665.68/11–1551: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
2167. Although for some time up to perhaps a year ago high officials of the Ital Govt indicated to me that one of the reasons for not pressing forward on a settlement of the Trieste question was the advantage of having US and Brit troops in Trieste, no official of the govt has recently mentioned to me anything about the matter of our troops remaining in Trieste in the event of a settlement (Deptel 2178, Nov 13).2 In a purely informal conversation one of the junior officials of the FonOff mentioned that any disadvantage of settlement might be overcome through retention of some troops under another Leghorn arrangement.3
Any settlement acceptable Yugos will at best be difficult for Ital Govt to have accepted by public opinion here and they will need all the psychological support possible in presenting it to the public. There is no doubt that an announcement that Ital troops wld immed enter into the Trieste territory wld be extremely helpful in offsetting the resentment felt at any definitive loss of territory to Yugoslavia. This derives from the emotions aroused after the first World War by the entry into Trieste of the famous Bersiglieri regiments and wld help to point up the definitive gain by restoration to Ital of sovereignty over Trieste rather than territorial loss.
If for reasons of broad defense strategy we or the Brit desire to have troops in Trieste after the settlement and after the formal transfer of auth to Italy this question wld be worked out in advance with the Itals and also possibly with the Yugoslavs. The actual steps for turnover of auth and withdrawal of US and Brit troops as soon as possible after the settlement shld be the subj of agreement at least with the Ital Govt.
It might be advisable to ask the Ital Govt now whether they desire the removal of our troops at the earliest possible moment [Page 260] and also whether they desire to have them return on some other agreed basis shortly after the taking over by Italy of auth in Trieste. In view of the difficulties the Ital Govt will face in putting forward here any settlement I believe we shld make every effort to cooperate fully with them in a matter of this kind not only for strategic but also for psychological reasons. In any event together with the Brit we shld be agreed upon a comprehensive plan which wld provide for the successive steps in turning over of auth to the Itals and which wld include provision for future econ assistance, control of the police and all of the principal attributes of govt now being exercised by AMG.
Another element which wld be extremely helpful to the Prime Min here in having any settlement accepted by the public wld be an announced plan of the continuation at least for a period of the econ assistance now being granted to Trieste under the Mutual Security Act or whatever source may be available.
- Repeated to Paris, Belgrade, London, and Trieste. The Secretary of State was in Paris for the Sixth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- Telegram 2178 requested that the Embassy in Rome comment on whether or not the Italians should be given assurances that the U.S. and British troops in Trieste would be withdrawn at the conclusion of an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. The British Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff considered such assurances would be politically desirable as a means of increasing De Gasperi’s readiness to begin negotiations. (665.68/11–1351)↩
- In telegram 649 from Belgrade, November 17, the Embassy informed the Department of State that the Yugoslav Government might secretly prefer U.S.-U.K. troops to remain in Trieste but could hardly take this position openly. (750G.00/11–1651)↩