762A.00/4–551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1

secret   priority

697. AGSec from Slater. Following is brief summary report of mtg between HICOM Council and Chancellor Adenauer held Bonn–Petersberg 5 Apr, Kirkpatrick (UK) Chairman, Hays (US), and Poncet (French).

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1–4 in which the revised Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement, the restitution agreement between Mannesman Dehrenwerke and Hahn family group, coal stockpiling in Berlin, and German participation in illegal East-West trade were discussed.]

5. Allied security guarantee to Fed Republic.

Major portion of today’s mtg was concerned with Adenauer’s plea that reinforcement of troops in Fed Republican area be accomplished on urgent basis. In support of this plea, Adenauer made following points, inter alia;

(a)
Poncet as chairman after Sept NY FonMin Conf had assured him that Allies had given complete guarantee of security to Fed Republic and in order to give expression to this guarantee, Allies would substantially increase their garrison in Ger (see Bonn sent Dept 165, rptd Frankfort 185, Berlin 74, Paris 29, London 32 of 24 Sept2). Since NY conf nearly seven months have passed without realization reinforcement program.
(b)
Public restlessness had increased in spite of present Four-Power agenda talks and prospect for CFM mtg. Sov and fifth column activities were spreading alarm among Gers. He had reliable info and proof that since GDR failed in its “unity campaign”, their subversive program had been strengthened. Korean war3 and recent events in Persia4 would make necessary even greater concentration of mil force in Orient. Menace of Sov attack from East Zone unchanged.
(c)
HICOM–Fed Republic discussions between mil experts were at standstill and “one-sided and theoretical in nature”. FedRep was continuing these discussions only due to fact that to interrupt them wld cause “extensive unfavorable repercussions”.
(d)
He admired Eisenhower “for taking over command of an army which was not very large”.
(e)
If he were leader of SPD opposition, he would not attack Schuman Plan but wld ask “what had been done to implement allied promises which Chancellor announced in Bundestag after FonMin New York conference?” Adenauer emphasized he could only answer that FedRep budget had been increased and land for a few airfields [Page 1469] had been requested and he couldn’t say anything about allied strategic plans, when troops would come, or whether his mil experts believed West allied defense plans could meet with success.
(f)
According to his mil experts, Soviet Army was always very weak in protecting flanks. His experts had concluded that if 12 divisions could be established on or near Soviet zone border in the north and 12 on or near border in south, with a strong force in the center, “there would be no Soviet attack”. Allied troops, even if supported by Ger contingents, could not stop a Soviet frontal attack”.
(g)
He outlined at great length growing strength of extreme right parties particularly in Lower Saxony where 3000 or 4000 mtgs were being staged by right extremists in preparation for May landtag elections. “A calm Bundestag Deputy” had informed him that the extreme Socialist Reich Partei in Lower Saxony wld have 11 of 120 members in Landtag. He underscored seriousness of fact that Bundestag President Eulers was recently shouted down during speech and that President Heuss was molested in Easter weekend speech at Salzgitter by FDJ from Soviet zone. In his opinion police won’t do anything against such demonstrations. He cited “very close connection between extreme right and SED”. All of the above wld have been “impossible and unimaginable two years ago”. These agitators have now come out in open and are successful in influencing a restless public. Large group of “fencesitters” was being created by program of extreme rightists. In order to check this “mental instability among Ger population,” Gers must see substantial deployment of western allied force in FedRep area. Therefore, urgently requested that western allied troop reinforcements be despatched as soon as possible. These troops shld show themselves frequently to Ger public. The campaign for next Bundestag wld commence in two years. He predicted that if during next one, two months there wasn’t a great demonstration of the might of Western allies in FedRep area, right extremists wld gain great importance in the next Bundestag. In reply to Adenauer, Kirkpatrick stated that with respect to troop reinforcements in Ger in particular and west defense efforts in general, Adenauer appeared to be a little pessimistic.

Kirkpatrick cited increased UK troop strength in its zone and offered to give Adenauer in confidence info on deployment of UK Armored and Air Forces. Poncet added allies had always made it clear reinforcements wld only begin to arrive in numbers in April, further the 500,000-man force to be established in West Ger represented a substantial force.

In course of above discussion, council agreed:

(i)
To transmit to their govts Adenauer’s request that “arrangements be made to inform either him or Fed Govt (through “suitable experts”) as to manner in which they intended to fulfill western allied security guarantee extended to FedRep”. (Adenauer promised to make his remarks subject of a memo which he wld send to HICOM as soon as possible. Will forward Dept upon receipt5).
(ii)
To forward to Eisenhower, Adenauer’s suggestion that Ger Generals who had had extensive combat experience against Soviets shld be given opportunity to make their knowledge of Soviet methods and operation available to Western Allies.

6. Ger mil instructors in Syria.

After completion above discussion Adenauer referred to fact Fed Govt had been requested by certain Ger “mil instructors” in Syria that they be recognized as a FedRep mil mission there. He implied French had asked FedRep to authorize such a mission. Poncet replied France had no troops in Syria and nature of reply to these Ger “mil instructors” was problem for Fed Govt to resolve. Poncet denied that French had asked FedRep to recognize such a mission and pointed out that Syria was an independent country.

7. Iranian request for Schacht.

Adenauer reported FedRep had told Iran it wld not like to honor Iranian request for services of Schacht (see Bonn sent Frankfort 824 rptd Dept. 689 Tehran 1.)6 [Slater.]

McCloy
  1. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Frankfurt, and Berlin.
  2. Not printed.
  3. For documentation regarding the Korean conflict, see volume vii .
  4. For documentation on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dispute see volume v .
  5. Transmitted in telegram 732, infra.
  6. Not printed.