All members of the Embassy, MAAG and ECA mission who deal with this question are acutely aware of this dangerously surcharged atmosphere.

Recent Gaullist criticism that the present French Govt is totally subservient to US instructions has further aggravated this feeling. We are in constant negots with French over vital military installations, we are probably approaching a 4 Ministers meeting² where mutual confidence will be a necessity, and there are many other political objectives of major importance for the furtherance of which a close understanding and at least trustfulness by the French in our leadership are essential. Such trust simply does not exist at present. I recommend that our subsequent actions in this area be influenced by the urgent necessity to terminate this state of affairs.

This discouraging situation stems primarily from conflicting interpretations of the agreement reached last Oct at Wash³ and from misunderstandings of unilateral actions taken by the 2 govts under that agreement. The major incidents at the root of the reciprocal bad feeling are the following:

1. The French administration first requested an excessive amount of aid in Oct talks and then after an agreement was reached drastically curtailed their request, they reduced their metropolitan defense program very substantially without prior consultation with US.

2. Altho French ministers gave prior oral promises to the contrary, the reductions made by the French did not fit the pattern of the priorities which the US officials thought had been established on a general basis at the Oct talks.

3. While Pleven was being given assurances during his Wash visit⁴ that Amer assistance wld be forthcoming as foreseen in the agreement without further difficulty, the US unilaterally shifted to a different method of financing. The French considered this action to have imposed new restrictions and therefore to have altered the basis of the agreement in a way detrimental to them. It was widely suspected there that action was motivated by US dissatisfaction with the French military program—a dissatisfaction implied but never stated categorically.

4. French now consider that US has imposed unilaterally a limit of $240 million on the combined ECA and MDAP aid that will be given in the first 6 months of 1951 thus implying rejection of a mutual discussion of the French estimates of their dollar needs. French understanding of agreement was that final amount of aid would be decided on basis actual developments and after discussion. Impression French have gained of our position is particularly unfortunate because the amount of aid that the French could have justified for their import needs on basis developments wld not have been substantially different from figure of $240 million. Thus same result could have been obtained without having contributed to present accusations of bad faith.

5. French have been informed that the US is now considering making even aid allotments yet to come from $240 million conditional upon and immediate restoration of certain items in the French metropolitan military budget and changes in the French military production program to which French believed US had previously given its general approval. In their present form our suggestions to this end comprise a complicated, extensive, and as yet ill-defined series of recommendations regarding various items of French military program, including military production. They do not constitute a workable action program and cannot do so until after conversations at technical level.

In addition to the above developments one should add the general attitudes contributing to the unfortunate controversies over the French military program. On the Amer side, there is general dissatisfaction with the manner of the French presentation and irritation with the economic and political problems of the French which prevent an increase of the French military effort to a level that the capacities of France wld otherwise permit. On the French side, there is dissatisfaction with the alleged delay in Amer end-item deliveries; their irritation with the interminable arguments and confused negot worse confounded by mountains of paper work and involved demands for information, much of which is irrelevant or never used, which surrounds their every request for equipment or matériel; their growing suspicion that the US has no real intention of forcing a NATO burden-sharing which will bring a contribution from the other European partners proportionate to that being made by the French; their belief that US administration does not give adequate weight to French contribution in Indochina.

In Oct and again in Jan I attended meetings at the Dept where these affairs were deliberated upon by numerous representatives of interested divisions and agencies. The major problems appeared resolved. Full understanding with Petsche and Moch and later with Pleven seemed to confirm that no difficulties existed on the broad issues. I had thought that these policy decisions wld be implemented without any reconsideration of the policy itself or obstruction of the policy by new conditions, or superfluous procedural exactions. These policy decisions were designed to give us an opportunity to ascertain whether or not the French wld carry through their pledged program. If we were to find that our assistance to them for the first 6 months of this year had not been wisely or effectively utilized, we cld then take this into account in connection with their requests for later assistance.

For the above reasons and others I fear that mutual discussions on the French rearmament effort will bog down in a morass of misunderstanding and mutual ill-will.

If you think I exaggerate the confusion and procedural snarls in which this whole affair has been involved for at least 6 months, I suggest a reference to the voluminous Embtels 6246, 6247 and 6248 of Apr 16,⁵ and if anyone with final policy responsibility has the patience to go through them and the other telegrams therein referred to and reflect that they only represent a small portion of the thousands of words that have flowed back and forth across the Atlantic on the subject with but few constructive results, I believe you will find that the apprehension of the Emb, ECA mission and MAAG about the apparently endless uncertainties of this matter has some justification. Today even when the term of our commitment is within 11 weeks of its conclusion we have no agreed position upon what our commitment really is. In spite of our insistence last year on a French high priority production program, and in the face of their numerous submissions of AMP requests for raw materials and machine tools over a period of about 2 fiscal years, they have thus far received approvals of only $3.5 million for these items. Moreover, the increased scarcity, price, and demand for raw materials and machine tools has made it extremely difficult for the French now to reckon on reasonable future schedules of delivery.

No purpose wld now be served by trying to justify to the French the US position in the many complicated questions I have alluded to above. The fact is that the US must have the firm support and confidence of the French Govt at this stage of our common military effort. If this is not obtained, it wld be a failure of US diplomacy and whether the fault lies basically in French inadequacies is comparatively irrelevant. As a first step to correct the situation I recommend that you instruct me to inform the French Govt that the remaining $129 million of the $240 million in aid will be allocated immediately without further discussion of conditions. This action wld be supplemented by the note suggested in Embtel 6248. I do not suggest that this approach wld of itself restore the situation but it might begin to recreate the environment of mutual confidence necessary for our discussions with the French of future military aid and problems of military coordination.

I shld like to get this particular affair settled as quickly as possible. The now expiring French Parliament is taking no decisive actions and will leave behind it a heritage of econ, financial and political questions of a most disturbing nature. As a result we will be beset by many other disagreeable problems in the future. They will undoubtedly include inordinate requests for Amer financial assistance.

My recommendation is not designed to allow France to impose on the Amer taxpayer. I am in agreement with the policy of being tough with our NATO partners in a way that will produce results. We shld give our assistance quickly and effectively to implement a definite agreement. As we discovered with the Marshall Plan the initial stages of the injection of foreign aid are the most important ones. This is especially true in the present instance where such an attitude shld in the long run prove to be the economical one for reasons set forth above.

Bruce

1. Repeated to London for Spofford and to Paris for Katz.
2. Reference is to a possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. For documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.
3. For documentation regarding the Franco-American military assistance agreement under reference, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1396 ff.
4. For documentation on the January 1951 visit to Washington of French Prime Minister Rene Pleven, see Documents 139 ff.
5. These telegrams were in response to telegram 4946 to Paris, March 21, which specified certain modifications in the current French military program before further American economic support would be provided. Telegrams 6246, 6247, and 6248 from Paris strenuously objected to both the substance and spirit of the proposed modifications and urged Washington to abandon its “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude toward the French. All of the above telegrams are in file 751.5–MAP/4–1651.