751.13/1–2451
Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup to the Secretary of Defense ( Marshall)1
My Dear General Marshall: Ever since Prime Minister Attlee visited Washington in December2 Prime Minister Pleven has wanted to meet with the President and other prominent American officials. The principal reason for this desire is prestige—both personal and national—to show to the French people that he, Pleven, is a leader capable of forcibly representing his nation and to show to the world that France has again assumed her pre-war position among the great powers. Criticism from de Gaullist quarters of Pleven’s failure to join the President and Mr. Attlee in Washington served to increase this desire.
In addition to the foregoing Mr. Pleven is genuinely concerned over Far Eastern questions. As you know, ever since 1946 France has been involved in costly military operations in Indochina. Just when the political problems in that area seemed to have been settled and there was some hope for the end of military operations, French Union forces found themselves faced with the serious possibility of overt Chinese participation. Under present circumstances such aggression would undoubtedly force the French to evacuate the area and Mr. Pleven accordingly desires to examine with the President, you and Secretary Acheson the Far Eastern problems and to discuss possible developments in that area.
A third and nearly as important a reason for his visit at this time is the fear of war in Europe that is shared by most Western European peoples. In this connection we have reason to believe that Mr. Pleven desires to obtain at first hand and from our highest authorities an indication of our intentions in Western Europe and our estimate of the present situation. He further hopes that he can persuade the President and prominent American statesmen that France is willing and able to discharge her responsibilities in Western European defense, thus counteracting the impression that France is an impotent ally.
[Page 300]The Department of State recommended to the President that he extend an invitation to Mr. Pleven to visit Washington for the following reasons:
First and most important, it was our desire to assist the French Prime Minister in his efforts to combat the psychological depression that exists in France by strengthening the French morale and the will to resist aggression. It was believed that the psychological effect of General Eisenhower’s visit might be vitiated were we to indicate that it was not opportune for Prime Minister Pleven to visit Washington.
The second reason for inviting Prime Minister Pleven to Washington was that it would afford an opportunity for a profitable exchange of views between French and American leaders during which we could again impress on Mr. Pleven the need for greater French contribution to the mutual defense effort.
In view of the foregoing the Department of State is recommending that in general the American tactics in the forthcoming talks be one of listening to the French position, commenting thereon as fully as possible, and, in the case of specific proposals to which an affirmative or definite answer cannot be given, putting forward in the greatest possible detail the reasons for our position.
The foregoing should not, however, preclude the Departments of State and Defense raising with the French Prime Minister any subjects on which they believe profitable discussions might be had. In general, however, it is believed that detailed or technical subjects which can be discussed elsewhere should not be raised by the President.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by Godley and cleared with Bonbright. A penciled notation on the file copy reads: “Delivered to Col. Hartshorn for Secretary of Defense. GMG 1/25/51.”↩
- Reference is to the visit to Washington of British Prime Minister Clement Attlee December 4–8, 1950. For the minutes of the Truman–Attlee meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1698 ff.↩