396.1–ISG/3–951: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany, at London 1

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Tosig 473. Pass Spofford for info.

I. In considering problems raised Sigto 506 Mar 6 rptd Frankfort 931, Paris unnumbered,2 we have found it useful to examine our conception of functions which NATO can and shld assume with respect to security in Ger. We are summarizing our tentative thinking for ur info (but not for use in discussions with Fr) because it is basis our specific conclusions with respect to an ad hoc procedure to deal with production of weapons, or components of weapons, in Ger in period before Gers agree to participate in Western Defense.

II. A. We do not believe NATO, whose main responsibility is to establish means of assuring defense of West, now or in foreseeable future will be designed or capable maintaining restrictions on Ger activity for security purposes. Nor do we see possibility that ITS or other members of NATO will be prepared give NATO sufficiently extensive set of responsibilities with respect to mil activity and production of mil equipment in all NATO countries to make it possible for it to administer restrictions on Ger which wld, or cld be said, to involve equal treatment for Ger and others.

B. It is conceivable that recommendations from NATO may ultimately result in Ger concentration on production certain types weapons and no provision for production other types weapons. Resulting imbalance in arms production might have certain security advantages as by-product. These decisions however wld be reached on basis of planning considerations related to efficiency and economy and quite distinct, we believe, from decisions on security grounds such as are incorporated in agreements reached at Brussels and in PLI. While we do not exclude NATO reconsideration of MC–30,3 for example, we believe recommendations NATO makes with respect security policy in Ger shld in future be at about same general level as the Brussels decisions.

C. We believe in general that hard core limitations on Ger freedom of activity in mil and related fields shld be accomplished by contractual agreement with the Gers. To extent that others, if any, are temporarily maintained we believe they shld be excluded from contractual arrangements, [Page 1380] maintained by Occupying Powers, and implemented through agencies of Occupying Powers, that is, HICOM and its successor.

III. In light of above we believe you shld not agree to the Br draft instrs to HICOM if they contain reference to development of procedure for screening in NATO. While we recognize that Fr may be so determined to incorporate concept of NATO screening and approval of mil prod in Ger that they will not agree to establishment of any procedure without it, we are prepared do without an agreed procedure for present if one cannot be obtained without reference to NATO.

IV. Subj to condition in III above, we agree it wld be most desirable to have a procedure such as Br suggest. Procedure shld provide that cases be brought up in HICOM for referral to Govts. We believe it might be best if provision was drafted to provide for HICOM action on instructions from Govts to permit speedy action in cases where no disagreement is likely.

We do not consider it necessary to limit cases which might be considered. Our view is in agreement with yours that we shld avoid creation of an armament industry in Ger before agreement is reached on Ger participation in Defense. We do not believe this objective need prevent production in Ger of urgently needed light weapons of some sorts and of mil equipment and components on a limited scale if we, Br and Fr, agree on specific cases.

V. In anticipation new PLI Agreement we will develop a procedure for preparation and presentation US requests for exceptional authorization production in Ger which coordinates views and action of DPB, and interested agencies Washington-HICOG.

Webb
  1. Repeated to Frankfurt and Paris.
  2. Not printed; it reported that the British were continuing “to press for agreement to refer to governments for ad hoc decision NATO country orders, during period prior to agreement on German participation in defense, for production in Germany of Schedule A items other than those forbidden at Brussels and those HICOM will be instructed to authorize. …” (396.1–ISG/3–651)
  3. For documentation concerning the consideration of MC–30 at the NATO Council meeting at Brussels on December 18, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 517, 531, and 585.