460.509/6–1351: Telegram

The United States Commandant for Berlin (Mathewson) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1

secret   niact

387. From USCOB. Personal for Hays.

1. Commandants held special mtg this morning to draft report to High Commission on situation arising from Sov requirement re certification of origin for goods shipments from West Berlin and our instructions to city govt not to comply with it. Report readily agreed except for recommendations to HICOM re action to be taken. Brit and I maintained that serious implications of situation required us to recommend imposition countermeasures, simultaneously in Berlin and FedRep, by Friday June 15 at latest unless favorable reply recd from Dengin meanwhile.2 French was at best lukewarm re countermeasures but was willing to go along provided recommendation of any date omitted. He claimed he had no authority make any such recommendation and in any case he thought it best go slow to see how situation developed and give Dengin time to reply. After lengthy and difficult debate, French reluctantly yielded to Brit and my insistence that commandants submit partially disagreed report. (Berlin’s 386 rptd Frankfort 1687, Dept 14973).

2. I based my position on following.

(a)
As stated in commandant’s report, 75 percent of West Berlin’s normal outbound shipments expected be halted within a week.
(b)
I see little or no chance of favorable Sov reaction to our protest until pressure applied by countermeasures.
(c)
If countermeasures delayed, Dengin may well send negative reply meanwhile which he wld not subsequently be able to reverse even under pressure of retaliation.
(d)
Our whole strategy in this business has been (1) to prevent Germans from complying with new requirement (2) to lodge protest with Dengin and (3) to follow up with countermeasures aimed at forcing him to yield. Having carried through with (1) and (2) it seems to me essential to implement (3) immed or find ourselves in a worse position than when we started. Only a show of strength can win US victory, and show of weakness or delay can have disastrous results to entire Berlin economy which we have spent so much money and effort to build up.

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3. I therefore hope that, with strong Brit support which seems likely, you can obtain HICOM’s agreement tomorrow to impose countermeasures simultaneously in West Berlin and FedRep by noon Friday June 15. We recommend first step of countermeasures consist of stopping shipments to East Zone and East Berlin of all goods on quadripartitely agreed ACA restricted list.

4. I realize difficulty in obtaining French concurrence in such action prior to elections June 17.4 In view urgency of situation however might it not be possible even over French objections to carry through measures, insofar as regards FedRep, in at least US and Brit Zones since they are ones more immed affected as adjacent to Sov Zone?

5. I cannot state too strongly seriousness with which I view situation and firmness I believe essential to turn it to our advantage.

Mathewson
  1. Repeated to Washington and Frankfurt. The source text is the copy in the Department of State files.
  2. On June 11 the Berlin Commandants had delivered identic letters to Dengin, from the Western sectors of Berlin, and denying that anyone other than the Commandants had the legal right to pass judgment on the documentation and movement of goods from their respective sectors. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1474 from Berlin, June 8 (460.509/6–851).
  3. Not printed; it transmitted the text of BK/AHC(51)45, dated June 13, the report of the Berlin Commandants on the implementation of the High Commissioners instructions of June 8. (460.509/6–1351)
  4. For documentation on the French national elections, June 17, see volume iv .