611.62A/9–551
Mr. George F. Kennan to the Secretary of State 1
While the degree of economic recovery throughout Europe has of course been amazing and encouraging, many of the present components [Page 1328] of this prosperity, as well as of the momentary political quietude, are illusory or unstable. Where free enterprise prevails, people seem not to have been able to give it a satisfactory ideological rationale or to cope with the crass social disparities and political tensions to which it often gives rise under European conditions. This has much to do with the continued inability of the French and Italians to eliminate the communists from the dangerous positions they have established in those societies. Where dirigisme and the welfare state are the word, on the other hand, economic vigor has obviously declined; and this is especially disturbing when it is recalled that the countries where this is the case are mainly ones extensively dependent on foreign trade for maintenance of heavily urbanized populations.
These things, while certainly a warning against complacency, seem to me no grounds for despair, provided real progress is made in the handling of the German question. German recovery must be measured not only in terms of economic statistics but even more in terms of returning self-confidence, hope, initiative, and will to act. In these respects, I think recovery has progressed further than we generally realize, particularly in comparison with ex-allied countries, and that the strength of the German position in Europe is actually much greater than appearances would indicate.
This being the case, a great deal, if not everything, depends on how we handle the Germans at this juncture, and on the terms on which they now proceed with the revival of their national life. Our aim must be to establish urgently relationships and understandings with the German leaders whereby the amazing rise in German strength and energy which we have no choice but to recognize as a major European reality, can proceed from here on out in agreement and collaboration with the rest of Europe, notably the French, and not in an atmosphere of jealousy and anxiety and conflict.
As things stand today it seems to me that our arrangements for dealing with Germany are quite inadequate and in some respects dangerously unsuitable to the task at hand. It is not a question of babying the Germans. There are many bitter issues that will have to be fought out with them in all sharpness if things are to go well. But it seems clear to me that the day for lecturing and preaching and for minor interferences in German domestic affairs has passed and that from now on the important results can be achieved only if we deal with the Germans realistically, on the diplomatic level rather than on the authority of the victor, and as with a sovereign power, though fortunately one dependent on us in many respects and vis-à-vis which we have a strong bargaining position. If this is correct, it is important that we recognize that the trappings and atmosphere of colonialism have not only lost their usefulness but stand in the path of progress [Page 1329] in our dealings with the Germans. If we are to be free to concentrate on the important things, the Allied Commissioners must be unburdened of all unnecessary bureaucratic and psychological impediments. To me these requirements are not reconcilable with the continued maintenance in Germany of bloated civilian and military staffs living partly at German expense on standards obviously more luxurious than they would enjoy at home. Not only do these establishments constitute an unnecessary irritant for the Germans but they inevitably operate to reduce flexibility and incisiveness in the development of Allied policy, to obscure realities, to distract effort and attention. In this connection, I think we should dispense with all forms of control and direction in German affairs which are not really important to the great issues of the immediate future. Such things as the continued fussing about decartelization and restitution and many of the elements of the pressure for reform and democratization, which still seem to occupy the time of our people in Germany, seem trivial anachronisms and caprices compared with the issues really at stake in the development of German affairs during the next two or three years.
I realize that the talks about to begin in Washington2 are designed to make progress in precisely the direction I am describing and also that the main resistance to this sort of progress has come from our Allies and not our own people. But I think we are in great danger of continuing to do too little and to do it too late, of being continually one to two years behind the reality of events, of reserving our favors until they become concessions to ugly and arrogant German demands, and of continuing measures of interference and control to the point where they are much more irritating to the Germans than useful to us. The shape of German political life seems to me to be assuming an alarming similarity with what we knew in the days of the Weimar Republic; and if we can not promptly find means this time of rewarding moderation and penalizing extremism rather than the opposite, the future is dark not only for Germany but for all Western Europe. The issues over which we have recently been entangled with the Germans, notably occupation costs and coal export, seem to me excellent examples of the sort of issue which should not have been permitted to arise and to become subjects of discussion in German domestic politics; for the logic of events says that eventually we will have to yield and the credit will then inevitably go to the extremist critics of a moderate regime.
- The source text was transmitted “for the Secretary” in despatch 1219 from London, September 5 (611.62A/9–551). Mr. Kennan, a career minister, was on leave from the Foreign Service.↩
- For documentation on the meetings of the three Western Foreign Ministers at Washington, September 10–14, see pp. 1163 ff.↩