Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 147

611.51/1–2551

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Secretary of State

secret

[ Washington ,] January 25, 1951.

Subject: Appearance before Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees on January 26th¹

The purpose of this appearance before the two committees is primarily to inform them concerning the President’s talks with Mr. Pleven. There was some Congressional criticism at the time of the Attlee Talks that the Congress had not been consulted. This will be your first meeting with the committees as reconstituted and there may be an effort to have you discuss a large variety of problems. However, the meetings are being set up to last only an hour, and it is recommended that you make it clear that this particular visit to the committees is confined to an explanation of the Pleven Talks.

It appears that there is a good deal of misunderstanding about all types of international discussions and negotiations. It would therefore be useful if you would try to give the committees an understanding of the nature of these talks and their relation to a possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.² You might point out that this meeting is not arranged for the purpose of concluding formal agreements between the Governments of France and the United States. It has been found useful over a period of time to have personal exchanges of views between the heads of governments in order to establish firm bases of understanding so as to assure common approaches to problems in which our interests are fundamentally identical. The talks with Mr. Attlee served this purpose, and it is expected that the talks with Mr. Pleven will be similarly profitable. You might point out that, if the Soviet Government accepts the position taken in our last note regarding a possible meeting of the CFM, it will be of primary importance that the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France present a united front since one of the obvious Soviet objectives is to split us. It is expected therefore that the President and Mr. Pleven will exchange views on the attitude which the three Western Governments should take in any such meeting. You might go on to say that this does not involve the adoption of any new policies on our part but merely the reaffirmation of the principles which have been worked out with the NATO countries for the strengthening of defense in the West. Particularly, this involves the question of German participation in that defense. The official position of the French Government is the same as ours but we realize that there are pressures exerted on the French Government to adopt some modifications in existing principles on the theory that this might affect Soviet actions to our advantage. We hope that the talks between the President and Mr. Pleven will reaffirm the unity of the Franco-American position.

In view of the fact that what you say to the committees is likely to get into the press, it is recommended that you avoid comments which might be reported as indicating that we feel that the French are “soft.” Therefore, while referring to the pressures exerted by some angles of French opinion, it might be useful to point out to the committees the strong and successful action taken by the French Government in preventing the communist demonstration against General Eisenhower. You could also mention that in their note of January 5th to the Soviet Union objecting to the Soviet protest about the North Atlantic Treaty, the French took a very strong and positive line.³

You could further indicate that we believe that Mr. Pleven will want to talk about the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan. You could indicate to them on these points the attitude we have taken regarding both of these plans. You might want to mention particularly the line developed in your letter to Mr. Schuman in which you indicate our support for the general principle of further European integration and our sympathetic attitude toward the French attempts to develop this.⁴ You could point out that at the same time we have steadily pressed the position that the plan for a European army must not interfere with the development of the NATO program. As a matter of information, you could indicate to them the present status of the Schuman Plan negotiations as summarized in the attached briefing paper prepared for the Truman–Pleven Talks (Tab A⁵). You could then say that we suppose that Mr. Pleven will raise with the President their interest in the raw material problem. It would be possible to recall the discussion of this in the Truman–Attlee Talks and to refer to the present status of the matter as summarized in the attached paper (Tab B⁵).

You might indicate that, while the program of American financial aid to France may come up in the Talks, it is not contemplated that the French will request additional assistance although there may be some technical questions in regard to the program which they may want to raise. We do not intend to take on any new types of governmental commitments in this connection.

You might then point out that Mr. Pleven has indicated that he wants to discuss the situation in Indochina and in this connection will undoubtedly want to discuss it in terms of the whole problem of Chinese communist aggression.⁶ You could point out that we have a large program of MDAP assistance to France and the Associated States in Indochina but that we will continue to make it clear that we do not intend to commit American armed forces to Indochina. The pertinent facts in regard to our aid program in Indochina are contained in the document in Tab C.

In regard to Korea you might indicate that the President will probably want to point out to Mr. Pleven as he did to Mr. Attlee our determination to maintain our stand in Korea. You might tell them that General Collins reported very favorably on the operations of the French forces in the Unified Command in Korea and draw attention to the fact that even this token French force there is notable in view of their very large commitment of forces in Indochina. You could also point out that the French have been supporting us in the UN on the question of the branding of the Chinese communists as aggressors.

Philip C. Jessup

1. For text of Secretary Acheson’s statement on the talks with Pleven, see United States Senate, Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee, (Historical Series), vol. III, Part 1, Washington, 1976, pp. 11–16.
2. Reference is to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris (Conference Palais Marble Rose).
3. For summary of the French note of January 5, 1951, replying to a Soviet note of December 15, 1950, addressed to both London and Paris, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chronology of International Events and Documents, vol. VII, pp. 56–57.
4. For text of the letter of January 27 under reference here, see vol. iii, Part 1, p. 759.
5. Not printed, but see the editorial note, infra.
5. Not printed, but see the editorial note, infra.
6. The source text has a handwritten notation at this point which reads “Tab C.” Tab C, one of the preparatory talks on Indochina, is not printed, but see the editorial note, infra.