Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

398.10–GDC/9–751: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays)¹ to the Acting Secretary of State ²

secret   niact

Berlin, September 7, 1951—3 a. m.

364. AGSec from Slater. Fol is summary report morning session HICOM deputies with Berlin Commandants and afternoon session with Mayor Reuter and Economics Minister Erhard held Berlin 6 Sept with Ganeval, French chairman; Hays, US; and Ward, UK.

Except for discussion Berlin constitutional difficulties which will be reported subsequently, mtg confined to consideration Berlin East–West trade sit.³ Mtg will reconvene 1000 hours 7 Sept to complete agenda. Reply Dept sent Frankfort 1630, Bonn 88, Berlin 101, Paris 1296, London 1354, Moscow 166 follows separate cable.⁴

1. Allied meeting.

After lengthy discussion in which US/UK met Fr resistance to positive action on almost every point, Council agreed:

a. Each acting High Commissioner wld transmit shortly after 0900 hours 7 Sept fol protest ltr to Chuikov: Begin text. “I invite your attention to three separate actions taken recently by auths of Sov Zone Germany to interfere with free access to Berlin, and to impede transportation of goods between Western Berlin and Western zones Germany, (i) Rothensee ship-lift on Mittelland Canal, near Magdeburg remains closed to barge traffic in spite of assurances given by General Smirnov on 20 January 1951 that repairs on this lift wld be completed by end of February 1951. To compensate for this closure, additional rail facilities were provided, but these have now been withdrawn, (ii) Since May 1951 auths of Sov Zone have refused to permit shipment of certain categories of goods from West Berlin to Western Germany by making illegal demands for certificates of origin. (iii) On 31 August 1951 Sov Zone auths imposed an exorbitant and discriminatory tax on West German and West Berlin motor vehicles which travel between Western Berlin and Western Zones of Germany. Each of above actions imposes new restrictions which were not in effect on or before 1 March 1948, and as such are in direct contravention of provisions of New York and Paris agreements of May 1949. Continuance of these restrictions will not facilitate resumption which we desire of interzonal trade. I protest against these violations and request immed action to ensure that these restrictions are lifted.” End text.

It was also agreed that each commandant wld forward copy above text with short cover note to Dengin for info.

b. Although there shld be no further exchange of ltrs between Kaumann and Orlopp, former authorized to make oral approach to Orlopp to effect that only obstacles in present circumstances to prompt signature of IZT agmt are Sov requirement certificates of origin WBS and tax recently imposed on West Berlin and West Zone vehicles transiting Sov Zone. (Reopening Rothensee ship-lift and granting three extra train paths daily to compensate for nonoperation ship-lift not requirements signature IZT agmt.)

c. To request German representatives at afternoon mtg to submit as matter of urgency proposals on imposition taxes on East Zone barges passing through Western Berlin which wld provide reimbursement West German vehicle owners (and West barge owners if Sovs impose counter tax). Proposals shld specify rates, conditions, manner and against whom taxes shld be levied. In addition, FedRep shld consider imposition of tax on East Zone vehicles travelling in Western Germany.

d. Unless Sovs lift restrictions, countermeasures referred to in c above shld be taken by 17 September at very latest. (If Germans fail to take such action, Ward and I indicated that our govts might consider it necessary for Allies to act.)

e. To instruct econ and finance advisors to keep in close contact with Berlin and FedRep Germans in order to keep HICOM fully informed and in position to act quickly.

f. To issue a press release which wld cite Allied protest to Chuikov, mention conditions for IZT agmt signature and note that Allies and Germans were considering certain measures which might be taken to counter Eastern restrictions.

In pressing for simple ltr of protest to Chuikov which wld not contain threats or any complaint which was not clear violation of New York or Paris agmts, I argued this matter might eventually have to be handled at govt level and therefore we should only include violations of international agmts which our govts cld contest. We agreed that Allied transport auths cld handle rail traffic issue by separate approach.

Ganeval repeatedly pressed for confirmation of Council recommendation referred to in para 5 of Bonn sent Dept 143 rptd info Frankfort 208, Berlin 34, London 56 and Paris 59 of 30 August.⁵ He argued that it was in Allied interests to have IZT agmt signed as soon as possible. Subsequent suspension of agmt if new restrictions imposed once Sov Zone factories had commenced activities wld be most effective weapon. In accordance with Deptel sent Frankfort 1583 rptd Bonn 85, Berlin 99, Paris 1344, London 1309, Moscow 162 of 1 Sept,⁶ I firmly rejected Fr proposal and added that vehicle tax made such approach even more untenable. Ward supported me fully and pointed out Sovs have long been aware that lifting WBS restrictions wld be met by prompt signing of IZT agreement by West. UK Govt took firm position that in view of vehicle tax, signing IZT agmt wld represent “horrible loss of face for West”. He later informed mtg that press in UK was becoming most critical of West’s lack of firmness in Germany in countering Sov tactics.

Fr throughout meeting attempted to magnify difficulty of implementation of western tax counter-measures. In reply Ward said system of taxation cld be introduced on 24 hour notice. (Most check points are in UK sector). He stressed that counter tax on barges shld be clearly earmarked for reimbursement purposes. We agreed experts shld determine if taxes from Sov barges would be sufficient to subsidize both autobahn and West barge traffic. UK experts thought taxes wld be sufficient, Ganeval, to support argument that no action cld be taken for some time, repeatedly argued that imposition of taxes wld require Berlin and FedRep legislative action. (In afternoon session Reuter said German lawyers were not in agreement on this point, but that he did not feel that legislation was necessary in Berlin and that administrative action cld be taken in 24 hours.)

Mtg accepted by [my?] proposal that econ and finance advisor shld ensure that Western Allies give all possible assistance to alleviate Berlin transport difficulties particularly with respect to such perishable shipments as milk.

2. Meeting with Reuter and Erhard.

Ganeval informed Germans of decisions cited in paras 1 a, b and c above. Ward and I stressed that Kaumann shld not submit any further written proposals to Orlopp which were designed to break deadlock as Sovs knew what West desired in exchange for signature IZT agmt.

Erhard made fol points and then left mtg before receiving Allied reply:

a. At last fed gov Cabinet mtg agmt cld not be reached to take reprisals in FedRep to GDR vehicle tax restrictions because of “present lack of necessary records”. That did not mean after due consideration fed gov wld not be prepared to take similar measures against vehicles from Eastern Zone travelling in FedRep area.

b. Implications and pros and cons of such reprisals were now being considered but from “practical viewpoint it must be admitted that West was in weak position and therefore any steps which might be taken wld have a decided influence on economic, political and social life of West Berlin”.

c. It wld be in interest of both FedRep and West Berlin if IZT agmt became effective at once.

d. There wld be much less polit difficulty if discussions wld take place solely between West and East German auths rather than through Allied media. Germans have impression that Eastern auths were prepared to discuss matters with them and that relaxations cld now be achieved. Therefore, interzonal trade negotiations shld be conducted by German auths. New vehicle tax measures shld be included on agenda of such interzonal conferences.

e. “Any policy statements directly associated with Allied auths wld lead to stiffening on part of Eastern auths and to further Sov demands. Further, negots which we have been conducting recently have been made particularly difficult because we have had to interpret demands made by Allies who were originators of policy we were compelled to negotiate.”

Reuter then reviewed points made to Berlin commandants on 3 Sept (Berlin sent Bonn 151 rptd Frankfort 409, Dept 342⁷).

Reuter’s enthusiasm for positive counter measures appeared to be considerably dampened by presence of FedRep reps. He pointed out that while last Monday possibility Sovs cld impose counter taxes for shipping on East Zone waterways if West imposed waterways tax was taken into consideration, mtg had not taken into account fact Sovs were in position to by-pass Berlin by water routes. These facts had now been submitted to Allied transport experts by Berlin authorities for consideration. Reuter again asked if commandants cld undertake to transport by milit vehicle and on milit trains a part of foodstuff traffic into Berlin. He finally urged that Allies appoint a commission which wld have authority to make final decision in concert with a similar commission appointed by West Berlin auths. He made ref to slowness of present Allied-German machinery to deal with such matters and need for quick decisions and action.

In reply to Erhard’s criticism that Allies were slow to get instructions to Kaumann, both Ward and I said that if Western reps came to Allies with proposals which indicated they were not “giving in to Soviets” and that Sovs were removing restrictions, they wld receive Allied agreement most quickly.

Ward, in reply to Reuter’s statement, said his experts did not believe that Sovs cld by-pass Berlin by water. UK cld not consider use of milit trains to support Berlin population, as such a course might risk whole basin for present agmt on trains. [Slater.]

Hays

1. McCloy was in Washington for the meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers, September 10–14; regarding their meeting, see pp. 1163 ff.
2. Secretary Acheson was in San Francisco for the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan. For documentation on the San Francisco conference, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
3. Berlin telegram 372, September 7, not printed, reported on the constitutional difficulties, the Berlin stockpile, detention of Germans serving in the French Foreign Legion, and the arming of the Berlin police. (398.10–GDC/9–751)
4. Not printed; it asked for detailed information on the effect of the road toll and suggested various steps that could be taken as countermeasures, including protests, tolls on Soviet vehicles and barges, use of train and air transport, and a possible tripartite protest to Moscow (962.50/9–551). Berlin’s reply on September 8 provided the requested information and comment on the suggested countermeasures. (Telegram 373, September 8, 962.50/9–851)
5. Not printed; but see footnoted, p. 1860.
6. Not printed; it stated that the Western position was sufficiently strong so that the signature of the interzonal trade agreement and the transmittal of a unilateral letter to the East Germans without the achievement of the Western demands was unacceptable. (462A.62B31/8–3051)
7. Supra.