762.022/8–2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

1208. Re Deptel 1122, Aug 23, rptd London 1091, Frankfort 1359, Bonn 79, Strasbourg 13.2

Emb considers that disadvantages wld outweigh advantages if US were to approach French Govt in near future on latter’s plans for definite status of Saar, although such an approach may be advisable later on. In any case, it is much to be preferred to suggesting to Adenauer that FedRep make proposal in matter (Embtel 8067 June 25, London 2169, Frankfort 1137, Strasbourg 55).3

Emb emphatically concurs in Dept’s preference for avoiding any immed step that wld inject Saar issue into FonMin’s Sept talks. Emb also agrees that if Schuman raises issue Secretary shld be prepared comment along lines numbered paras of reftel.

Emb believes that two considerations make it preferable that if any approach at all to French on this matter is to be made in next few months, it be left in first instance to Brit. In first place, US is already in position of seeking to influence French on a number of issues relating to Germany and even mere inquiry on Saar question might be regarded by French as sign US policy shifting and as additional US pressure for French concessions to Germans. It might thus create atmosphere that wld have harmful effect on settlement other, more important, current issues.

Secondly, any approach by US wld very probably result in French incorporating in their reply a reference to passage in Secy’s press conf statement of Jan 18, 1950, concerning US support for French view that Saar shld have certain degree of autonomy when final status fixed. (Summary our position given numbered para 1 of reftel does not coincide with that position as it is understood by FonOff, French believe on basis Jan 1950 statement that we also support their gen view on approach during peace treaty negots.) Result might be that French shld endeavor to nail down US support for French-proposed settlement (as part of negot over Whole current Ger problem) that might be more generously formulated if additional time allowed to lapse before positions taken.

With regard to future status of Saar, Emb recalls that some uncertainty exists as to whether it is Adenauer’s intention in next session Council of Europe Comite of Mins, tentatively scheduled for Jan 1952, merely to question Saar govt’s observance of human rights convention or to raise whole question of Saar’s future without waiting for peace [Page 1982] treaty. Emb wld welcome any light HICOG can shed on Chancellor’s intentions.

So far as Emb is aware, FonOff official charged with Saar affairs has made preliminary study of reply to Adenauer if he raises human rights issue, but has not considered second possibility. On other hand, Schuman is reported in Le Monde Aug 21 to have said in speech at ceremony in Moselle that “with regard to Saar, day will come when long-awaited agreement will calm troubles that certain precipitate words and deeds have brought on, provided that all parties show good will and good faith equal to that of France.” It is possible that this indicates FonMin himself already has under consideration some plan for settlement Saar issue that he believes acceptable to Germans. If this is so, Emb believes it wld be better tactic let this ripen without interjection US or UK inquiries.

Bruce
  1. Repeated to London, Frankfurt, Bonn, and Strasbourg.
  2. Supra.
  3. Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1978.