398.10–GDC/7–651: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt 1
443. For McCloy from Byroade. Had hoped withhold substantive comment from here on items of importance in contractual relations [Page 1491] field until we had received your gen views and recommendations subsequent to discussions with your staff after your return from Wash. Continued trend reflected in Bonn 37,2 however, and fact that negots on the subject therein seem to be reaching advanced state leads me to call your personal attention to views expressed ourtel 108 July 6.3 As we understand Bonn’s 37 July 13 (rptd Lon 16, Paris 18, Fkft 63) HICOG does not contemplate as broad an exercise of supreme authority for purpose of preserving democracy as had been assumed from Fkft’s 10702 June 30.4 Nevertheless it remains Dept’s firm position that retention of power to intervene on behalf of democratic or federal system, including power to veto amendments to basic law, is inconsistent with our conception of new relationship between Allies and FedRep. This position and supporting reasons was stated in Deptel 108 July 6 to Fkft, rptd Lon 108, Paris 128, Bonn 11, and need not be rptd here.
We wld not object to indicating basic purposes for which supreme authority wld be exercised as proposed Bonn’s 37. Consider, however, these purposes shld not go beyond (a) right to station troops in Ger and to protect their security; (b) Berlin; (c) unification of Ger and subsequent peace settlement; (d) territorial questions. Do not believe any of these shld be expressed in detail, and do not agree that suggestion Bonn’s 37 of adding “maintenance of democracy” as another purpose for exercise of supreme auth wld be convincing demonstration to Gers of “limited application of our reservation in this field”.
From Bonn’s 385 it seems you still contemplate supreme auth wld be used to enforce decisions of disputes comm against Gers. As already indicated, Dept does not consider retention of powers which wld include the unilateral Allied right to impose decisions in the arbitration process upon Gers wld be compatible with new relationship with FedRep.
While this tel covers only two particular points, we consider them to be fundamental in process of terminating occ regime and hope you will find it possible gain Fr and Brit acceptance of this point of view. Shld you find them unable agree, it wld be preferable from our point of view to receive split report from HICOM rather than have you agree that these powers shld be retained, as this wld facilitate efforts by Sec to obtain agreement to Dept’s point of view at Fon Mins level.
Acheson