No. 118

665.68/10–551: Telegram

Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Winterton ), to the Secretary of State 1

secret

369. Coming months may see Italo-Yugo negots leading to settlement Trieste question and with it end of AMG’s admin here. However, if such negots are not undertaken or are unsuccessful and it becomes clear that status quo Trieste may be expected continue into indefinite future I recommend that basic reorg govt this zone be considered. Present type admin inevitably arouses Ital antipathies despite best endeavors and if AMG cannot be brought to end by Ital-Yugo settlement I believe it shld give way to new regime more in keeping spirit Mar 20 proposal and present Ital internatl position.

Issues De Gasperi raised with Secretary (Deptel 350, Oct 1)2 appear to be same which have troubled AMG-Ital relations for at least one year and on which Dept fully informed. Review of these will shortly be pouched. AMG under Winterton and Airey has sincerely tried find compromise in each case which wld satisfy Ital sensibilities but also meet AMG’s responsibilities as govt this zone, as auth responsible for inhabitants wellbeing and in a sense, as local rep of Amer and Brit Govts. Recognize that Itals with sincere patriotic feeling about Trieste and expectations based on Mar 20 proposal are becoming daily more anxious about territory’s future especially in view our and particularly Brit changed relations with Yugo. As result they are hypersensitive to AMG actions and have increased their efforts tie this zone ever more closely to Italy. AMG has come in conflict with Itals in instances where because of its other responsibilities it has felt impelled resist these efforts (there are also instances where it has acquiesced) but I wld emphasize that AMG has taken no action further to separate zone from Italy. Many issues of which Itals complain are those of which present state of affairs was established several years ago or more and accepted by Itals without question until recently.

Dept will also recognize that in situation which has grown up irresponsible politicians and journalists anxious to improve their position through exploitation nationalist passions have thrived on promotion these issues and in fact often created them where they [Page 254] might well not otherwise have existed. Ital mission here has also contributed to misunderstanding by slanted reporting etc. although in recent weeks appears sincerely interested in keeping situation quiet.

In advising zone commander I shall continue as in past to guide AMG away from actions offensive to Itals as far as it is feasible for AMG avoid such actions but my conviction is that very existence AMG is antipathetic to Itals. Some more months of present admin until bilateral settlement can be reached and implemented can certainly be managed but if settlement not forthcoming I wld recommend Dept seriously consider putting govt this zone on entirely fresh basis in interest of friendly Italo-Amer relations.

One way in broad outline might be to move Allied mil command into background and strip it of direct responsibility for civil govt including multitude of social, econ and admin affairs which might well be in local hands. At same time zone pres might be recognized as prefect and put essentially in charge where he wld in fact be subject to Ital Govt instrs in most matters with Allied mil command exercising only limited veto power on such matters as security. Foreign relations already in Ital hands in many respects cld be handed over in large measure with possible exception certain relations with zone B and Yugos. Aust arrangements may offer pattern which cld be adapted to situation here. Zone’s laws and instructions including judicial procedures to extent not now in accord Ital pattern cld be studied by mixed commission and gradually brought into line. Such reorg wld probably meet opposition from number of sources: (1) Sovs might use peace treaty or zone’s dependence on Security Council as basis for protest over virtual reincorporation Italy (2) Yugos might feel called on protest pro forma but believe in fact they wld not oppose move actively and might secretly welcome it, mistakenly interpreting it as step toward acceptance partition of terr on present interzonal line (3) certain elements local population such as Slovenes who still cling to free terr idea wld protest being placed again under Ital rule and many business elements wld secretly regret termination present status satisfactory to their interests.

If rearrangement as basic as that outlined above not considered feasible recommend Dept and FonOff nonetheless consider sending zone commander new instrs in event settlement does not materialize. These wld recognize more frankly that zone eventually to be returned to Italy and wld provide that Itals be taken more into councils locally and AMG be more prepared respond Ital wishes, wld at same time relieve commander of certain considerations he now feels he cannot ignore with regard to peace treaty provisions, protection minority rights this zone, reactions Yugo Govt and zone [Page 255] B auths and respect for certain principles and procedures which are part of government and tradition of US and UK. Otherwise believe zone commander will not feel able make basic alteration in AMG’s policies or conduct and I fear AMG will continue as sore point in relations between Italy and US and UK.

Foregoing ideas my own not discussed with US mil or Brit here.3

Unger
  1. Repeated to Rome, Belgrade, London, Paris, and Moscow.
  2. Not printed.
  3. In telegram 453 from Belgrade, October 10, Ambassador Allen informed the Department of State that he concurred with Unger’s recommendations and noted that despite their protests the Yugoslavs regarded Italianization of Zone A as tending to solidify the present division of the territory which they had long favored. (750G.00/10–1051)