Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

662B.001/1–2351: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ²

secret

Frankfurt, January 23, 1951—7 p. m.

6053. PEPCO. ReDeptel 4402, December 18,³ expressing Departmental concern over effects GDR “law for protection peace” (Berlin’s 845 December 15, sent Frankfort 956 and Bonn’s 408, December 19, sent Frankfort 460, both pouched London, Paris and Moscow⁴), these supplemental comments submitted:

• 1. Agree with analyses of Berlin (Berlin’s 883, December 27, sent Frankfort 1002⁵) and Bonn (Bonn’s 426, December 30 sent Frankfort 478, pouched London, Paris, Moscow⁶) but feel both tend overlook that law forms tactic called for by Warsaw 2nd World Peace Congress as part of most recent Communist drive against NATO as well as Western German rearmament and available forms of warfare. Though spread of fear psychology and focus on Western Germany, (together with possible set-up in kidnappings, border controls, propagandistic trials, et cetera) form aspect of implementation law, text, (being despatched separately, HICOG despatch 2396, January 22³) and editorial comment in Cominform Journal appear establish wider purpose is to promote “independent neutralism” line spawned at Warsaw and now being advanced by Western European Communists. Think, therefore, law should not necessarily, as suggested by Berlin, be interpreted as abandoning mask of friendly overtures of GDR to Federal Republic which commenced with Grotewohl letter to Chancellor.⁷
• 2. Both law and Grotewohl letter aimed at crypto-Communists, fence-sitters and neutralists. “Appeal” of law is that all persons, including Germans, who fail to support Soviet “peace” line deserve (and will receive) punishment. Hence, partisans of peace must push for similar Federal Republic legislation and implementation. “Appeal” of letter is that plans to rearm Western Germany have caused national emergency which requires Germans to concert and take own future into their hands. Hence two moves complement each other and implementation of law within Soviet Zone to date probably not intended as hostile act so much as action intended to demonstrate seriousness choice Western Germans must make between war and peace.
• 3. Considered within purely German text, however, believe law furnishes instrument which Soviets intend combat adherents of Schumacher position that rearmament Western Germany must be contingent on build-up of sufficient US and allied forces within Federal Republic to seize strategic offensive and fight world war three in Poland and beyond. Considering strength of SPD Ost-buro (underground) in Soviet Zone, Schumacher’s line has obviously taxed nerves of GDR and Polish Communists and, from Soviet standpoint, is example of warmongering. That law not entirely divorced from Schumacher thesis seems evident from recent article in Cominform Journal by Reimann, Western German Communist (KPD) chairman.
• 4. Two lines counterattack suggested by Berlin have been implemented in large part and continue to be plugged in Germany and overt media. Chancellor’s highlighting of law in his January 15 statement on Grotewohl letter and Schumacher follow-up in January 21 RIAS broadcast have been helpful in exposing fraud and Soviet inspiration of law.⁸ Western Germans have, like Berliners, taken law in stride and Soviets/GDR have made little if any headway in rationalizing law’s “purpose” as defining war propaganda as crime against humanity. Appears no likelihood that Cominform purpose attaining similar law or endorsement thereof in Federal Republic will be realized.
• 5. Since Germans themselves took initiative in denouncing law we thought it best not to dignify it with official comment lest such might increase apprehensions of its effects. Believe it can best be exposed as part of phoney Soviet “peace offensive”. Meanwhile, as suggested by Berlin and Bonn and Federal Republic [officials with whom we have spoken, we shall encourage Magistrat and Federal Republic] to tighten kidnapping legislation and border controls, but will seek avoid implications these measures taken as reprisals. As Department knows, we have already moved ahead with implementation regulations to control and eliminate importations of subversive propaganda from Soviet Zone.
• 6. Kaiser Ministry officials and Wehner, SPD chairman Bundestag all-German committee, tell us law has already backfired somewhat against GDR by discouraging visits to events such as Leipzig fair and that SPD intends in near future call for interpellation on law in Bundestag. SPD will call on Bundestag to pass resolution or law condemning crimes against humanity and will seek have convictions under GDR law defined as crime against humanity. Federal Republic has given some thought to sponsoring law disclaiming applicability GDR law to Federal Republic territory and making application of GDR law to Federal Republic citizens penal offense but has decided against it for following reasons: (a) would put Federal Republic in weaker propaganda position than if GDR law more or less ignored, (b) would tend heighten apprehensions among Western Germans, and (c) would involve Federal Republic in tit-for-tat type of reprisals best avoided under circumstances.
• 7. Pending formulation within UN or CFM of broad approach to blunt and discredit Soviet “peace offensive”, including this latest variant, believe best current lines are those suggested by Berlin, plus fact that law instrument of Soviet policy, plus fact that law contributes to difficulties in effecting German unity.

McCloy

2. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Warsaw, and Praha.
3. Not printed.
4. Neither printed; for the text of the Law for the Protection of Peace, see Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 536–538.
5. Not printed; it reported that the purpose of the law seemed to be an effort to intimidate West Germans and Berliners from supporting the Western defense program and also afforded a legal basis for further repression against disaffected elements in East Germany. (662A.62B/12–2750)
6. Not printed; it reported that Bonn political sources substantiated the Berlin estimate of the significance of the law. (762B.OO/12–3050)
3. Not printed.
7. For documentation on the response to Grotewohl’s letter of November 30, 1950, concerning German unity, see pp. 1747 ff.
8. Regarding Chancellor Adenauer’s statement of January 15, see ibid.