Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

700.001/6–1151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, June 19, 1951—8 p. m.

8665. Urtel 9990 June 11.² Agree advisability developing immediately tripartite position with respect to any attempt by Sovs to implement World Peace Council proposal thru World Peace Congress or otherwise. While leaving open for the moment question whether we shld take initiative in proposing prior to Sov-Communist approach an impartial inspection, believe you shld endeavor obtain early tripartite agreement to Western position whose main elements cld be used either as proposal or counter-proposal. Such position shld (a) expose fraudulent character Communist suggestion already made by World Peace Council; (b) express our willingness to sponsor a truly impartial inspection conducted by a commission designated by UN; (c) propose that area of investigation be broadened to include Balkan satellites, i.e. to include all ex-enemy states. We regard point (c) as indispensable point. It follows line we have been increasingly taking since Paris talks began and which we wld take in any CFM, viz., that whatever we may be planning for western Ger has been made necessary not only or primarily by milit preparations in east Ger but by those farther east, and that in any event western Ger is open for anyone to see what is going on, whereas real area which requires investigation is that behind Iron Curtain, from which no info is made available and which therefore causes gravest disquiet to peace-loving peoples.

We agree that in any event we cannot permit any commission appointed by World Peace Congress to inspect western Ger. We recognize that inspection even by UN Commission wld have certain disadvantages and possibly cause embarrassment, and we wld not wish to accept such inspection unless assured that inspection of equal thoroughness wld and cld be made in Iron–Curtain countries. You will note we do not suggest extending inspection to Sov Union in this connection as we feel this might be self-defeating propaganda-wise. On the other hand, it shld be borne in mind that agenda thus far elaborated at Paris includes our proposal for discussion of existing level of armaments, and this will probably lead us to propose elaborate investigation in all countries including US and the Sov Union. If more limited proposal covering Ger and satellites were made at present, it cld be swallowed up in later more universal proposal if made at CFM.³

Acheson

1. This telegram, drafted by Laukhuff and Cox and cleared by Byroade, Olson, Wainhouse, the Policy Planning Staff, and the Bureau of European Affairs, was repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Supra.
3. On June 21 Berlin reported that there was a total absence of any further indications about the proposed commission and speculated that the idea might have been killed in Moscow or might have been merely a trial balloon whose reason was not yet apparent. (Telegram 1531, June 21, 702A.00/6–2151).