Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.0221/8–2351: Telegram

The Director of the Berlin Element of HICOG (Jones) to the Office of the united States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Berlin, August 23, 1951.

Unnumbered. Ref mytel 341, rptd Dept 288, Bonn 127, Paris 103.² We have been increasingly disturbed of late over seemingly intransigent attitude of French here which has led to stalemate on number of important matters affecting Berlin. This attitude has been particularly marked in discussions, both formal and informal, re new relationships to be introduced in Berlin as corollary to contractual agreements in West. French Econ Adviser Lefort, now also Acting Deputy Commandant, has several times recently expressed to us his concern over obviously fundamental differences of opinion and he invited Wellington, US Pol Adviser Berlin, to informal mtg at his house Aug 21 to discuss problem in attempt to expose and if possible reconcile differences. French Polad de Lousse also present.

It was agreed at outset of discussion that all would speak quite frankly and that, although views presented would obviously be within framework of policies of respective govts, some comments might of necessity merely represent personal interpretations of those policies.

French opened by expressing their basic fears that liberalization of controls in Berlin would enable Germans to lead Allies into war. Berlin, they said, represented “the spearhead, the springboard” of German irredentism re East Ger territories. If Berlin govt, especially Reuter, were allowed leeway in conduct of city affairs and, above all, if they were allowed too close association with West Germany, they would incite West German irredentism to point where Allies would inevitably be drawn into war. Western defense not yet adequate to war which, if it came now, would mean France “would be finished forever.” French policy recognizes importance of maintaining Allied position in Berlin and making city “show window of West” but this should be achieved without incurring risks which would inevitably follow if Allies relaxed any of controls aimed at preventing Berlin becoming twelfth Land, “by back door” or otherwise.

Wellington pointed out that although she assumed US policy remained favorable in principle to Berlin’s becoming twelfth Land, she felt she could assure French that US had no intention of pressing for twelfth Land status in foreseeable future. Given this assurance and knowing Brit attitude was more or less same, French position seemed somewhat illogical, since as long as Allies stood firm on this point it was impossible for Berlin to become twelfth Land, even by back door. Furthermore, French argument that closer Berlin-West Germany association would enable Berlin to incite West German irredentism seemed unrealistic in view general West German lack of interest in Berlin and Sovzone, and fact that even Oder-Neisse line presently little more than propaganda football. (French admitted validity this point.) In fact, prolonged unnatural separation of Berlin from West appeared present greater potential danger of inciting irredentism than would normal association of the two free parts of Germany. If French agreed that Berlin should be show window of West, city must be allowed to develop its ties with West. Bluntly speaking, show window had been maintained largely by means of US dollars, and it was difficult to envisage continued effective maintenance on this basis if city was to be isolated economically and politically, as well as geographically, from West Germany.

French then expanded their argument re irrenderitism. SPD, they said, as most vocal agency in this respect, offered greatest danger. Should Berlin become too closely associated with West Germany, Reuter might gain ascendancy in party over Schumacher and, since he followed more reasonable line in general, he might attract West German adherents who shy away from Schumacher’s radicalism. If, therefore, through Reuter’s influence, SPD gained in power in West Germany, danger of Allies being drawn willy-nilly into war would be increased. When asked if what they really meant was that they considered radicalism of Schumacher less dangerous to Allies than reasonableness of Reuter, they somewhat shamefacedly admitted this was more or less the case.

Asked if real reason for their attitude toward Berlin did not lie in their fear of a reunited Germany with Berlin as capital, they warmly but rather perfunctorily denied this was so. European unity, which was essential, must be based on Franco-German rapprochement. Schuman Plan, Pleven Plan³ were steps in this direction. Given 2–3 years, unity could be achieved by such means. Then, but not until then, would West be in position to risk more positive policy re Berlin and steps toward German reunification.

After several hours discussion along above lines, Wellington was asked to summarize US position re Berlin. On understanding that statement must obviously be subject to confirmation by higher authority, following was presented as outline of US views:

• 1. No twelfth Land status in foreseeable future, given continuation of present situation (although if GDR were to declare Berlin a sixth Land this would presumably change picture).
• 2. Supreme authority to be retained by Allies.
• 3. Beyond this, Germans to be allowed to conduct their own affairs subject only to Allied intervention, or Allied resumption of authority in whole or in part, if necessary to maintenance of security, fulfillment of international obligations and interests of their govts or preservation of city’s economic and financial stability. (Re latter point French at first asserted complete disinterest in retaining control although they recognized US interest in view US financial aid. When Wellington explained this point was intended include such matters as recent Warenbegleitscheine and other trade difficulties, French somewhat lukewarmly conceded its importance).
• 4. Closest possible ties, short of twelfth Land status, to be encouraged between Berlin and West Germany, this to include permission for Berlin to pass laws which adopt Fed laws merely by reference (this is presently subject of considerable controversy in Kommandatura); to merge certain offices and services with those of Fed Rep such as, perhaps, Postal Dept; and, where necessary in view of economic and financial aid given Berlin by Fed Rep, or because of other practical reasons, to permit Fed Rep to exercise certain amount of authority over Berlin city govt.

Wellington explained that above was based on following considerations: (a) Berlin cannot be expected to maintain its unique and valuable position behind iron curtain if it is not allowed normal progress in conduct of its own administration and in development of its natural ties with accessible parts of Germany; (b) it would have disastrous psychological effect and play into hands of Communist propagandists if Berlin lagged too far behind West Germany in relaxation of controls; and (c) it is wholly unrealistic and unreasonable to impose greater controls than reduced Allied personnel can effectively administer.

• French position summarized as follows:
• 1. No twelfth Land status.
• 2. Allied supreme authority retained.
• 3. No association with Fed Rep which would give city any attributes of even de facto twelfth Land status (French consider US point 4 above would lead to such status).
• 4. Reduction in number of present reserved powers but otherwise no relaxation of controls.
• 5. Allies to have right of prior approval of German action “in certain fields”. (French intentions this point unclear. When pointed out to them that, even under para 5 of present Statement of Principles,⁴ German legislation is not subject to prior approval they hemmed and hawed but, in answer to direct question, admitted they would prefer to revert to prior approval in some fields).

Lefort aptly summed up opposing views by saying “We both consider show window must be maintained but while you are willing let Germans fill it as they wish, subject only to withdrawal of objects of which you disapprove, we want to control all that goes into it.” Wellington suggested that what French really wanted was complete isolation of city from West Germany as well as maintenance of tight control. French agreed.

In concluding discussion, French said basic differences obviously so great they saw no hope of reconciling them on Berlin or even HICOM level. They expressed opinion, however, that resolution of problem so important as to warrant discussion by Fon Mins in September.⁵ They intended, they said, cable Paris at once giving gist of conversation which they felt had been valuable in exposing differences hitherto unclarified. They agreed that, like US position, French position had only been personal interpretation. They said it now probable that Quai d’Orsay would ask French Embassy Washington to seek State Dept confirmation of US views as expressed by Wellington.

Since British were not present at mtg it w;as agreed that conversation might be reported to them if any of participants wished. We intend do this tomorrow.

Comment: It is difficult to estimate whether French position as outlined above is wholly accurate interpretation of governmental policy. We have gained impression in recent months that some of French here, particularly de Leusse, are inclined to put words into mouth of Quai d’Orsay when they wish to be more than usually restrictive. This impression is further borne out by fact that in some cases where tripartite agreement in Berlin has been impossible because of adament French stand, agreement has subsequently been reached in High Commission without too great opposition from French there. (Brit here recently remarked that they attributed this to “fact that François Poncet is under strict instructions to get along with McCloy”.)

Whatever the facts may be, we agree with French opinion that high level resolution of fundamental differences is essential if we are to make any progress here in future on tripartite basis. Even day to day operations are at present difficult, with French usually in opposition to Brit–US, and Kommandatura work bogged down as result. In conversations with Brit during past several weeks, it has become apparent that their views re future policy in Berlin are now more or less in accord with ours as outlined above, and that little difficulty is to be expected in reaching agreement with them re basis of new Allied-German relationships.

Jones

1. This telegram, drafted by Wellington, coordinated with Lyon, and cleared by Jones, was also pouched to Washington, Paris, and Bonn. The source text is the copy in the Department of State files.
2. Not printed; it transmitted a summary report on the meeting discussed in detail in this telegram.
3. For documentation on the Schuman Plan, see volume iv; regarding the Pleven. Plan for a European Army, see pp. 755 ff.
4. For the text of the Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kommandatura and Berlin, as modified by the First Instrument of Revision, dated March 8, see Sixth Quarterly Report on Germany, January 1–March 31, 1951, pp. 145–146.
5. For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings at Washington, September 10–14, see pp. 1163 ff.