Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

320/12–1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden ¹

confidential
priority
niact

Washington, December 13, 1951—2:20 p. m.

724. For the Ambassador. Hiekerson saw Swed Amb this morning re proposed Swed res in GA on Ger item² (Delga 631, Dec 12 being rptd you, Bonn and London³). Bequest you see Prime Min immed with view his sending instrs to Unden in Paris not to submit draft res in ad hoc comite. You shld stress fol points indicating reasons why draft Swed res highly undesirable.

Point up long history of fruitless Western Allied-Sov negots on Ger question both within Ger and on FonMins level, citing particularly constant Sov obstructions and walk-outs from Allied Control Council and Allied Kommandatura Berlin and recent Paris deps mtg where Sovs made it impossible even to agree on agenda. We are most reluctant become invovled in another protracted four-Power mtg which wld probably result in failure and again raise false hopes and eventual deep disappointment in Ger and elsewhere. From US policy viewpoint such fruitless efforts wld merely delay and interfere with present policy of building defensive strength of West. Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer strongly opposed discussions this subj between East and West Gers since wld play directly into Sov–East Ger Commie hands by arousing false Ger hopes and distracting Gers from policy of integration with West. Purpose of tripartite GA res as requested by Adenauer was to see whether Sovs prepared genuinely cooperate in seeking res of Ger problem and to bring such pressure of world opinion as possible to bear on Sovs to induce improvement in conditions in SovZone. Sov record in Ger makes it essential have evidence through acts of their sincerity and good faith before undertaking any four-Power action to bring about all-Ger elections, unification and peace settlement. Implementation of tripartite proposal wld afford opportunity test Sov intentions whereas Swed res wld play into Sov hands exactly as feared by Adenauer. You shld emphasize our strong concern that four-Power and/or East–West Ger talks on this question now wld risk, in our view, jeopardizing present western policy of strengthening western defense and integrating FedRep into free western world by enmeshing us in protracted but fruitless talks which wld make Ger people more confused and more indecisive. At same time it wld not afford any evidence Sovs sincerely desirous achieving solution Ger problem.

You shld indicate that Swed res also unacceptable and dangerous in its specific terms. Its para two implies that conditions in all parts of Ger are unsatis and must be corrected, thus lumping West Powers and FedRep with Sovs. This failure to recognize that conditions of freedom have been created in West Ger wld certainly be exploited by Commies as evidence of truth their allegations that freedom does not exist in Ger.

Furthermore, conditions specified in para 1 of Swed res do not by any means cover conditions which we have insisted are prerequisite for elections and unification of Ger. We have, for example, insisted that paramilitary and secret police must be abolished and Sov-seized econ enterprises be returned to Ger people before unification can be permitted. Swed res dangerously simplifies problem and wld put us in most difficult position.

Paris and Stockholm authorized at their discretion to indicate that if disinclination serve on our proposed comm is in any way behind new Swed move, we wld of course defer to their wishes although we wld highly value their services.

Dept believes Swedes wld be favorably influenced by direct indication from Gers in Bonn, Stockholm or Paris of their own misgivings over possible effects of Swed Res.⁴

Acheson

1. This telegram, drafted by Laukhuff and Calhoun and cleared with EUR, BNA, and UNP, was repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.
2. A memorandum of Hickerson’s conversation with Ambassador Boheman is in file 320/12–1451.

3. Not printed; it reported that Undén had given Cooper a copy of the following draft which he appeared determined to submit to the Ad Hoc Political Committee Respite the efforts of the U.S. delegation to dissuade him:

   “The General Assembly.

   Having taken note of letters of Nov 5, 1951, addressed to Secretary General of the UN, by which Govts of US, France and UK, acting on proposal made by Ger Fed Chancellor, have brought before the Gen Assembly request for appointment of impartial international commission to carry out simultaneous investigation in FedRep of Ger, in Berlin, and in Sov Zone of Ger in order determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas.

   Having regard to purposes and principles of UN as set out in charter, and taking due account of responsibilities of four occupying powers regarding Ger,

   1. Considers it desirable that elections for Constituent Assembly be held throughout Ger after fol conditions have been duly satisfied before elections, (A) the citizens of Ger must enjoy freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of assoe and assembly, freedom of speech, press and broadcasting (B) polit parties must be free to organize and carry out their activities.

   2. Invites four occupying powers to make necessary arrangements, by mutual agreement and together with reps of Ger nation, for organization of free elections throughout Ger, in conformity with points 1 A-B.

   3. Declares that UN is ready, after having assured itself that all conditions indicated in point two have been satisfied, to offer its help to guarantee freedom of elections, and, particularly, to appoint for that purpose neutral international commission.” (320/12–1251)

4. In a telegram received in the Department of State at 4:08 p. m. on December 14 the U.S. delegation at the United Nations reported that Boecker indicated the West Germans would make direct representations to the Swedes. Delga 648 (320/12–1351).

   In two subsequent telegrams on December 14 the Department of State instructed its Embassies in Copenhagen and Oslo to call on the Danish and Norwegian Foreign Ministries and seek their cooperation in bringing about the withdrawal of the Swedish resolution, and instructed the Embassies in Paris and London to see Schuman and Eden, inform them of the steps that had been taken and urge “that they take similar steps without delay so that all possible pressure can be brought on Swedes directly and through other Scandinavians.” (Telegrams 485 to Oslo and Gadel 465 to Paris, 320/12–1451)