Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.0221/2–2251: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Berlin, February 22, 1951—midnight.

1070. For Byroade AGSec from Slater. Reference Bonn, sent Department 376, repeated Frankfort 422, Berlin 151, EuCom Heidelberg 8 of 9 December 1950.²

Following is summary report executive session High Commissioners with three western Berlin commandants, held Berlin 22 February 1951, during which following questions were discussed:

(a) Status of reinforcement of Berlin police together with financial requirements involved; (b) Evacuation of non-combatants from Berlin; (c) Status of tripartite integrated staff and unified command for Berlin; (d) Soviet interference inter-zonal waterways.

a. Status of reinforcement Berlin police and financial considerations.

Council noted:

(1) That “force A” which is now raised and in service constitutes approximately 9,000 “police on the beat”, 1,000 criminal police and 2,000 einsatz kommandos (total approximately 12,000 men);

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(3) With respect to “force C” a proposed force to consist of no more than 6,000 volunteers, who could relieve existing police of routine duties in an emergency, that although commandants had authorized Berlin police president on 3 February 1951 to start recruitment this force, no action had been taken;

(4) Commandants recommendation that HICOM use its good offices with Federal Republic and Berlin Government in order to reach agreement for financing einsatz component of “force A” and capital and recurring expenditures of “force B and C” outside of Berlin budget;

(5) That Federal Republic 1950/1951 budget includes sum of DM 6 million for Berlin police with provision additional DM 4 million for next year’s budget all of which has been ear-marked for non-recurring expenses. However, to date, no actual funds have been made available;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(7) That commandants no longer favored establishment of “force C” in view of changed situation. Factors leading this conclusion are that these volunteers now want uniforms and to be paid. Furthermore, that it would be difficult to recruit or attract proper personnel for such force;

(8) UK Commandant’s statement that efficient and adequate arming, equipping and motorizing existing police force would now be most profitable course to pursue and UK opinion that danger of Bereitschaften has declined due to troop reinforcement in Western Zones; increased US/UK tank strength in Berlin; and recent intelligence information re Bereitschaften;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(10) UK view that best way to safeguard Berlin was not to concentrate great armed force there, but rather in Western Germany in order to keep general peace. Pouring millions DM in Berlin would be taking resources from West zones where they could be more profitably employed.

After considerable discussion, Council agreed:

• (a) That planning at this time for “force C” should terminate;
• (b) That it was not desirable to request Berlin Government for financial support for police reinforcement in view of implications and difficulties which might arise from debate in Berlin legislature;
• (c) To instruct HICOM FinCom to meet with Federal Republic Finance Minister Schaeffer and Berlin Senator Haas (City Treasurer) in order to obtain Federal Republic financial support for reinforcement Berlin police; i.e., “forces A and B”. If Federal Republic is not prepared to make such appropriations, FinCom should press for at least DM 6½ million at once for “force A”.

b. Evacuation of non-combatants from Berlin:

Council considered both commandants recommendations that (a) in an emergency, following unanimous agreement, commandants should make timely recommendations to HICOM for evacuation, contacting chairman High Commission by most rapid and direct possible communication and (b) HICOM should arrange discussions in the near future with appropriate commanders with view to establishing agreed plan for Berlin air evacuation and previous Council decisions re evacuation of allied families and dependents from Berlin “that these measures may not be necessary at any stage and are not necessarily related to alerts.

Political consequences of the tripartite measures are such that tripartite approval and special approval of governments is necessary, although US authorities reserve right in special circumstances to unilateral action, informing UK and French authorities accordingly”.

In order to provide opportunity for setting forth clear formula designed to maintain freedom of action for US and in order that HICOM should not bind governments to action only in event of unanimity, I agreed that HICOM special security committee consider both Commandants recommendation and Council decision cited above.

c. Status of tripartite integrated staff and unified command for Berlin:

Council noted that Allied staff Berlin had been established and that it would initially consist of nine officers, including chief of staff and ten enlisted personnel. Staff now is almost complete with exception of French element which has to date only supplied one officer. It is at present acting as planning staff and could not act as operational headquarters without suitable augmentation. Although activities of staff still secret, it has now been decided to allow it to use overtly name “Allied Liaison Committee”.

With respect to new unified command (see paragraph (b) of subject cable), we agreed that nothing further could be done at this time by HICOM until SHAPE examines question.

[Here follows part d of this telegram, printed page 1829.]

[ Slater ]

McCloy

1. Repeated to Frankfurt. Heidelberg, and Bonn.
2. Not printed; it reported on a meeting of the High Commissioners with the Berlin Commandants on December 7 at which were discussed (a) the nature, quantity, and financing of the armament of Berlin police and (b) a unified Berlin defense plan. (762A.0221/12–950)