Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 154

Conference files, lot 59D95, CF 51

United States Minutes of the Third Meeting Between President Truman and Prime Minister Pleven, Cabinet Room of the White House, January 30, 1951, 3 p.m.–4:45 p.m.

Washington, January 30, 1951, 3 p.m. to 4:45 p.m.

top secret

US MIN-3

U.S.-French Washington Conversations

participants

United States	France
The President	Prime Minister Pleven
Secretary of State Acheson	General of the Armies Juin
Secretary of Defense Marshall	Ambassador Henri Bonnet
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder	Ambassador Alexandre Parodi
	Ambassador Herve Alphand
Director of Defense Mobilization Wilson	Director of the Ministry of Finance Guindey
Mr. W. Averell Harriman	M. Raoul de Vitry
Mr. William Foster	M. Jean Daridan
Ambassador Philin C. Jessup	M. Pierre Paul Schweitzer
Ambassador David K.E. Bruce	M. de Marranches
Mr. Willard Thorp
Mr. Thomas D. Cabot
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. James C.H. Bonbright

[Here follows a short table of contents which lists: Economic Problems: Inflation, Trade Policy, and Stockpiling; Military Assistance; Proposed 3-Power Consultative Body on Far East; German Participation in Defense of Europe; Proposed 4-Power Talks With Soviets; Minutes of Joint Economic Subcommittee (Annex A); and Communiqué (Annex B).]

President Truman opened the meeting by saying that if the Prime Minister was agreeable they would discuss economic questions and then turn to unfinished business, including the question of a communiqué. The Prime Minister having indicated his approval, the President called on Assistant Secretary of State Thorp.

Assistant Secretary Thorp reported briefly on the work of the Joint Economic Subcommittee. He said agreed minutes of these discussions would be attached to the record of the conversations (Annex A). Mr. Thorp said the subcommittee had discussed the question of United States financial assistance, including the $200 million program, the use of counterpart funds, the question of rising prices and the allocation of raw materials.

Prime Minister Pleven impressed upon the President the importance to France and other European countries of the fight against inflation. He said it was absolutely necessary to get across to the Europeans that inflation is greater in Europe than in the United States because of the terrific productive capacity of the American economy. He said that Finance Minister Petsche was very worried about this problem. In France it is easier to get people to pay higher taxes than it is to get them to accept a rise in the cost of living. Fears of inflation are based largely on the huge increase in the price of raw materials and the rapid rise in land freight and shipping rates. He said the present situation is creating a feeling of insecurity which is a serious problem for every European government. He admitted that this economic insecurity is the weakest point in the French situation. He begged that the President do everything possible to help halt the rise of international prices. The French would support any measure proposed to achieve this objective, and he felt that the Allies must aim at some way of controlling internationally the prices of raw materials which are in short supply. All government programs are affected by this question. Pointing out that France was not a producer of raw materials, the Prime Minister said that they were the tail of the kite on this problem. As an example, he cited the huge increase in the cost in France of newsprint. This led to a 50 per cent rise in the sale price of newspapers. To the average Frenchman the increase in the cost of his daily newspaper was symbolic of the rise in items affecting his cost of living. He said that we must find a way to control effectively the prices of essential materials.

President Truman said that we are making a major effort in the United States to control prices. We are raising taxes to meet the huge new military costs. We had discussed the cost of defense and its effect upon each domestic economy with Prime Minister Attlee in the same way that we are discussing it now. He stated that if inflation comes, the Russians will have won their point.

The President said that in the past several months we have reviewed and revised our defense plans. He recalled that in December and again this month he had asked Congress for much greater sums for defense. When Mr. Attlee was here last month, he and the British Prime Minister had announced their agreement on steps to increase our defenses as rapidly as possible. He called attention to the fact that the British had introduced their new defense program into Parliament yesterday.

The President said that in regard to current French trade policy, France had apparently taken our place as the advocate of protectionism. High tariffs hadn’t worked for us, and he predicted that they would not work for the French. The President said that we must make every effort to increase production. He had appointed Mr. Charles Wilson, who was present this afternoon, to head up these efforts.

Secretary Snyder reassured the Prime Minister that we are taking a very serious view of the inflation problem. He cited the aggressive fiscal steps which we took at once to fight inflation. He recalled that the administration had been successful in taking a tax reduction bill which had been introduced in Congress, turning it around, and having it resubmitted as a bill which would greatly increase government revenue. He noted also the steps which we have taken to encourage savings, including a program to expand the sale of savings bonds which he thought would be received favorably by Congress. He referred to the controls which we have already put on scarce items and asked the Prime Minister to assure Mr. Petsche that we are attacking inflation in every way we know how.

Prime Minister Pleven said he would do so. He said he had appointed as French representative to the three-power raw materials group Mr. de Vitry, who is head of one of the largest business organizations in France. This was proof of the seriousness of French interest in the problem of raw materials.

The Prime Minister said he would like some information about our stockpiling policy which he indicated was creating pressures on prices. He asked that our policy be changed to ease these pressures, and indicated that the French were prepared to ration raw materials in order to conserve existing supplies and avoid unessential use of them.

The Prime Minister said he accepted the President’s criticism of French tariff policy.

President Truman said his comments were not meant as criticism.

Prime Minister Pleven said that the French would alter their policy and go forward with tariff reductions now being discussed at the Torquay meeting.¹ He explained their past actions on the grounds that a French Government agency was out of line with the thinking of the Cabinet and promised that this would be rectified at once.

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation of our action in unfreezing the counterpart funds which Mr. Thorp had mentioned.

The Prime Minister said that he had available and would give to the President full information on changes in the October 5 rearmament program. He did not go into details but said that when a scheme of armament is undertaken on a mutual help basis, it is impossible to foresee all the difficulties. The efficacy of our military assistance would be greater if the United States law, under the terms of which the aid is made available, was altered to make it more flexible. He pointed out that under this law the French could not be given assistance in the building of air bases, with the result that there was a delay, since France had to find the required funds somewhere in its budget. He cited other instances where the restrictions of the law delayed or prevented actions which would be mutually beneficial.

President Truman said we can examine this problem to see what can be done. He noted that already there was some criticism in Congress and some agitation to put an end to all military assistance. He predicted that such assistance would not end but indicated that the providing of assistance will have to be done in a way acceptable to Congress.

Prime Minister Pleven said that the way United States aid for military assistance is now being handled results in the least aid being given to those states which are doing the most on the manpower problem. United States aid went in larger amounts to those countries concentrating on building up military production of end products and discriminated against those states which were spending large amounts on increasing the number of men under arms.

Secretary Acheson said we were now engaged in drafting new legislation and promised to examine the questions which the Prime Minister had raised and review the situation with the appropriate French officials.

Mr. Foster said that ECA was attempting to put more flexibility into the new legislation.

President Truman said that our Deputies in London have instructions to look into all of these problems. He promised that we would see that something was done. We must put our shoulders to the wheel and go ahead as fast as we can rather than delay until everything was worked out to our full satisfaction.

Secretary Marshall pointed out that the Administration always asked Congress for more flexibility than it ever got.

Secretary Marshall said that General Bradley had told General Juin that we are studying the problem of emergency evacuation of French forces in Indochina and that we will do whatever we can in the event this action becomes necessary. His Department had looked again at the question of providing another aircraft carrier to the French but that he had nothing new to add to what he had said yesterday. He repeated that the two difficulties were that (1) the only carrier available would have to be one taken out of moth balls which was a long process and (2) Congress would have to approve any transfer.

President Truman said that one of the difficulties of presenting this question to Congress was the necessity of proceeding with care so as not to give the critics of the Administration a chance to say that we were doing something for others which we were not doing for ourselves.

Secretary Marshall said that he had asked the Air Force to look again for any transport planes which might be turned over to the French for use in Indochina. He admitted he was very doubtful that they would find any but he would let the French know if they did. He indicated that we might be willing, if the French so requested, to ease some of the restrictions on the use of the USS Langley.

Secretary Acheson reported that the French and United States staffs had held a very useful discussion this morning about military assistance for General de Lattre’s operations in Indochina. He said that there is agreement on the urgency of the need and the character of the assistance required. He expressed the hope that within the next day or two we would have specific answers for the French delegation as to just what we will be able to furnish and an approximation of when we can furnish it. He explained the delay by saying that it was necessary for us to examine the actual availability of the items which are required immediately.

Secretary Acheson also reported that the two staffs had discussed the suggestion made by the Prime Minister yesterday concerning budgetary assistance for the National Army in Indochina. Because little detail was available concerning the proposal, the Secretary said the discussion was largely on the principle of the proposal. On the basis of the information which the French officials gave us, we would find it very difficult to hold out any hope of assistance along this line. He stated that last October when Secretary Snyder and Finance Minister Petsche discussed the question of French budgetary deficit, they agreed that the United States would limit its dollar assistance to payment for end items or matériel. The Secretary said that we continue to believe that we cannot become directly involved in local budgetary deficits of other countries. Our military assistance can be given in terms of supply and equipment not otherwise available to the country receiving the aid.

Secretary Marshall asked General Juin to do anything he could to facilitate the negotiation of the agreement covering the Moroccan air base. He pointed out that our fastest build-up can be done by air and that it was very important for us to be all set to do this.

General Juin said that the French were ready to go to work on the landing field.

President Truman, replying to the Prime Minister’s request for a three-power consultative body to advise on Asian strategy, said we had been rather reluctant to accept such proposals. He added that we did not see how we could work with two of our allies and leave the others out. This might hurt us more than help us. The United States was not ready to agree to this proposal which he thought would require further conversation with the Prime Minister and with Mr. Attlee.

The President said, however, that we want to give the French all the consultation they want because we know they are on the Rhine. He said that the United States was neither headstrong nor arbitrary in its actions and that we were conscious of the welfare of all of our allies.

Secretary Acheson, at the suggestion of the President, added that he believed the way to proceed was to tie together the large number of bits of machinery now used for consultation. He pointed out that we were agreeable to tripartite military consultation on Indochinese matters He said that the NATO Standing Group worked in this field and that it soon would be made more effective. He pointed out that three times a week Assistant Secretary Rusk meets with French representatives to keep the French and our other allies up to date on events in Korea and to inform them of our current thinking on the Far Eastern problems. The three Foreign Ministers meet periodically to discuss mutual problems. If the President approves, Ambassador Bruce could be instructed to meet regularly with the British Ambassador in Paris and a representative of the French Foreign Office to discuss questions of common interest. The Secretary said that in our opinion we can accomplish what we want by the means which he had just described. To set up a separate organization would in his opinion cause us many complications. He cited the Prime Minister’s reference to a US-UK meeting in Malta which neither the President, Secretary Marshall nor he knew anything about and which apparently had not taken place. He also cited the serious difficulties which arose in NATO during the Brussels meeting over the question of the Three Powers’ action on the raw materials question.

Prime Minister Pleven expressed his appreciation for the quick action which the United States had taken on all the questions he had raised.

The Prime Minister suggested that possibly some financial help for the Vietnamese Army could be obtained by extending the list of materials which we are sending to Indochina. He illustrated this point by saying that there is an item in the French budget for gasoline for Indochina. If the United States would pay for this gasoline, French funds allocated for this purpose could be used to maintain the Vietnamese troops. In explanation, he said that the French legislature balked at paying for the upkeep of native troops when they had already authorized large funds to pay the cost of maintaining French armies in Indochina.

The Prime Minister said he would accept our views on consultation. He added, however, that it had not been his idea to have any tripartite consultations known to the public. The French feel that the Allies have a tendency to make piecemeal decisions on the Asian questions, and he had proposed the new organization in the hope that it would meet a need for coordinating policy in Asia. This was our objective, made necessary by the fact that we were facing an adversary whose policy was highly centralized and coordinated.

Secretary Acheson said again that he thought we could work this out by using Ambassador Bruce and suggested that possibly Assistant Secretary Rusk might go over to Paris for discussions. He repeated his conviction that the French desire for fuller consultation could be met.

Secretary Acheson then asked permission to clarify a point which arose this morning during the discussion on Germany. He said that he had understood the Prime Minister to say that the fact that a four-power meeting is pending or actually in progress must not cause any interruption in carrying out our defense effort under the Brussels Agreement, including the execution of the plans for German participation. He said that on the basis of this statement he assumed that all of us are agreed that we will go forward as fast as we can with the military and political talks with the Germans and that we would not hold up reaching final agreement with the Germans in these fields.

Ambassador Parodi, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister, replied that the French did not suggest there be any delay, even on the question of German rearmament. He added, however, that the French believed it would not be wise to push German rearmament to the point where the entire question was settled by the time the four-power meeting took place. The French did not want a four-power meeting to be made useless by prior settlement of all questions concerning German rearmament. This whole matter was one of proper timing.

Prime Minister Pleven said that there was no disagreement between us on this point. From the moral point of view it was highly important for us never to appear to be refusing to talk to the Soviets. We should always be in a position to say honestly that if there was no agreement with the Russians it was because Soviet proposals were unsound. He stated that if we by prior action settle everything which the Russians want to talk about, they can say that in effect we have already resolved the questions which we say we want to discuss with them. He fully agreed that we must not allow the Soviets to get us into a position where we cannot go forward with our German policies. (The President interposed that this was exactly our tactic.) On the other hand, we must not get into a position which the Soviets can use to their advantage in attacking us on the grounds that we have made any talks with them useless by things which we have done prior to the opening of the talks.

Secretary Acheson recalled the situation in 1949 when the three powers were asked by the Russians to delay the creation of the Bonn Government while the four-power meeting was in progress. The western powers refused to do this at that time and the Secretary said he thought we should follow the same line now. He referred to the Paris Conference on the creation of the European Army, which the Germans would attend, and the discussion with the Germans by our High Commissioners,² and urged that we reach agreement with the West German Government if we can as quickly as we can. He recommended that we move along on an even course, no faster or no slower because of the possibility or actuality of four-power talks, and he cautioned against bringing everything to a halt pending the outcome of any talks with the Russians.

Ambassador Parodi said that if by any chance the four-power meeting was a success, the western powers would want to look again at the problem of rearming Germany.

Secretary Acheson replied that inevitably this would be true. He said that he could not see any possibility of the Russians making a concession on Germany at this time which would be acceptable to us. If the Russians had a change of heart and altered their entire present policy, including a major reduction in their armed forces, obviously all of us would reconsider many of our policies, not only our German policy but also our arms program.

General Marshall asked whether you could believe the Soviets and rely on their agreements even if they accepted agreements. He said that in his experience on this question he favored making no change in our policies until a year or two after the Soviets had accepted agreements, during which time we could see if we could believe that they had honestly changed their intentions. He argued that the Soviets must prove their good faith by deeds and that we would be foolish to alter our programs until we were convinced by their actions that we were safe in believing them.

Prime Minister Pleven said that he was more concerned about public opinion in France and Europe and much less about the possibility of the Russians making real concessions.

President Truman said we cannot allow the Russians to get us into the position of holding up or delaying our military build-up. The Soviets respect only force and we must go forward fast to get the force that they will respect.

Secretary Acheson concluded by saying that we must not give the impression to anyone that the plans of the West may be upset by what comes out of a four-power conference.

President Truman said that unless there was further discussion he would suggest that they take a look at the draft communiqué.

When it appeared that both delegations desired to make considerable changes in the communiqué, the discussions were adjourned. The final communiqué (Annex B) was accepted later in the evening by the Prime Minister and the President.

[Annex A]

Agreed Minute of Discussions on Economic Questions by the U.S.-French Economic Working Group, Washington, January 29–30, 1951

confidential

Department of State	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
Mr. Thorp
Mr. Bell	Mr. Guindey
Mr. Beigel	Mr. de Vitry
Treasury Department	French Embassy
Mr. Martin	Mr. Richard
Mr. Willis	Mr. Schweitzer
Department of Defense	Mr. de Margerie
Colonel van Syckle	Mr. Siraud
Mr. Whitehouse	Mr. Demont
ECA	Mr. de Boisgelin
Mr. Porter	Mr. Dangelzer
Mr. Lippincott
White House
Mr. Gordon
ODM
Mr. Mitchell

Preliminary to the consideration of economic questions by President Truman and Mr. Pleven, the Economic Working Group of the two delegations discussed the following agenda items:

1. Questions raised by US military and financial assistance to France.

2. Development of Atlantic cooperation to deal more effectively with rising prices and inflation.

3. Raw materials problems.

1. US Assistance to France in Relation to the French Defense Effort

Economic assistance during the first half of 1951. The French side recalled that Parliament had recently voted the 1951 military budget and that the French Government is providing information on its defence program to the American Embassy in Paris. In the French view this program is substantially consistent with the program presented on October 5, 1950, and may be considered to be a firm and unconditional commitment. The French side indicated that it has submitted proposals for the provision of $200 million of US assistance contemplated for the first half of 1951. The French side emphasized its interest in actually receiving this amount of assistance during the first half of 1951.

With regard to assistance during the first half of 1951, the US side raised two points. First, that the US must be assured that the definitive French defense program is substantially consistent with the program presented on October 5, both with regard to Metropolitan France and with regard to the Overseas Territories, especially Indochina. The French must also demonstrate that the $200 million are required for payments referred to in paragraph 13E of the aide-mémoire of December 18, 1950.

In this respect, the US side drew attention to the recent increase in French gold and dollar reserves. The US side emphasized that the result of US assistance should not take the form of increases in monetary reserves and that the US could not adopt a policy of financing internal French budgetary outlays associated with the rearmament effort. This view would apply to expenditures in francs or piastres in Indochina, as well as to other French budgetary outlays.

The French side replied that detailed documentation on the first point had been provided to the American Embassy in Paris. With respect to the second point, the French side stated that the recent increase in French reserves is partly artificial, and that France will be forced by circumstances to spend more dollars for imports than had earlier been anticipated. The French Government will provide full details about its import program to the United States Government in either Paris or Washington.

The US side gave assurance that if the above two points are settled satisfactorily, no administrative difficulty should arise in connection with the provision of $200 million during the first half of 1951.

The US side pointed out that the US Government has revised its own programs sharply upward since last October, looking toward a more rapid rate of rearmament. The US assumes that other countries will be taking similar action when appropriate and attaches great importance to such action.

Economic assistance to France in the future. In October 1950 the French Government pointed out that the effect of linking US economic assistance with military production in recipient countries would interfere with the accomplishment of our common objectives. In the French view such a linking would not permit the equitable distribution of US assistance to those countries whose defense expenditures are devoted in large part to the maintenance of forces and infrastructure. The French Government believes that its view has been confirmed by further studies of its future military program. Although the problem may not exist in relation to assistance during the first half of 1951, it is feared that it will become acute later on. The French side said that in its view a broader interpretation or an amendment of the present law may be required in order to deal with this problem.

The US side indicated that the US is presently thinking about the foreign assistance program for 1951/52. Whatever form this program takes, it is the US position that aid would be provided to meet real dollar requirements and not for the purpose of providing local currency resources to cover a budget deficit. The US does not consider the administrative techniques for the provision of assistance to be a serious problem, provided the French military effort is proceeding as agreed and provided there is a demonstrated need for dollar imports. The French need not worry about US technical problems if these two fundamental conditions are satisfied.

The French side indicated that the French Government is presently considering its defense budget for the period after December 31, 1951. In this connection, the French would find it extremely helpful to know, in a preliminary and unofficial way, something of US thinking on foreign assistance in the future and on the amount of such assistance that may be requested from the Congress. The French side also stressed the fact that its Government is greatly interested in the continuance of economic assistance, the counterpart of which will still be necessary to finance the investment program in 1952.

The US side indicated that it will probably seek legislation involving the “marriage” of the ERP and the MDAP, at least in so far as they involve the members of the NATO. At the same time, it will seek to obtain greater freedom of action for the distribution of funds between the supply of end-items and economic assistance. The US is not yet in a position to determine the amounts which will be requested from the Congress for foreign assistance. However, it hopes to assemble before March 1 sufficient documentation to justify the estimates which will be submitted to the Congress. The French side agreed to provide as much documentation on the proposed French 1952 budget as may be available during February. The US side indicated that the estimates for foreign assistance as a whole, both economic and military, will in any case be higher than the appropriations for the current fiscal year.

Use of ERP counterpart. The US side indicated that the US had agreed in principle to the release for investment and reconstruction expenditures and, if consistent with US legislation in force at the time of release, for military expenditures of French counterpart funds generated in calendar 1951 from ERP aid provided prior to the end of US fiscal 1950/51. It was pointed out that this agreement involves no US commitment as to the amount of economic aid which will in fact be provided to France during 1950/51 or calendar 1951 (which amount has not been finally determined). It was also pointed out that the possibility of new legislation in US fiscal 1951/52, or of new US policies with regard to US foreign economic assistance make it impossible to discuss at this time counterpart policies for that period. It was made clear that the specific release of counterpart funds will be the subject of further discussions with the French Government in Paris.

2. Development of Atlantic Cooperation To Deal More Effectively With Rising Prices and Inflation

The French side emphasized that its Government is strongly attached to the principles of equitable distribution of defense burdens and international cooperation to combat inflation. The French side welcomed the measures taken by the US to curb inflation and deal with rising prices. The French side indicated that the price controls which have already been established in France affect about half of all French transactions. Moreover, the French Government is ready when necessary to strengthen and extend the scope of French price controls.

Without putting forward any particular proposal, the French side wondered whether or not it may be useful to establish a limited international group in order to permit consultations intended to coordinate the policies followed by each of the NATO countries to deal with inflation.

The US side recognized that the objective of dealing with the problem of price increases and inflation, in so far as international action contributes to this objective, deserves further consideration. The US side pointed out that no specific procedures or approaches have been developed and that further study would be required before any specific measures would be undertaken.

The US side indicated that there appeared to be certain anomalies in the policy followed by the French Government to deal with inflation. For example, the protectionist position taken by the French delegation at Torquay appeared to the US to mitigate against an increase in French imports as a means of combatting inflation.

The French side observed that with respect to the reduction of quota restrictions, the French Government had scrupulously fulfilled its obligations as defined by the OEEC, and that it had been one of the original sponsors of trade liberalization. With regard to tariffs, the French side maintained that the misgivings about the French position are on the verge of being removed. The French side observed that its Government in numerous instances had suspended tariffs entirely in order to curb price increases (although many of these suspensions have recently been restored). In the future the French Government intends to resort to such measures whenever necessary.

The US side agreed that consideration might be given to the possibility of temporary tariff suspensions, such as were made during the last war.

The French side stated that its Government is also greatly interested in international monetary cooperation in connection with the stabilization of exchange rates and currencies of the NATO countries.

The Working Group agreed upon the following suggested paragraph for the final communiqué:

“We have recognized the importance of dealing with the problem of inflation and rising prices, which adversely affect the common defense effort. We agreed that not only should vigorous national action be taken but that whenever international measures may effectively contribute to this objective we would give our full support.”

3. Raw Materials Problems

The French side stressed the importance its Government attaches to raw materials problems. The French Government has just designated Mr. Raoul de Vitry as its representative to the central commodity group, and hopes that the nomination of the US representative will be made as soon as possible. The French side emphasized two essential problems relating to raw materials: restrictions on the unnecessary accumulation of stocks and controls on raw materials in short supply.

Measures have already been adopted by the French Government to prevent the excessive accumulation of inventories. The French Government has also decided to control the use of scarce raw materials. Business and trade associations in France have already imposed upon themselves certain voluntary controls, which they are ready to strengthen.

The US side indicated that its representative to the central community group will be nominated in the very near future, that specific measures have been taken with regard to raw materials, and that general price controls have been introduced in the US. The US side pointed out that international commodity groups were to proceed by recommending allocations of raw materials for the purposes of (1) reducing the volume of goods going to Iron Curtain countries, (2) stimulating production of essential goods, (3) curtailing non-essential uses of certain commodities, (4) avoiding unnecessary accumulation of stocks, and (5) avoiding competitive purchasing. The US side emphasized that in its view the groups should proceed through recommendations to national governments.

The French side emphasized that its Government believes that the contemplated commodity groups should deal with all raw materials in short supply. In this connection, the French side raised the question of wood pulp and newsprint. The French side also drew attention to the problem of rising ocean freight rates.

The Working Group agreed upon the following suggested paragraph for the final communiqué:

“We agreed that the solution of raw materials problems ought to be the aim, not only of national action, but also of international action undertaken with the utmost speed and vigor. The objectives of such action are to give the necessary priority to defense requirements and to meet essential civilian needs through the stimulation of production, the equitable distribution of available supplies, the avoidance of waste in non-essential uses and of unnecessary accumulation of stocks. The two governments, together with that of the United Kingdom, are presently proposing the formation of International Commodity Groups which will take up immediate problems of material shortages of common concern to the countries of the free world.”

[Annex B]

Communiqué Issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of France, January 30, 1951

Since Prime Minister Pleven arrived in Washington on January 29 three meetings between the President and the Prime Minister have been held. Those who participated as advisers were:

United States

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State

John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury

General George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense

Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization

William Foster, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration

General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large

David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to France

Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Thomas D. Cabot, Director Designate of International Security Affairs, Department of State

Donald R. Heath, U.S. Minister to the Associated States of IndoChina

Charles E.Bohlen, U.S. Minister to France

James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Henry A. Byroade, Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State

France

Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States

General of the Armies Alphonse Pierre Juin, French Resident General in Morocco

Ambassador Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Deputy to the North Atlantic Council

Guillaume Guindey, Director of the Ministry of Finance

Raoul de Vitry, French Representative to the Central Committee on Raw Materials

Tezenas de Montcel, Inspector General representing the Ministry of the Associated States

Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy

Pierre Paul Schweitzer, Financial Counselor, French Embassy

Gontran de Juniac, Counselor, French Embassy

Colonel Allard, Chief of Staff to General de Lattre de Tassigny

M. de Marranches, Aide to General Juin

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on the broad subject of international affairs and they touched upon all the questions that are of common interest to France and the United States. Once again they found that there exists a fundamental identity of views between the two countries.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that the principle of collective security, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, is the chief bulwark of world peace and of the independence and survival of free societies in the world. They agreed that, in conformity with this principle, aggression must not be rewarded or the menace of aggression appeased. It is in this spirit that the President and the Prime Minister examined the means to assure coordinated action and turned to the more detailed questions as set forth below.

I. Far Eastern Problems.

The President and the Prime Minister found themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence.

The situation in Korea was discussed and they concurred that every effort must be exerted to bring about an honorable solution there. Until that end can be accomplished, resistance by United Nations forces to aggression must continue. Both France and the United States will support action directed toward deterring aggression and toward preventing the spread of hostilities beyond Korea.

With regard to Indo-China, the Prime Minister described the heavy responsibilities borne by France in that area and the great cost, both in lives and money, she has paid in resisting the communist onslaught in order to maintain the security and independence of the Associated States, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. The Prime Minister declared that France was determined to do its utmost to continue this effort. The President informed the Prime Minister that United States aid for the French Union forces and for the National Armies of the Associated States will continue, and that the increased quantities of material to be delivered under the program authorized for the current fiscal year will be expedited.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that continuous contact should be maintained between the interested nations on these problems.

II. Problems of Europe.

The President and the Prime Minister both recognized the vital importance of Europe to the defense of the entire free world. The Prime Minister described the French efforts to achieve European unity. He stressed in this regard the French desire to see disappear the divisions and rivalries that oppose a harmonious development of the European economy and the establishment of a strongly organized Europe. The Prime Minister stated that the policy of the French Government was to favor the creation of a broad European market open to competition by all through the abolition of cartels and discriminatory practices.

The President and the Prime Minister were in fundamental agreement that the cause of peace in Europe and the world would be furthered by a progressively closer integration in every aspect of a democratic Germany into a vigorous Western European community.

The Prime Minister brought the President up-to-date on the recent developments relating to the Schuman Plan Treaty. He expressed appreciation for the interest and the comprehension which this Plan found in the United States. The President hoped that the Treaty would be concluded in satisfactory form at the earliest possible moment. The Prime Minister also mentioned that new steps are anticipated in the same direction, particularly in the field of agriculture.

The Prime Minister also referred to the conference to be convened in Paris on February 6th, to consider the formation of a European Army based on European political institutions and within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The President welcomed the conference and expressed his hope for its success. He informed the Prime Minister that the United States would be glad to accept the invitation to send an observer, and that Ambassador David Bruce would be designated.

III. Atlantic Defense Plans.

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views with regard to the progress made by both countries in their defense programs. The President described to the Prime Minister the great efforts now being made by the United States. Mr. Pleven outlined the steps taken by France in this field and added that the French Government would neglect no opportunity to intensify its rearmament and particularly to accelerate as much as possible the execution of existing programs.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their conviction that German participation in the common defense effort as envisaged last month at Brussels would strengthen the security of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

IV. Economic Problems.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed certain questions concerning United States assistance to France in the economic field. They clarified procedures so that United States assistance will make its most effective contribution to the French defense effort.

They agreed that the solution of the raw materials problems ought to be the aim, not only of national action, but also of international action undertaken with the utmost speed and vigor. The objectives of such action are to give the necessary priority to defense requirements and to meet essential civilian needs through the stimulation of production, the equitable distribution of available supplies, the avoidance of waste in non-essential uses and of unnecessary accumulation of stocks. The two governments, together with that of the United Kingdom, are presently proposing the formation of International Commodity Groups which will take up immediate problems of material shortages of common concern to the countries of the free world.

They recognized the importance of dealing with the problem of inflation and rising prices, which adversely affect the common defense effort. They agreed that not only should vigorous national action be taken but that wherever international measures may effectively contribute to this objective they would give their full support.

The President and the Prime Minister wish to state that the supreme objective of the foreign policies of the United States and France is the establishment and maintenance of durable peace based on law and justice.

The measures which they have discussed and undertaken in common with other free nations for the development of adequate defense under the North Atlantic Treaty and for the development of European unity are directed solely to that end.

Moreover, the two governments have never neglected in the past and will never neglect in the future any genuine opportunity to settle international problems by negotiation.

The discussions between the President and the Prime Minister have shown again that no menace or maneuver will succeed in shaking the fundamental unity which exists between the United States and France.

1. The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held a Special Session at Torquay, March 29–April 3, to discuss the question of European tariff disparities.
2. For documentation concerning the Bonn meetings between representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Allied High Commissioners, see vol. iii, Part 2, pp. 1446 ff.