Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

320/11–2051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, November 20, 1951—10 p. m.

Delga 268. Re German item. Refer Delgas 251² and 243.³ Revised draft res on German item (Delga 243) has been cleared with and accepted by UK Govt and informally approved by Parodi of Fr FonOff. In tripartite staff meeting Nov 20, French expressed confidence draft res wld be officially approved by their govt in next two or three days. US del staff (including Laukhuff) on basis Dept’s GADel 190⁴ indicated revised draft also acceptable US.

UK and Fr were not prepared undertake other than highly tentative discussion of outstanding questions (Delga 228⁵) since they had not recd guidance from respective govts on most of them. Following points were however made:

(1) UK and Fr both definitely oppose hearing Germans at UN GA session because they fear it will lend invectiveness and excessive scope to deliberations which should be as factual and limited as possible. Elaboration of German points of view is not necessary nor advantageous at this stage and shld be reserved for presentation COM itself, when and if established. US del staff advanced idea that since item originally initiated by West Gers and since quite likely Sovs will raise issue anyway, it might be better propagandistically to take initiative than be forced into position of secondary approval later. Cooper concurs. It was agreed to leave question open for further consideration.

(2) Suggestion made by German observers re desirability of conducting investigation in FedRep and West Berlin whether or not comm is permitted enter Sov zone (Delga 251) was rejected by UK, Fr and US staff as unwise from viewpoint our policies in Germany. It was agreed that Adenauer shld be sounded out on this (possibly during Paris visit⁶) in order to avoid future difficulty over issue.

(3) It was agreed that possible Sov counter proposal calling for formation mixed east-west German comm shld be rejected with arguments that such comm cld not be expected be impartial and wld exaggerate current unity impasse rather than help remove it because such comm wld be incapable of performing neutral fact-finding type of job required.

(4) Questions 4 and 5 of Delga 228⁷ passed over as relevant to underlying issues which must be kept in mind but as not presenting any immediate practical problems not otherwise covered.

(5) Composition of comm still an open question. Initial UK thinking, which French supported, wld include one satellite state (Ukraine in preference to Poles or Czechs because of bitter national hatred for Ger in these latter) and Sweden, Netherlands or Luxemburg, New Zealand or Australia, Turkey, Siam, and Brazil or Mexico. French suggested NATO powers and powers having troops in Germany shld be excluded (hence Turkey and Luxemburg) otherwise they agreed. We indicated that US del had not firmed up ideas on composition yet.

(6) Generally agreed that comm shld set up headquarters in West Berlin from which it shld operate as unit (particularly if one satellite and one or two shaky neutrals are selected) with field teams of staff assistants located in FedRep and Sov zone for continuous inspection and reporting work. Comm itself wld then be free to interview in Berlin and travel to various areas as single body. This arrangement or something similar wld be necessary to assure simultaneous investigation on one hand and prevent possible division of comm itself in such way as to give less friendly segment sole responsibility for one area. Security factor in interviewing East Germans also taken into account and led to conclusion that much advantageous preliminary work cld be done in West Berlin. These and related points to be considered further in connection with speech preparation.

(7) Generally agreed that sponsorship of resolution shld remain limited to three powers in view of their responsibilities and origin and initial handling of item.

Acheson

1. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, and Moscow.
2. Not printed; it reported that the West German observer at the United Nations, Boecker, had, inter alia, expressed approval of the draft resolution. (320/11–1951)
3. Supra.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 7, supra.
5. Not printed, but see footnote 5, supra.
6. Chancellor Adenauer arrived in Paris on November 21 for discussions with Foreign Ministers Acheson, Eden, and Schuman. For information on their discussions, see editorial note, p. 1312.
7. They dealt with the possibilities of the Soviet Union using United Nations discussions to delay achievement of Western goals in Germany and agreeing to allow a one-time investigation.