Frankfurt Mission files, lot 311, D (51) 991: Telegram

The United States Commandant for Berlin ( Mathewson ) to the United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ), at Frankfurt 1

secret   priority

76. From USCOB. Personal for McCloy. In Commandants meeting July 16 British proposed that in view deterioration of trade situation Berlin we recommend jointly to HICOM small air lift to move out of Berlin backlog of goods held up by Soviet demand for certificates of origin. I blocked the move saying we should first collect sufficient data to put whole shipping picture before HICOM at time we made recommendation. My real reason for stalling however was that I wished first to have an opportunity to present the picture to my superiors unilaterally—which is the purpose of this message.

Situation has reached a point in my opinion when we must face up to the possible necessity of inaugurating small air lift if only to protect our investment in Berlin. Economic deterioration here will come fast once manufacturers begin to miss delivery dates and Western confidence in ability of Berlin to deliver its goods is laid open to question. [Page 1854] Such confidence has been built up slowly and painstakingly over year and a half of ECA program during which time we have poured average of 40 million marks a month into Berlin economic recovery. Confidence once lost will be difficult to regain. Recently launched new program of 200 million for capital development here is nonsense if it merely buys machinery for plants that cannot get orders.

In very real sense same argument for protecting our investment applies politically as well. We have succeeded in building up in Berlin a morale and a spirit that has won world acclaim. This spirit will survive any crisis, I am convinced, if Berliners are given good reason to believe we are doing what we can to help them. Under present circumstances however Germans are showing considerable anxiety over situation. This is due to lack of understanding as to the real issues involved (is it worth the risk of another blockade they are asking) and to doubt as to what we are prepared to do in a positive way to help them. Soviets meanwhile are capitalizing on this uncertainty in minds of Berlin firms by encouraging them to succumb to illegal practice of by-passing West Berlin Senate and submitting certificates of origin direct to Soviet Headquarters. We do not expect big firms to fall for this but smaller firms have already begun to weaken seeing no choice between this and bankruptcy. Although large firms can hold out financially for a while under present circumstances, smaller firms are already seriously hit and face prospect of being forced out of business.

Finally, lift is certainly directly justified on defense program items, some of which are included among goods covered by 1422 Warenbegleitscheine which were returned unstamped July 13 with demand for certificate of origin. These Warenbegleitscheine represent some 6,000 tons of goods valued at 31 million DM. Included in list is large order for British Ministry of supply. Such special items may in the end have to be moved out by military and of available choices air lift seems by all odds most feasible and least likely to lead to additional complications.

I estimate that lift of approximately 600 tons daily for 30 days would clear up present backlog and take care of essential current shipments of goods on restricted list. This would give us time to bring full pressure to bear on Soviets and unless their intention is to make trouble in Berlin regardless of cost to themselves should achieve our objective of restoring trade flow to normal.

In addition, lift would constitute compelling demonstration to Soviets of our determination to see this thing through and add to pressures being brought to bear on them. Psychological value therefore great in view Soviet loss of face as result previous air lift and presumption they have no stomach for second such contest. In my judgment, [Page 1855] playing this card might well be decisive factor in breaking serious impasse we may well have reached.

All of the above, in my opinion, makes it necessary for us to give serious thought based on local considerations alone, to the mounting of a limited airlift (together with our British and French Allies) possibly within the next two weeks.

Would appreciate your comments.2

Mathewson
  1. Sent also to Heidelberg for Handy and repeated to Bonn for Hays and to Washington for Byroade and Foster.
  2. On July 20 McCloy replied that HICOG’s attitude on the Berlin situation was first to try all reasonable remedies before instituting an airlift. (Telegram 605 from Frankfurt, July 20, 962A.50/7–2051)