Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/3–151: Telegram

The Acting Director of the Berlin Element of HICOG (Jones) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

restricted

Berlin, March 1, 1951—6 p. m.

1241. SED proposal for Berlin reunification (mytel 1233 February 28 repeated Department 1094, Bonn 282, London, Paris, Moscow unnumbered²) was only one part of broad resolution encompassing future Party program. Keynote was struck by section headed “struggle for peace has entered decisive phase,” based on new situation created by US remilitarization of “West Berlin. Following is summary of highlights of resolution.

• 1. Chief task of Berlin Party organization consists of winning majority of population to fight against remilitarization and for conclusion peace treaty in 1951 and Volkskammer appeal. Working class main force in peace fight; therefore, creating unity of action throughout Berlin is central point of policy of all-Berlin Party organization.
• 2. Party tasks in West Berlin are (1) mobilizing masses by exploiting growing dissatisfaction of East Berlin workers in fight for wage increases (mytel 1238 March 1 repeated Department 1098³); (2) capitalizing on price rises resulting from remilitarization (bread prices, chocolate tax, et cetera); (3) exploiting lone [low?] standard of living (coal and housing shortage) and (4) effects of remilitarization (requisitioning of housing for troop reinforcements, drafting for US labor service battalions et cetera). For this the Party must utilize present growing dissatisfaction of SPD and trade union members and opposition to Berlin’s coalition government.
• 3. Party must, through personal discussion in every factory, organization and house, win converts in West Berlin to Stalin’s peace appeal, Volkskammer appeal, and resolutions of World Peace Council.⁴
• 4. In East Sector the principal Party task is preserving and insuring peace by carrying out five year plan and thus further bettering living standard. East Sector must also be basis for campaign against West Berlin. In latter connection, successfully carrying out May first demonstrations and World Youth Festival are particularly important, as power development (Kraftentfaltung) of peace campaign must reach its climax during festival.
• 5. Proposal for Berlin unity was inserted here in resolution.
• 6. Following sections contained criticisms of shortcomings in East Sector and within Berlin SED organization. East Sector failures, such as unsatisfactory technical developments in factories, insufficient support of FDJ in school, bureaucracy in school administration, formalistic tendencies in architecture of new apartments in Stalina i.e., architecture in stage and arts [formalistic tendencies in architecture (new apartments in Stalin Allee) , stage and arts?] came under fire.
• 7. As remedy to criticisms and to ensure fulfillment of program a series of corrective measures within the Party were proposed which included organizational reforms and greater Party schooling. (End of resolution summary)

February 26 meeting at which above resolution adopted was only one in series over past month devoted mostly to severe self-criticism which revealed Party efforts in West Berlin extremely weak and ineffectual. Basis of resolution, including reunification proposal, was apparently to present positive program designed to strengthen Party’s position in West Sectors.

So far there has, surprisingly, been no follow-up on resolution in Soviet-licensed press except for factual items in several papers March 1 which reported only that part re Berlin reunification.

West Berlin press reaction March 1 to reunification proposal was typified by Telegraf headline, “Ohne Uns!”. No papers gave it particular prominence. CDU oriented Der Tag editorial rejected proposal, cited West conditions for Berlin unity as generally free elections expressing will of people; and respect for individual liberties. Put blame for city split on Communists in first place. Kurt Schumacher, in Berlin at present, told press conference SPD rejected proposal because elections given only sixth place “if elections are not first step, all the rest is deceit”.

There are so far no indications of what concrete use will be made of proposal, although it will undoubtedly be kept alive in some manner, probably at least on lines Volkskammer appeal. Perhaps, too, it portends Soviet intention make special issue of Berlin in CFM.

We recommend, however, that comment from US official sources be avoided in order not give impetus to keeping proposal alive. Comparison of it with earlier Soviet position on reunifying Berlin (Mytel 839 May 9, 1950 repeated Dept. 699, Bonn 58, Paris 224, London for USDel 57, Moscow 44⁵) shows it is merely reiteration of unacceptable conditions plus window-dressing in line with current “Petze” theme.

Jones

1. Repeated to Washington, Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow. The source text is the copy in the Department of State files.
2. Not printed; it reported that at a meeting on February 26 the Berlin SED had adopted a resolution calling for reunification of Berlin along the lines of the January 30 Volkskammer appeal, see the editorial note, p. 1751.
3. Not printed.
4. For documentation on the Soviet-sponsored world peace movement, see volume iv. Stalin’s peace appeal is presumably a reference to his interview with a correspondent of Pravda on February 16, which is printed in Folliot, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 290–294.
5. Not printed; for the text of the Soviet letter of May 8, 1950 to the three Western Commandants, outlining the terms for free democratic elections in Berlin, see Documents on German Unity, vol. i, pp. 224–225.