Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.022/5–151: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

secret

Washington, May 1, 1951.

A–1755. While the French attitude regarding the Saar in recent Paris negotiations leading to the signing of the Schuman Plan has been sufficiently flexible to permit acceptance of the formula embodied in the exchange of letters between Adenauer and Schuman,² we are still seriously concerned over the range of Saar problems discussed in the Department’s airgram 1037, December 28, 1950 to London (repeated to Paris, Frankfort and Strasbourg).³ We note from Paris’ despatch 2771, March 29 (copies to London, Frankfort and Strasbourg)⁴ that the French Foreign Ministry desires an indication of the Department’s thinking on the problem of Saar membership in international organizations. This has been stated in Deptel 4432, February 23 to Paris (repeated to London 3898, Frankfort 5787, and Geneva 662) in the case of the ILO, and in Deptel 5237, April 4 to Paris (repeated Frankfort 6682, London 4513) in the case of the WMO.⁵

On the broader issues of Saar policy we believe that any long-range solution will eventually have to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants of the Saar and the necessity for closer Western European association. Once the Schuman Plan is implemented to the point of achieving that economic integration of the steel and coal industries of Western Europe which is its goal, the purely economic incentives motivating French policy towards the Saar (essentially a coal and steel producing area) should assume considerably less importance. Moreover, other forces making for European cooperation and integration may in time tend to mitigate those political pressures which make the Saar a volatile issue.

The most practicable present approach, therefore, to what is admittedly a difficult problem seems to lie in an attempt to persuade the French that their own interest can best be served by a moderate and reserved handling of Saar questions. During this critical period of basic political decision and new institutional development in Western Europe, any injection of the Saar issue can only jeopardize those objectives for the achievement of which the signing of the Schuman Plan has given new hope. It should be obvious, both from the content of the criticism levelled at the present German Government on the Saar question and its reaction to such criticism, that the positive and cooperative orientation of that Government is at least partly contingent upon its ability to keep the Saar from becoming a major issue in internal German electoral and parliamentary struggles.

We do not wish to suggest any ready-made formula for handling the Saar problem other than that generally implied in the principles discussed above. Although the three occupying powers have a compelling common interest in preventing the Saar from becoming a critical issue at this time we should prefer that the French, on their own initiative, develop a consistent approach which will achieve this objective.

In your discretion, you may raise the question with the Foreign Ministry stating our general position as outlined in the two preceding paragraphs and emphasizing our desire to avoid having the Saar problem precipitated into current or forthcoming negotiations where it might become a decisive factor. It may be pointed out that we attach particular importance to the necessity of keeping this in mind in connection with membership in international organizations and conferences, and express the hope that, in the foreseeable future, Saar participation in such organizations and conferences will be limited to observers attached to the French delegations proper. We would be prepared to examine any other proposals the Foreign Ministry may advance on this particular problem, although we continue to believe that the present modus operandi is the one least likely to excite adverse reactions in both Germany and France.

Copies of this airgram are being sent to Frankfort, Bonn, London and Strasbourg and comments from these posts are invited. London may at its discretion discuss the contents of this message informally with the Foreign Office.⁶

Acheson

2. For the French texts of the letters exchanged by Adenauer and Schuman at the signing of the agreements on the European Coal and Steel Community at Paris on April 18, see Folliot, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 242–243; for English translations, see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 334–335; for further documentation on the European Coal and Steel Community, see volume iv.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 940.
4. Not printed.
5. Neither printed; they indicated that the United States opposed full membership of the Saar in the International Labor Organization and the World Meteorological Organization (398.06–ILO/2–2351 and 399.7294/3–2851).
6. Ambassador Gifford reported that the substance of this airgram had been conveyed to the British Foreign Office, whose spokesman “expressed full agreement with Dept’s views.” (Telegram 5998 from London, May 17, not printed, 762A.00/5–1751)