762.00/2–1651
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1
Subject: Courses of Action in the Event East Germany Imposes a Blockade on Berlin.
1. In connection with the current National Security Council (NSC) Staff project being conducted pursuant to paragraph 42 of NSC 73/42 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated their views on possible United States courses of action in the event East Germany imposes a blockade on Berlin. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that:
- a.
- Under present conditions, and during the continued Soviet
occupation of East Germany, in the event of a Berlin
blockade imposed
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either by the USSR or by East Germany which does not involve
an armed attack upon the Western Allies (for this
contingency see “Agreement on Berlin Security”3) the United States should:
- (1)
- Institute a partial airlift, together with those other states that are able and willing to contribute. This airlift should be continued until Soviet, or ostensibly East German, interference makes it patently impracticable.
- (2)
- Institute an appropriate counterblockade in accordance with the decisions made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on 19 September 1950 (“Agreement on Berlin Security”)
- (3)
- Take appropriate diplomatic action.
- (4)
- Initiate no armed action on land to lift the blockade beyond such probing actions as may be necessary to develop the enemy’s intentions. Make no attempt to force or maintain a land corridor from the West.
- (5)
- Make no attempt to reinforce the United States garrison in Berlin.
- (6)
- In the event a unified allied command for the defense of Berlin has not been established take action in concert with the British and French to establish immediately such a unified command.
- b.
- If the action indicated above is not successful in lifting the blockade any further action to be taken should be determined at that time, at the highest governmental level, in light of the conditions then existing.
- c.
- If, in the course of the blockade, armed action in Berlin should result from an attack upon that city, only the Berlin garrison, augmented by the West Berlin police, should be used to resist the attack, pending further consideration at the highest governmental level as indicated above.
2. In developing their views on this subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that:
- a.
- It would be far more serious from a political and military point of view to accept a blockade of Berlin imposed by the Eastern German Republic than one by the USSR, since a German blockade would be an act of revolt by conquered Germany against the Western Allies. Because of the serious repercussions of such an event throughout Germany and Western Europe, the Western Allies are justified in taking bolder action to prevent this occurrence than may have been expedient at the time of the Soviet blockade.
- b.
- A partial or total blockade imposed by the Eastern German Republic should be resisted by energetic Allied and Western German countermeasures, to include a resumption of an airlift, economic sanctions and appropriate diplomatic action.
- c.
- A partial blockade imposed initially by East Germany might develop into a total blockade by the USSR.
- d.
- Upon conclusion of the Soviet occupation of East Germany, or at such time as the military strength of the Western occupying powers and/or the West German forces increases so as to change their existing relative capabilities with respect to the East German forces, the course of action outlined in paragraph 1 a above should be reviewed and revised accordingly.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that their views in this matter, as expressed above, be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the NSC for consideration by the NSC staff.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The source text was attached to a memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the NSC Senior Staff, dated February 16, not printed. Lay indicated that the JCS memorandum was being transmitted for consideration of the Staff and would be placed on the agenda for an early meeting of the National Security Council Senior Staff. The source text bears the typed indication “For NSC Staff consideration only”.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 375.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 1296.↩