Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

800.4614/9–1251

The Director of the Eastern Element (Morgan) to the Secretary of State

confidential
No. 176

Berlin, September 12, 1951.

Ref: Eastern Element tel. Aug 25, Fkft 357, Secstate 299, Bonn 132; Eastern Element tel. Aug 20, Fkft 327, Secstate 277, Bonn 123; Eastern Element tel. Aug 15, Fkft 289, Secstate 247, Bonn 111; Eastern Element tel. Aug 14, Fkft 281, Secstate 240, Bonn 107; Public Affairs tel. Aug 13, Fkft 268, Secstate 229, Bonn 105; Eastern Element tel. Aug 13, Fkft 265, Secstate 226, Bonn 104; Eastern Element tel. Aug 6, Fkft 220, Secstate 188, Bonn 86. (See also despatch No. 179 for description of specific East German attitudes revealed at WYF)¹

Subject: Appraisal of World Youth Festival

Introduction and summary

The following analysis of the World Youth Festival has been made on the basis of policy statements by leading GDR and international Communist figures during the Festival; a study of Communist press propaganda; numerous visits to the East Sector to observe demonstrations, exhibitions and the general behaviour of Festival participants; first-hand conversations with East German FDJ’ers and rather spotty contact with foreign delegates, including two Americans; innumerable reports of American, Allied and German observers some of whom also had contact with foreign as well as East German participants; and discussions with British, Dutch, Australian, and American political observers.

The conclusion which seems to be indicated by information obtained from the above sources is that the Festival, when regarded from different angles, may eventually add up to gains for both the East and the West. If the Festival is assessed from the viewpoint of Communist intentions, it is the consensus of nearly all competent observers, foreign and German, that it successfully laid the groundwork for achieving specific long-range political goals even though certain features of the Festival were damaging to the Communist cause.

The Communists were bent on mobilizing youth throughout the world as a driving force behind the present phase of their anti-“remilitarization” campaign in Germany which hopes: 1) to identify the West German government as the prototype of re-emerging German “imperialism” and thus isolate it from the mass of the German people and from foreign, particularly neighboring governments; and 2) to prepare German, particularly West German, youth psychologically for “national resistance” and revolutionary actions.

The West’s chief gain was its opportunity, of which it took fruitful advantage, to contact large groups of East German youth who visited West Berlin. The latter factor should not be underestimated for its effect upon future East German attitudes; but neither should it give rise to an over-optimistic tendency to regard the Festival as a Communist fiasco. Sensitive and open as the Communists are to the danger of infection, it was a calculated risk for them to stage a mass demonstration in Berlin. It remains for the future to determine whether the setbacks the Communists suffered will be outweighed by long-range political gains along the lines indicated above.

Long-range Political Aims of World Youth Festival

An objective analysis of the World Youth Festival can only be made within the framework of the Peace Movement of which the Festival was one climatic event capable of future exploitation. As such, the Festival, even though it had an eye on developments regarding Japan, was directed primarily towards frustrating West German and West European defense. The Festival’s chief significance and contribution to this over-all Communist effort was 1) to lay the groundwork for mobilizing youth on an international, non-sectarian, ostensibly non-Communist basis; and 2) to harness this powerful youth force behind the present Communist campaign to represent the West German government as the main ally of U.S. “imperialism” in Europe, and thus render it anathema to the mass of the German population and to European and other foreign governments.

Specific Program Outlined for Youth

Festival speeches and propaganda indicated that the political actions behind which youth is expected to throw its active support are chiefly those which are already in motion on an international and/or local basis: 1) agitation and signature campaign for the so-called Five-Power Peace Pact; 2) exploitation of social discontent to be laid at the door of Western rearmament and to be spearheaded particularly by labor youth; 3) resistance to West German remilitarization, which can be exploited in foreign countries fearful of a revival of German military strength and in West Germany to turn public opinion against the West German government; 4) resistance to Marshall and Schuman Plans, the Atlantic Pact and the European Union idea as steps leading to the undermining of national sovereignties and to the formation of an aggressive Western war-bloc; 5) intensified campaign in West Germany for the plebiscite “against remilitarization and for a peace treaty in 1951”, including resistance to military service; 6) expansion (particularly in East Germany) of cultural and sports activities and closer integration of them with the Communist political program; 7) expansion of ideological and political indoctrination among the East German FDJ in preparation for the Fourth FDJ Parliament at Whitsuntide 1952 in Leipzig; 8) increasing emphasis upon work among the Young Pioneers, i.e. among the very young groups of German youth.

With all this, greater efforts will be made to promote “unity of action” among youth throughout the world probably along the lines of the contemplated international conference for the “defense of the rights of youth” to be held sometime in 1952. The propaganda frame will be provided by exploiting the World Youth Festival as a contribution to “peace”.

Three Facets of World Youth Festival

There were three distinct though overlapping levels upon which the World Youth Festival was expected to exercise its influence in favor of the present Communist program. The mission of the foreign delegations, allegedly numbering 26,000 from 104 countries, was to provide the appearance of international solidarity and support for the “national resistance” movement to be undertaken by East and West German youth. Foreign youth was to receive in return the impetus for carrying on parallel movements in their native countries to alienate local sympathy from Allied and West German government policy; 2) West German youth, numbering 35,000 according to Soviet press reports, symbolized the German will for peace and unity and were to get the moral lift and practical experience to enable them to become the instrument for active overt and subversive resistance to Allied and West German Government controls; 3) East German youth provided the mass “fill-in” and supporting chorus for the “peace” and German unity campaign; they represented to the foreign delegations the “new Germany” in contrast to West German “imperialism”; it was from their ranks that the example and well-trained fanatic leadership for future revolutionary actions were to come.

(It seems probable that, in addition to acting as a deterrent upon FDJ visits to West Berlin, the FDJ rush upon the West Sectors on August 15 was staged to create enthusiasm and provide justification and experience for acts of “national resistance”. This interpretation of motivation seems to be supported by Communist sources and by subsequent Communist propaganda, which has been attempting to drum up feeling against the “brutal” West Berlin police, in much the same manner as the Innsbruck incident² is exploited on an international level. In his August 30 report to the FDJ Central Secretariat, FDJ Chairman Honecker described the August 15 incident as “ushering in a new stage in the revolutionary training of the German youth”. Honecker also stated that the incident had revealed “the fighting readiness and growing ideological level of our cadres”. He then proceeded to outline the most important task for the various FDJ group leaders to be that of learning to know and groom further those individuals who proved their mettle. It might be noted that the leaflets which participants in the incident were to distribute in West Berlin gave excerpts from Ulbricht’s August 12 speech, the main emphasis of which was upon “national resistance”. Regardless of the apparent hastiness with which the incident was organized and its negative effect upon some of the participants (described below) there can be no doubt that such an action reveals not only organizational weaknesses but also demonstrates which individuals can be relied upon to carry out orders no matter what the purpose.)

Effectiveness of World Youth Festival

The impact of the World Youth Festival upon the participants will influence to some extent the ultimate success of the Communist attempt to make youth the spearhead of its present program. In other words, a good deal of youth’s future effectivenss may depend upon the degree to which it was fired with enthusiasm for the WYF slogans of “peace”, “unity”, “friendship”; upon the extent to which it responded to increasing anti-American sentiment, to the deification of Stalin, and to the call to “defend peace to the utmost”; and upon the measure to which the World Youth Festival succeeded in imparting to youth the necessary confidence and optimism and practical as well as psychological preparation for future revolutionary action under Soviet aegis. Vis-à-Vis Foreign Delegations

As far as the impact of Communist ideology went, the foreign delegations split into two main groups—those representing countries inside and those representing countries outside the Soviet sphere of power; and, in the case of the latter category, into two subdivisions—on the one hand, the Communist hard core and fellow-travellers, and, on the other hand, the curious, the undecided, the misguided, the “peace” idealists and those who had come for the ride.

From observation and available accounts, which have been admittedly spotty due to segregation of the foreign delegations, it appears that on the whole the Communist hard core and fellow travellers, which included the bulk of the delegates from Iron Curtain countries and Communist representation from the non-Communist sphere, got a lift from the World Youth Festival. Despite a certain amount of known disgruntlement regarding accommodations and assuming the inevitable political conflicts and jealousies which arise from proximity of so many dissimilar groups, there seems to be no doubt that Communist and fellow-travelling delegates were, on the whole, impressed with what they experienced and saw, particularly regarding the progress the GDR has apparently made in the way of reconstruction. This seems to be particularly true of delegations from colonial countries. Defections from Iron Curtain countries were few; contact with the West and with non-WYF circles was extremely limited.

Undoubtedly some of the non-Communist delegates from the Western hemisphere went home somewhat shaken in their pro-Communist inclinations. They were not likely to be particularly impressed with the living standard in East Berlin, although it has been established that Australian labor delegates, for example, were favorably impressed by what they saw and were told regarding the GDR Five-Year Plan. Non-Communist foreign delegates did not, according to reports; take too kindly to the ubiquitous propaganda claims of Soviet superiority and leadership; their conception of equality in the Communist order was offended by the discrimination in their own favor. On the other hand, non-Communist foreign delegates were even more scandalized by U.S. treatment of delegates held up in Innsbruck. This incident furnished the motivation behind the refusal of some non-Communist delegates to visit West Berlin, and it was cited by them as an example of how the much-touted freedoms of the Western world are allegedly being violated.

On the whole, despite odd complaints and the defection of some few Communist delegates from Iron Curtain and Western countries, the Communists can probably consider the World Youth Festival a success from the viewpoint of furthering world Communist youth efforts both as far as internal cooperation and public manifestation of strength go.

Vis-à-Vis West German Participants

West German participants were next in line to the foreign delegations for preferential treatment. Like the foreign delegations they were feted and secluded. As far as can be determined, very few visited West Berlin and very little contact existed between them and East German FDJ’ers. They were treated as heroes and clever adventurers for having defied and outwitted Allied measures to prevent their attendance at the WYF. Side by side with those East Germans who took part in the August 15 rush on West Berlin, they provided the martyrs for the Communist cause. If the August 12 “Peace March”, which was the outward climax of the World Youth Festival, was any indication, the participating West German youth enthusiastically responded to the especially spirited reception and acclaim given them by the foreign delegations and German guests of honor.

Vis-à-Vis East German Youth

The case of the East German group, which numbered over the course of the two-week period probably close to a million and a half, was different. Despite moral pressure and some physical deterrents, probably well over half a million FDJ’ers visited West Berlin during the course of the Festival, some of them returning several times. This group tasted a non-Communist atmosphere, enjoyed West Berlin and Allied hospitality and experienced at least to a limited degree personal contact and free exchange of ideas with Berliners and Allies.

The tendency of this large mass of East German FDJ to seek outside contact was reinforced by dissatisfaction with the physical and social treatment accorded them by the WYF. All FDJ visitors to West Berlin agreed that the WYF diet was monotonous; most considered it highly inadequate; only a small minority regarded it as sufficient. Quarters, including sanitary arrangements, were described as varying from very bad to tolerable or, in some few cases, decent. Nearly all agreed that transportation to Berlin had been uncomfortable and tedious and that transportation within East Berlin was difficult. Above all, East German youth were offended by the discrimination against them. They pointed out that tickets to popular events, particularly sporting meets, the choicest cultural shows and movies went to the favored few among their ranks and to foreign and West German delegations. In other words, it was the East German youth who bore the brunt of the organizational weaknesses and breakdowns evident in the World Youth Festival.

The above factors, combined with the initiative of the Allies and West Berliners in exploiting the opportunity given them to influence the largest group of East German youth ever to come into contact with the West, added up to a gain for the West. It meant the strengthening of East German anti-regime and pro-West sentiment, a factor which should not be underestimated for its effect upon future attitudes in East Germany. The thinking of the East German youth who came into close contact with the West will probably long be affected by the friendly and non-polemic reception accorded them; by the free exchange of ideas and access to top officials such as McCloy³ and political leaders such as Schumacher. At least as far as this segment of the East German youth is concerned, the Communist-staged August 15 rush on West Berlin proved a boomerang and future Communist claims of West Berlin police brutality probably will not be proof against personal experience. Various groups of young people from the East with whom U.S. personnel were able to discuss the incident subsequently were unanimous in recognizing 1) the true purposes of the maneuver; 2) the calculated use of innocent youth to manufacture a political incident for propaganda purposes; and 3) that it represented an action on the part of the party leadership based not on strength but upon a sense of fear that the Eastern Zone youth were becoming influenced by dangerous ideas from their contact with the free and friendly West.

This combination of circumstances, namely, the large FDJ influx into West Berlin plus Allied exploitation thereof, and the negative effect of the August 15 incident upon a considerable segment of the FDJ youth should not, however, lead to over-optimistic assumptions of an active resistance potential among East German youth which omit from consideration the generally submissive nature of the East German population and previous experience with resistance activity. It must be recognized that the motives of many of the East German youth who came to West Berlin were non-political. Certainly a large percentage were impelled by ordinary curiosity, by a desire to buy West Berlin goods, by a free snack or entertainment, or by the circumstance that they had been left to their own devices. Moreover, even a goodly percentage of those who were critical of the GDR regime were also not necessarily pro-West. Many revealed a lack of information, a misunderstanding and skepticism regarding Western, including U.S., European policy. It is interesting to speculate, for example, to what extent the superior material standard of West Berlin will be proof against the hope and confidence, and sense of brotherhood in East German reconstruction which the Communists are fostering. Even though not necessarily subscribing to the Communist program, practically all FDJ visitors to West Berlin showed in their reaction to certain ideas, in their modes of expression, and in their mental images, the effects of Communist propaganda and indoctrination. In addition, the WYF was, as far as Western opportunities go, a one-time show while the Communists have constant and practically unlimited opportunities for indoctrination among the youth. Fruitful as contact with the West may have been for those FDJ’ers who visited the West Sectors there is always the danger that anti-regime attitudes will be swamped by the younger groups coming up. In this connection, it is useful to compare the vigilant, secluded treatment given the 20,000 (for the most part East German) children during their four-week stay in the international children’s camp in East Berlin with the relative freedom enjoyed by their older counterparts in the FDJ.

Also, it must be admitted that perhaps almost one-third of the FDJ attending the Festival did not come into contact with the West; that for those who were able to participate to any extent in East Sector events, which were myriad and diverse, the Communists put on a good show; that the hardships suffered are apt to become dimmed with time while the sense of camaraderie, of freedom from controls, of opportunities for sexual adventures will be associated with the Festival. Still more, the psychological effect upon the mass of the youth who are swept by even momentary enthusiasm should not be discounted. The large mass demonstrations of the Festival illustrated once again the ability of a totalitarian regime to carry along the masses via a small proportion of hard core fanatics.

Despite obvious organizational breakdowns and weaknesses, there seems to be no doubt that considering its tremendous scope the Festival was successfully handled on the whole, and that it was a fruitful exercise in logistics.

It might also be relevant to point out that effective as the impact of the West has been in reassuring large numbers of East German youth of the West’s determination not to “write them off”, many had to be satisfied with what was for them the disappointing answer that no immediate radical alleviation of their situation could be expected from the West.

At the moment, all that can be done with any assurance is to point out pertinent factors; it remains for the future to indicate whether evidences of general enthusiasm for the FDJ program will become apparent among the East German youth as they did after the Whitsuntide rally last year. What is certain, however, is that, sensitive as the Communists are to the danger of infection, they took a calculated risk in holding such a mammoth rally in Berlin in the face of the obvious impossibility of strictly controlling it; and that set-backs would not have been risked if it had not been believed that they would be out-weighted by the prospect of furthering long-range Communist political aims as outlined at the beginning of this despatch.

Without jumping to extreme conclusions regarding a pro-West attitude among East German youth, it remains for the West to follow up and consolidate the gains as far as possible vis-à-vis the East German youth which the WYF offered it in such unexpected measure. (See following despatch⁴).

George A. Morgan

1. None printed.
2. Presumably a reference to the detention at Innsbruck of persons attempting to transit the U.S. Zone in Austria to attend the Berlin festival. Documentation on this incident in which the detainees were allegedly beaten by military police, is in file 800.4614.
3. Excerpts from McCloy’s discussion with members of the FDJ on August 17 are in the Frankfurt Mission files, lot 311, D(51)1205.
4. Despatch 179, September 18, not printed (800.4614/9–1851).