762.00/10–2951: Telegram
The Director of the Berlin Element of HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1
737. Ref mytel 683; rptd info Bonn 279, Dept 586, Paris 193. Pouched London and Moscow.2 In conversation with US liaison officer, Ernst Lemmer gave fol account his recent mtg with Dertinger:
Mtg came as surprise as Lemmer had been invited by old friend merely to meet “politically interesting personality.” If identity of “personality” had been known, Lemmer wld have refused invitation.
Dertinger made no bones about fact that he had come to convey a msg with explicit approval of Semeonov and Grotewohl, and Lemmer felt it obvious that he (Lemmer) was intended to convey msg to his Western friends. Sov offer was serious; Moscow wanted it. Eastern efforts for united Ger were very real even if SED infuriated. Technique, mode, and even control of elections were all points where agmt was possible. East was aware Natl Front wld get only small minority in honestly elected Nationalrat. That was unimportant, Russians wanted unified Ger. They insist, however, on one condition. Unified Ger state must guarantee not to associate itself with Washington decisions. Both parts of then-united Ger must turn from their respective occupying powers. Sovs willing to pay high price for neutral Ger; even willing disinterest themselves in Ger. Dertinger ventured, strictly, he said, on his own, that Sovs might even swallow integration of new United Ger into Eur, Schuman Plan participation, etc.
Lemmer here said he interjected to Dertinger that it was obviously impossible to prejudice actions of a govt still to be created by making guarantees such as Sovs demand. Deftinger thereupon turned to “threat and terror” tactics. West was courting catastrophe. It underestimated Sov power. Had not Lemmer read Stalin’s interview re atom bomb? USSR cld sacrifice 40,000,000 people. US had better atom bombs but bombing Russian cities wld not destroy Russia. Sovs have smaller atom bombs but wld US stand up under bombardments with these “old-fashioned” bombs on New York, Chicago and Washington—and soon? His, Dertinger’s, recent speech that USSR wld not tolerate West Ger rearmament had Semeonov’s approval.
Lemmer said he had reported entire interview to Adenauer, Kaiser and deputy Fr HICOM Berard none of whom objected to his handling of it. [Garble] CDU had also voted confidence in him after brief explanation. Lemmer interpreted whole affair as desperate attempt [Page 1804] to prevent Ger participation in Atlantic Pact. Sovs were afraid of Ger soldiers. They were not honest, however, even with their threats. One cld expect them to attempt immediately to fill power vacuum of a neutral Ger by infiltration, subversion or resolution. Here Lemmer disagreed with Kaiser who thought unified Ger wld be strong enough to ward off Commie subversion.
Lemmer said he felt West must continue to push east with concrete suggestions for election laws, control machinery, and free access for election speakers. East must be kept on defensive. According to him Adenauer not quite of same opinion and wants to prevent “talks” at all costs. His emphasis of Oder-Neisse-Line question was thus designed to kill all chance of East-West talks. Adenauer reasons, and Lemmer thought with justification, that any East-West approach wld only make US suspicious and US was only hope for Ger and Eur. Ger cld never afford to alienate US. It was troublesome enough keeping Fr, Br, US and Ger on good terms without such political games as Grotewohl business. But, Lemmer stated, political games started by others cannot be ignored—they must be played and won.
- Repeated to Washington, Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow. The source text is the copy in the Department of State files.↩
- Not printed; in it Morgan reported that Lemmer had had an interview with Dertinger concerning an all-German conference and that the Communist tactics of deception continued in full swing. (762.00/10–1751)↩