Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

398.10–GDC/7–1951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret   priority

Washington, July 23, 1951—7 p. m.

585. (1) It seems to us that Bonn’s 52 July 19 to Dept rptd Fkft 88² contains two further examples of basic difference in Dept and HICOG thinking on contractual relations discussed Deptel 443 July 17 to Fkft rptd Bonn 31 London 367 Paris 378.³

(2) First example is statement para 5 Bonn’s 52 that Allies will not relinquish power to enact legis. Right to enact legis wld turn Council of Ambassadors into second High Commission. Dept has never supposed occ auths wld have legis power after contractual arrangements became effective and believes it wld vitiate new relationship to retain this power. Allies need not even enact repealing legis for Gers can be authd to do this. In cases where important Allied interests are concerned, amendment or repeal by Gers can be made subject to Allied consent.

(3) Second example is statement para 1 Bonn’s 52 that special position of Allies includes right to ensure respect of internatl agrmts affecting Ger but not covered by contractual arrangements. Agrmts mentioned this connection are general ones which cover great variety of subjects, particularly Potsdam and Control Council Proclamation No. 2. Is it HICOM intention retain power enforce these agrmts by requiring Gers comply with their provisions? If so, Allies will in effect be retaining powers broader than those reserved in Occupation Statute which is contrary to our idea of new status for FedRep. Insofar as provisions these agrmts fall within scope of declared purposes for which supreme auth will be exercised, Allies wld of course have right to enforce such provisions. It will be necessary to ensure that statement of purposes for which supreme auth is retained is adequate basis for dealing with Sovs. We have reviewed specification of purposes in Deptel 443 and are inclined to believe that while language contained therein describes our aims we must take care that Gers understand our intention to include powers necessary to effective negotiation with Sovs re Ger (e.g. such matters as Jessup–Malik agrmt and Paris 1949 modus vivendi⁴).

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Auchincloss; cleared with Lewis, Reinstein, and Raymond; and repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.
2. Supra.
3. Ante, p. 1490.
4. For documentation on the Jessup–Malik talks in the spring of 1949 and the discussion of a modus Vivendi for Berlin at the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 694 ff. and pp. 856 ff., respectively.