751.02/3–251: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1
Unnumbered. Following is Embassy’s analysis of present French Government crisis, circumstances which brought it about, difficulties in forming new Government, and possible elements in solution of crisis. It should be emphasized that, since crisis only in its second day, following is largely conjectural. No parties have yet given helpful indications as to their stand on key points. Tentative conclusions are that this crisis will not be solved within next few days, but will not be allowed delay Auriol’s trip to US,2 and that another “third force” Government rather than a “national union” coalition including Gaullists will succeed Pleven’s cabinet.
(1) Importance of Electoral Issue: Intransigence of parties on electoral law reform goes beyond mere selfish ambition to include maximum number of its members in next legislature. Local situations of individual deputies are admittedly influential. Nevertheless, basic to disagreement is desire of MRP do all possible insure that coalition in next legislature is, like present one, essentially one of the center; whereas Radicals are ready join either Centrist coalition or one based on Right, with or without Gaullists. Differences between two solutions in terms French Government policies over next five years is fundamental.
(2) Circumstances of Crisis: If crisis had to come on electoral law issue, Pleven chose good moment in that he did not put question of confidence on one system in preference to another and, therefore, did not take sides against any party of his coalition. Secondly, by avoiding being overthrown on vote of confidence, Pleven made it constitutionally impossible for continued differences within parties of majority to be resolved by new elections at this time. This of considerable importance since new elections under present law would both favor Communists and risk return of Assembly in which governing coalition most difficult to find since composition might well [Page 381] be roughly one third Communists, one third Gaullist, and remainder third force.
(3) Difference from Previous Crises: This is first crisis since Communists left government that has not had as its occasion conflict over economic policy between Right and Left wings of a coalition that inevitably includes parties with divergent orientations on how to divide the national income. Fall of Queuille Government in 1949 and of Bidault Government in 1950 both caused by demands of Socialists for more money for lower income groups. Successor in each case formed by compromise at expense of third party, i.e., tax payer. In present case, on other hand, Socialists have been party working hardest to avoid crisis (were only group to rise and applaud Pleven as he left Assembly February 28), and compromise on electoral law reform must be at expense one of interest parties.
(4) Multiplicity of Immediate Issues: Now that crisis opened, issues dividing majority can no longer be resolved one at a time. Together with electoral law there must be a simultaneous agreement on person of Prime Minister, composition of Government, and such outstanding issues as measures for combatting current and expected price rises, financing of budget deficit, etc. Although it is possible to logroll agreements between different aspects of economic policy, it appears difficult to bargain, for example, economic policy pleasing to MRP in return for MRP concessions on electoral law reform, since gains on economic policy during life this legislature cannot offset possible loss by MRP of its say as to economic policy during five years of next legislature. Basic lines of French foreign policy not at stake. Need for simultaneous solution multiplicity of personnel and policy questions will tend to lengthen crisis.
(5) Factors Making Quick Solution of Crisis Advisable: As usual French crisis comes at inopportune time. In field of foreign affairs it is awkward, to say the least, to have crisis simultaneous with last stage of Schuman Plan negotiations and with European Army Conference, on eve of Big Four talks preparatory to CFM, and of President Auriol’s trip to US. Domestic situation calls for prompt handling inflationary pressures that are already bringing serious labor discontent, and decision needed soon on how to provide funds for budgetary deficits. Budget itself remains unvoted.
Political interests of parties should also induce early solution. As inflation mounts, Socialists likely to lose voters to Communists, who remain loudest in demands for aid to all categories of poor while they have no responsibility for finding funds. The longer the crisis lasts the stronger will appear Gaullist argument that third force parties incapable of governing France. Gaullist condemnation of “regime of parties” will have particular appeal in connection [Page 382] crisis brought about by disagreement of parties as to electoral systems neither of which gives voter free choice among candidates. Gaullist threat may ultimately be decisive in bringing present coalition together again.
(6) Composition Next Government: That present coalition parties will get together again seems virtually inevitable. After repeated crises they have provided the only politically possible coalition that has necessary arithmetical strength in Assembly. Only substitute would be “Government of national union” against Communists called for by de Gaulle. This is admittedly tempting for some Rightists, some Radicals, and some MRP, but it would certainly be refused by Socialists. Auriol himself would obviously do best to avoid such an outcome. On specific issue of electoral law reform substitution of Gaullists for Socialists in coalition would not help toward solution.
(7) Possible Prime Ministers: Four names recur whenever press discusses possible successors for Pleven: Radical Rene Mayer, MRP Bidault, Socialist Ramadier, and Pleven himself. Last named (whose wife reported quite ill) has already informed Auriol he could not think of succeeding himself, but development of crisis might change his mind. He has advantage that as leader of UDSR he is not member of any of coalition’s big three parties. At outset of crisis, Socialist seems more likely candidate than either a Radical or MRP since latter have been two protagonists in electoral law struggle. Mayer’s chances would of course improve if he could swing a number of Radical votes from two to single ballot system. Fact Auriol asked Bidault on March 1 to consider taking responsibility can be attributed to fact MRP widely held be party chiefly responsible for crisis. He unlikely succeed, at least on first try.
(8) Possible Solution of Electoral Law Reform: So long as electoral law reform continues being fought out on issue of single ballot vs. two ballots for departmental lists, former appears likely winner. Because Pleven Government had Radical Ghcobbi in charge electoral law reform, he was bound resign if Government took stand in favor of single ballot, and his resignation would probably have entailed that of other Radicals. Now, although Radicals might attempt make two ballots price of their entry into new Government, recent votes have shown that within parties of majority itself there is almost a majority of full Assembly ready accept single ballot. Since Radicals themselves include some dissidents on this issue, it would be easier for them to accept single ballot compromise than for MRP, so far solid against two ballots, to accept latter.
There may be swing toward single member constituencies. If it is evident that Assembly is really determined bring about reform this would be least objectionable to Communists and, therefore, might [Page 383] possibly fail meet their opposition, which has so far successfully swung from side to side in order prevent any reform. Moreover this likely cause minimum difficulties with Council of Republic. Nevertheless very difficult to see how this system could be plank in platform of new Government since it generally thought be extremely disadvantageous to MRP.
Whole reform issue might, of course, be put off. Sentiment is growing inside Parliament, presumably as reflection similar sentiment outside, in favor of a popular referendum to determine basic lines of voting system. This would require constitutional change, and hence some delay. If parties unwilling work out prompt compromise there could hardly be better excuse for delay than agreement consult sovereign people.
(9) Date of Elections: By delaying enactment new electoral law, crisis has, of course, made it technically more difficult hold elections this spring—always supposing majority of deputies ready to end life of this Assembly before date specified in present law. Since Assembly passage of bill will probably not take place until after Easter recess at earliest, and since there will surely be need of second reading following revisions proposed by Council of Republic, it is unlikely to become law before latter half of April. Under these circumstances, even if Assembly agrees cut its life short, elections more likely in June than in May. Introduction of referendum would almost surely delay elections until autumn.