Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A. 00/3–2751

Draft National Security Council Staff Study¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 26, 1951.

Policy With Regard to a Possible New Berlin Blockade

the problem

1. To discourage a reimposition of the Berlin blockade, and to hold the city in the event a new blockade is imposed either by the Soviets directly or by the German Democratic Republic.

analysis

2. NSC 24/3 approved as governmental policy on June 15, 1949,² recommends certain courses of action in the event the USSR reimposes the Berlin blockade. The principal recommendations of current concern are that:

• a. All measures requisite for the reinstitution of the counter-blockade be kept in readiness.
• b. The airlift system be kept in a state of readiness for full operation.
• c. All efforts, including the airlift, be made to increase the reserve stocks of supplies in Berlin.

3. This policy was further supported by a decision of the U.S., British and French Foreign Ministers on May 12, 1950, that the Allied High Commission should be prepared to take effective and appropriate counter-measures if the Soviets should again disrupt Berlin’s communications with the West; and seek to ensure that any future trade agreement between Western and Eastern Germany should not preclude the application of such counter-measures.³

4. The Foreign Ministers’ Agreement on Berlin Security, dated September 19, 1950,⁴ (included in NSC 89, October 20, 1950⁵) further implemented the recommendations in 2, a and c above, and the NAT deputies have now agreed in principle to the action called for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Agreement. Most of the Agreement on Berlin Security was based on a HICOG–EuCom–USCOB paper (submitted in NSC 89).

5. The commitment of aircraft to the Korean War has seriously reduced the US ability to resume a full airlift Moreover, it seems clear that the Soviets have a capability to jam flight radio communications, and possibly radar as well, although there does not appear to be agreement as to the effectiveness of such jamming or Allied ability to overcome it. A JCS memorandum to the NSC, dated October 30, 1950^*, states that “a combined US–UK study indicates that the Soviets have, and will exercise, a capability of interference with an airlift.” Moreover, it states that the diversion of large numbers of multi-engined aircraft to an airlift is considered militarily unsound under present conditions.

6. The first-phase plan for stockpiling in Berlin whose implementation is virtually completed provides food, fuel, medical supplies, and raw materials sufficient for one year with severe rationing, assuming an airlift of 2,000 tons per day. This stockpile would maintain the city for 150 to 165 days without any airlift.

7. With such a stockpile and assuming a relatively small airlift in the event of a new full blockade, Berlin would be an almost totally isolated city living on its substance. From a morale standpoint, it is doubtful whether the population would hold out for as long as the stockpile would last, in the absence of visible evidence that the West was making every effort to support and free the city. The Berliners’ morale is better than in 1948, thanks in large part to Allied efforts in the political, economic and military fields. The improved morale could be quickly weakened, however, by a strong Communist offensive such as a blockade combined with a failure of the West to counter it vigorously. Meanwhile, the economic level of the Soviet Zone Germans, while still below that of employed West Berliners, has been slowly improving and is now perhaps equal to that of unemployed West Berliners. During a blockade the Berliners would almost certainly be living less well than the people around them, and relative to their own present standard of life the Berliners would suffer much more than in 1948–49.

8. While the vulnerability of the Berliners has been increasing, the Soviet Zone has been getting in a better position to do without imports from the West; and there is evidence that this is true of the whole Soviet orbit.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to NSC, dated February 7, 1951,^† recommended that under present conditions and during the continued Soviet occupation of East Germany, in the event of a Berlin blockade imposed either by the USSR or by East Germany which does not involve an armed attack upon the Western Allies, the United States should take a series of actions which amount to somewhat less than the NSC 24/3 program, or than what was actually done during the 1948–49 blockade, and that if this action should be unsuccessful in lifting the blockade further action should then be determined at the highest level.

10. It can be fairly assumed that under present conditions, once a blockade had been decided upon, with the realization that a counter-blockade would be more or less inevitable, implementation of the Allied plans and proposals outlined above would not break the blockade in less time than similar Allied actions took to induce the lifting of the previous blockade (about eleven months). Since the ability of the Berliners to hold out that long without a full airlift is questionable, the Department of State does not consider the present plans for meeting a new blockade, or the specific proposals of the JCS, to be adequate. It can be predicted now that they would not achieve our objective of holding Berlin.

alternate courses of action

11. Possible ways of improving our plans fall into three main categories:

• a. Action designed to prevent or discourage the reimposition of a blockade.
• b. Action to improve the supply and morale of Berlin during a blockade.
• c. Action designed to break or cause the lifting of a blockade.

Action to prevent or discourage a blockade.

12. Retaliation which has been undertaken against Soviet restrictions on Berlin trade and transport since the lifting of the “big blockade” on May 12, 1949, has also in part served the purpose of discouraging further restrictions. Examples of such retaliation are the steel embargo in force from February to July 1950 and periodic delays of Soviet Zone barges in Western Berlin when the Soviets obstruct water transport to Berlin. Such retaliation has usually led to a partial relaxation of Soviet restrictions, but new restrictions were usually imposed after a short while. The results have been far from satisfactory. One reason for this has undoubtedly been that the retaliatory action has always been taken after undue delay and has been incomplete as to enforcement. The British, French and West German governments have always been reluctant to hit hard with retaliatory measures. With the approaching termination of occupation controls it will be necessary to persuade the Germans to take over the retaliation program.

13. The HICOG–EuCom–USCOB paper (NSC 89) recommended other action to discourage or prevent a new blockade. It suggested a psychological offensive to convince the Soviets that a blockade would be met firmly by a counter-blockade and other measures. This offensive is being prepared. The HICOG–EuCom–USCOB paper also suggested that widespread sabotage action might be encouraged throughout the Soviet orbit or at least in the Soviet Zone of Germany to distract the Soviets and to convince them that the basis of their power is insecure.

14. After examination of this proposal, in consultation with the appropriate Government agency, the Department of State has concluded that it cannot favor taking such action in advance of a blockade, though very limited disruptive actions involving limited risk might be undertaken. Allied controls over trade in strategic items are also important in discouraging a new blockade in that they hold down the Soviet orbit’s strength for aggression. It does not need to bo stressed that European cooperation in these trade controls needs to be improved. However, with recent negotiations and with the expansion of the Western European armament production, this situation is gradually improving.

Action to improve the supply and morale of Berlin during a blockade.

15. The stockpile mentioned above is intended to ensure Berlin supply for a period, but its limitations have been described. The feasible magnitude of a possible airlift would depend on availability of transport planes, crews and ground crews, as well as Soviet capabilities for jamming radar and flight radio or otherwise obstructing our planes and our ability to overcome the effects of such jamming and obstruction. Intensified exploration of these factors should be undertaken. Possibly the production of military transport airplanes should be increased, so that sufficient craft would be available for emergencies such as a new blockade. It would appear useful to study and arrive at an agreed estimate of Soviet jamming capability. It would also seem necessary to put American ingenuity to work devising means of overcoming such jamming, since it could affect not only a Berlin airlift but also air transport and bombing anywhere in or very close to the Soviet orbit. Within the near future a new estimate of American and Allied airlift capacity for Berlin, taking account of all factors, should be drawn up, and such an estimate should be revised frequently so that it is constantly available as a realistic guide to planning. It is to be hoped that these efforts would result in an airlift more extensive than that indicated in recommendation 1a (1) of the JCS February 7, 1951, memorandum.⁶

Action to break or cause the lifting of a blockade.

16. NSC 24/3 and the JCS memorandum of February 7, 1951⁶ provide for a counter-blockade as the main instrument to break a blockade. The agreements outlined in the Analysis above will, if implemented vigorously, produce an effective counter-blockade. They will shortly have to be presented to the German authorities for acceptance. However, not only is there question as to their enforcement, but also, as mentioned above, there is evidence to indicate that the Soviet orbit is in a progressively better position to withstand a counter-blockade. One answer to this increased strength would be an extension of the counter-blockade until it became economic warfare against the whole Soviet orbit. This would broaden the program called for in JCS recommendation 1 a (2). Our ability to do this would depend on the temper of our Allies at the time such action became necessary.

17. Another possible action would be to weaken the Soviet orbit after a blockade had begun, by the sabotage campaign mentioned in paragraphs 12–14 above. It would not seem wise to conduct such sabotage outside Germany in connection with this issue, but a well-planned and limited sabotage campaign, largely non-violent, in the Soviet-occupied areas of Germany would be feasible.

18. Bringing the issue into the United Nations again would at the very least exercise psychological pressure to break a blockade and might lead or contribute to more tangible pressures. This would constitute “appropriate diplomatic action” (recommendation 1a (3) of JCS memorandum of February 7).⁶ At the same time, there should be “no attempt to reinforce the United States garrison in Berlin” (JCS recommendation 1 a (5));⁶ and, in the event a unified command for the defense of Berlin has not been established, the United States should take action in concert with the British and French to establish immediately such a unified command (JCS recommendation 1a(6)).⁷

19. It must be assumed that the Soviets would have discounted in advance all or part of the above-suggested measures and that they might not hurt the Soviet orbit enough to cause the lifting of a new blockade in time to save Berlin, unless an airlift comparable to the previous one could be mounted. Thus, it seems necessary to re-examine the question of a possible ground break-through, which means military action of a type sufficient at least to take and hold a corridor to Berlin. It is recognized that under the most favorable conditions such action would involve the risk of a general war. Clearly, then, a decision to take such a step would not be made until the other steps suggested above, and any other means available not involving a great risk of war, had been utilized and seemed likely to fail. The question which would then have to be decided would be: risk war by an attempted break-through or abandon Berlin. Such a decision obviously should not be taken by the United States alone. This study suggests, however, that it is likely that the decision would have to be faced if a new blockade were imposed. It should be stated at this point that, while the Soviets would probably prepare for the other steps suggested before undertaking a blockade, they might not count on a possible ground break-through. This consideration means only that the risk of war might be less than anticipated, not that there would be no risk.

20. The probing actions suggested in JCS recommendations 1a(4)⁷ are not believed to be a substitute for a decision on the fundamental question of armed action to break the blockade, nor in the absence of an affirmative decision are they believed desirable. If probing were met with effective resistance and were not followed up with decisive action, the political effect would be worse than if no probing had occurred. If no resistance were met and if land transport were therefore resumed, it would be very difficult to prevent leaks of the information that the probing elements were not to engage in armed action. When that information became known to the Soviets, further land transport and probes would be resisted. If the information that armed action was not intended were held closely enough to prevent leaks, it would be very difficult to prevent incidents leading to armed action. That is, the situation might well get out of hand, leading to hasty decisions with far-reaching effects.

21. On the other hand, if an affirmative decision on armed action had been taken, probing might be a means for determining what further specific steps in the armed action would be necessary.

22. From a political standpoint three possible contingencies are relevant to a consideration of possible ground break-through:

• a. A blockade imposed by the East Germans after Soviet forces had been withdrawn from Germany. This contingency seems very unlikely in the absence of a four-Power agreement for a unified Germany (which would eliminate the danger of blockade). It will therefore not be discussed here, but should be considered if it became likely in the future.
• b. A blockade imposed by the East Germans while Soviet forces were still in occupation. This is the most likely contingency, especially if the German Federal Republic is freed from occupation controls. Such a blockade would signify that the Soviet government did not wish to become directly involved and might indicate that it would not come to the direct aid of its satellite should difficulties ensue. However, the Soviets could not dissociate themselves entirely from the East German action, and a justification for economic warfare against the whole Soviet orbit would exist. If non-military counter-action seemed likely to fail, however, American and world opinion would find military passivity in the face of a relatively weak German Communist force actually imposing the blockade difficult to understand. The enormous political importance of Berlin to Europe, an importance which is at present at least as great as Korea’s significance to Asia, would have to be taken into account. The mood of the European countries at that time, plus Allied strength on the ground in Europe, would probably be determining factors in a decision.
• c. A Soviet-imposed blockade. This would indicate that the Soviets had decided that it was vital to subjugate Berlin and might indicate that the Soviets considered it worth risking a war to do so. It might be vital to the Soviets in order to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe, or in order to prepare an offensive against the West, or both. The Soviets would probably hinder an airlift to the maximum degree, in order to bring about a quick decision. This would face the free world with the most naked kind of aggression, not different in quality from overt military aggression. The fall of Berlin would be correspondingly demoralizing to anti-Soviet forces throughout Europe. The decision would have to be made in this light, even though the Soviets might be prepared to withdraw in the face of Allied military action.

conclusions

23. Accordingly, the program outlined in NSC 24/3 should be broadened to include the following measures:

• a. Action to Discourage a New Blockade.
  • (1) Efforts should be made, in agreement with the German authorities, to speed up and make more effective and automatic measures of retaliation against every significant Soviet or East German restriction on Berlin trade and transport. The standard for such action should be that trade between Western and Eastern Germany should be kept constantly somewhat more difficult than trade between Berlin and Western Germany.
  • (2) Through information and other channels the effort should be made to convince the Soviets that a new blockade would be met firmly by appropriate measures.
  • (3) The security export controls of the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit should be strengthened and made more effective, but should not be pressed to the point of all-out economic warfare, except as a measure of retaliation against overt aggressive action such as a blockade.
• b. Action Designed to Improve Berlin Supply and Blockade.
  • (1) A stockpile of food, fuel, medical supplies, raw materials and other necessary items in maximum practicable amounts should be constantly maintained in Berlin. Action: Department of State, ECA.
  • (2) The capability of the Soviets to jam radar and flight radio and otherwise to interfere with an airlift should be intensively investigated, as well as all possible means of overcoming such jamming and other interference. Action: Department of Defense.
  • (3) If it is concluded that an airlift could get through Soviet obstruction, the necessary planes should be made available as soon as possible for the resumption of an airlift. The British and French should be requested to take similar steps. Likewise, available crews and ground crews should be increased in number if necessary. Action: Department of Defense.
  • (4) A revised estimate of Western Allied airlift capacity, taking account of all relevant factors, should be worked out with the British and French and brought up to date at frequent intervals. Action: Department of Defense.^‡
• c. Action Designed to Break any Future Blockade.
  • (1) A counter-blockade with European cooperation should be imposed and tightened around the entire Soviet orbit as circumstances warrant. Action: Departments of State and Commerce.^§
  • (2) Sabotage actions of such magnitude as would be feasible should be conducted in the Soviet-occupied areas of Germany, in cooperation with the British. Action: The appropriate Government Agency. Coordination: Department of State.
  • (3) The issue should be brought to the United Nations, and we should at least propose the immediate dispatch of a UN commission to investigate. Action: Department of State.^║
  • (4) The above proposals, together with the chances of their success, should be discussed at some time in advance of a blockade with the NATO Commander and other countries as appropriate, taking into account the necessity for security. The question of a possible ground break-through under varying contingencies should be explored tentatively with the NATO Comander at an appropriate time. Insofar as practicable, the US should prepare the way to gain UN approval or direction to take such action. However, no attempt should be made at this time to obtain an Allied decision on the question of ground military action. Action: Departments of Defense and State.^¶

1. The source text was attached to a memorandum of transmission by Executive Secretary Lay, dated March 27, which indicated that it was being transmitted for the early consideration of the National Security Council Senior Staff Also attached to the source text was a draft statement of policy on a possible new Berlin blockade, dated March 26. Its elements were the same as those presented in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c of paragraph 23 of the source text.
2. Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 839.
3. For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings at London, May 12–14. 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 828 ff.
4. For text, see ibid., p. 1296.
5. For text, see ibid., volume iv.
6. Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Policy with Respect to Berlin and East Germany,” dated October 31, 1950. [Footnote in the source text]
7. Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, “Courses of Action in the Event East Germany Imposes a Blockade on Berlin,” dated February 16, 1951. [Footnote in source text. Regarding the paper under reference, see memorandum of February 7, p. 1892 and footnote 1 thereto.]
6. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
6. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
6. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
6. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
7. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
7. A footnote in the source text at this point referred to the memorandum cited in paragraph 9.
8. These recommendations represents an expansion of JCS recommendation 1a (1) in memo referenced by footnote to par. 9. [Footnote in source text.]
9. This is an extension of JCS recommendation 1a (2) in memo referenced by footnote to par. 9. [ Footnote in source text.]
10. This accords with JCS recommendation la (3) in memo referenced by footnote to par. 9. [Footnote in source text.]
11. This differs from JCS recommendation la (4) and 1 b. JCS recommendations 1a (5) and (6) are concurred with. JCS recommendation 1c is not discussed, as it concerns a problem different from a blockade. For JCS recommendations see memo referenced by footnote to par. 9. [Footnote in source text. No record has been found in the Department of State files showing further consideration of the source text.]