762A.00/9–1451
Memorandum by the Director of the Eastern Element of HICOG (Morgan)1
The central problem for West Berlin (unless war comes) is how to tide over until the balance of power in Europe is shifted enough to enable the West to deal with pressures against Berlin on favorable terms. That may take several years.
Meanwhile an increasingly critical phase looms ahead, due to (1) prospective completion of the canal by-pass, which will neutralize our most potent single weapon, (2) diminishing value of Berlin to the Soviets as a channel for illicit trade, (3) intensification of the Soviet drive against West German rearmament coupled with steady failure of Communist lures (which indicates increasing reliance on pressures), (4) development of a tactic (certificates of origin, Autobahn toll) which has had some success in dividing Allied views and in causing even non-Communist Germans to regard the increasing difficulties as due chiefly to Allied intransigeance, (5) communist need to isolate East Germany more completely from Western influence, notably in order to increase productivity by exploiting labor. To these might be added (6), a possible belief on part of GDR political leaders that the GDR has already achieved a certain degree of economic independence from the West, and that they have successfully extended international smuggling operations to circumvent existing restrictions at least for the most essential goods.
The critical sector is Berlin communications. The military sector has been adequately reinforced: the Soviets are unlikely to try force short of general war. The economic sector is increasingly sound except for the communications problem. The political (including public morale) sector, though at times thorny, will probably hold out unless the economic sector is badly hit.
We are now in the midst of a very gradual but serious build-up against Berlin communications. Western counter-measures have so far not availed to stop it. The key problem is whether to (a) continue along present lines, (b) relax our counter-measures (as some advocate),or (c) bring maximum non-military pressures to bear in such a way as to bring the whole issue of free access clearly and immediately to a head and win a decision which would set the Soviet buildup back to zero and thus gain time toward the long-range objective of tiding over in Berlin. This would include stopping Soviet canal traffic [Page 1946] through West Berlin—e.g. by closure for repairs—and also the proposed use of Kiel canal and Hamburg free port sanctions if possible. (Frankfurt now says they are “improbable” not “impossible”.)
“C” would evidently be desirable per se; the main question is whether it is within our capabilities, and if so whether it involves too great risks.
In this connection, it should be noted that the Department’s proposal (which we endorsed) for Tripartite action in Moscow is a mixture of “c” and “a”: it would bring the whole issue to a head, but as sanction it would employ only continued non-signature of the IZT agreement. Though this sanction may in the end prove sufficient, there are reasons for fearing that it may not (when tied to all Berlin harassments), and for expecting in any case that under such a load it will work so slowly that the decision may be won only after protracted damage to Western position. There are increasing signs that the broad political and economic aims associated with present harassments of Berlin are such that the Soviets may accept grave East German losses in order to persist with the build-up. (Note also that their handling of the WYF showed a reckless sacrifice of East German communist interests for the sake of wider ones.2) So if we are going to bring matters to a head, we should back our move with the maximum sanctions that are not too risky, in order to maximize the chance of an early decision.
Other reasons for doing this are: (1) after contractual relations are substituted for the occupation statute we may be in a generally weaker position for securing West German cooperation on such matters; (2) this is probably our last chance to use Berlin’s hold on the canal system as a weapon; (3) the present harvest time is particularly propitious for interference with barge traffic; (4) we are in more favorable position to act strongly before West Berlin has been hurt economically than after serious economic damage (which requires only a few turns of the screw) has been suffered; (5) we may have difficulty nerving some Germans and Allies to sit out a long siege over the IZT signature.
The dependence of the Orbit on the canal system through West Berlin is such that denial of this traffic to the East would add very powerfully to the incentives to the Kremlin to back down temporarily in Berlin. If the Hamburg and Kiel canal sanctions were added, all the better. In either case our capability of winning a decision, while of course not certain, seems substantially probable.
As to whether such moves might precipitate a blockade or semi-blockade instead, this question depends in part on an estimate of the whole pattern of chess-moves in the world struggle, which can best be made in Washington. As a contribution to such an estimate, we can [Page 1947] point out: (1) The Kremlin is never “provoked” into a move unless it is generally prepared to take it anyway. If they are now about ready for a blockade, as part of wider strategy, our action might speed the step by a few weeks or even months, but hardly more. This small difference of timing could hardly be a major loss for the West, and could be a distinct gain, as a spur to greater unity and energy. If the Kremlin is not ready for a blockade, it will have no difficulty in backing down, as it did earlier this year on the canal issue. (2) Current signs, for what they are worth, make it seem more probable that the Kremlin will not be ready for as drastic a stand as a blockade for some months yet—notably until the canal by-pass is nearly completed. (3) The economic losses which apparently helped induce the Kremlin finally to terminate the previous blockade would be as great or greater this time (the canal weapon was not used then, and economic activity is at a higher level now). The political losses are more difficult to assess, but should still seem substantial as long as the communist line includes wooing West Germans. (4) A blockade means a serious risk of general war, and there are reasons for thinking that the Krelmin would prefer to postpone that. On the other hand (5) a war scare in Western Europe might seem useful to the Kremlin, (6) serious risk of war in Berlin might be chosen as a diversionary move supporting more serious action elsewhere (Korea, Jugoslavia, etc.), and (7) as indicated above on page 1, item (6), Soviet and GDR politicians may be misled by wishful thinking into believing that their economy is less vulnerable than in 1948, despite evidence to the contrary (as in “3” above). In sum, the question of a blockade poses a calculated risk which, on balance, seems worth taking on the basis of evidence available here, though the full score can only be added up in Washington.
The bulk of this memo has been devoted to alternative “c” because it seems to be the one which requires most additional thought. If alternative “a” of continuing along present lines were adopted, that should mean essentially not bringing the whole issue of free access to a head but rather dealing with harassments piecemeal and applying such related counter-measures (together with “face-saving” offers) as seem best suited to discourage further harassments and perhaps to induce the Soviets to yield on particular issues. This is obviously the right policy if “c” is finally deemed unwise. It would seem to work best if the issues were kept separate rather than all or several tied to the IZT agreement. One difficulty is that we rapidly run out of appropriate counter-measures—e.g. IZT for certificates of origin, barge tax for autobahn, but what for confiscations, parcel post cars, Rothen-see, or the next “Schikan” and the ones that come after that? Another difficulty is that if, as can be expected, this line of action had to be [Page 1948] continued for a protracted period of time, it might put Allied and German solidarity to a serious test. Also, leaving negotiations to German representatives, whose attitude and determination do not coincide with ours, involves the danger that the final solution for the present problems may be an uneasy compromise which will sacrifice principles to the Soviets unnecessarily, thus legitimizing and handing over tools for future action against Berlin. Another drawback of such a course would be the nature of the negotiations, which would continue to deal with technicalities of arguable nature rather than with the principle of free access to Berlin, thus failing to take an initiative which is the most likely to rally public opinion and Allied-German solidarity. Finally, it would let go a potential position of strength by default possibly braking Soviet advance against Berlin, but leaving the way more open politically, psychologically and otherwise for renewed and increased harassment in the future.
For alternative “b” of simply giving in and permitting signature of the IZT agreement, without Soviet fulfillment of even our minimum demands, there is little to be said. It would merely yield another step to the Soviet advance, and thus increase their suspicion of our weakness in a way that subsequent re-imposition of sanctions would not fully erase. Such a step might conceivably be forced on us in the future if German and some Allied morale begins to cave in, but that is far from the case as yet. Meanwhile we should remember that this is a poker game for cool nerves, and take warning from famous cases, like Gallipoli in World War I, where the Allies gave up just when the enemy had fired his last shell.
- The source text was sent as an enclosure to a letter from Morgan to Laukhuff, not printed, dated September 14, which stated that it had been sent directly to Laukhuff “because certain lines of thought in it may be useful in Washington.”↩
- For documentation on the World Youth Festival in Berlin during August, see pp. 1987 ff.↩