Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/4–2651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, April 28, 1951—2 p. m.

7273. Stone from Kellermann re Bonn 772, Apr 24² and 784, Apr 26,³ re Fed Gov prohibition of plebiscite on constitutional grounds. Assume here that action likely to result in arrests and detentions and possibly subsequent public trials of sponsors, promoters, and organizers of campaign and of collectors of signatures.

Dept concerned that arrests and trials may be used by defense and interested parties as opportune platform to propagate neutralism and detract and obstruct European defense program. Argument of defense in court, while implicitly exploiting polit issues involved, might be based essentially on technical grounds such as unconstitutionality of gov and police action. Possible acquittals might be interpreted by Commies and others as polit defeat of Fed Gov and vindication of neutralist position and possible sentences denounced as proof of servility Fed Rep to fon “war-mongers”.

Feeling here that trials might be turned to psychological advantage, if used by prosecution for following purpose: immediately, to identify and expose real sponsors, agents and victims of plebiscite, including financial resources, machinery, methods and targets; ultimately to exhibit, to Germany and world audiences, background of Sov-sponsored “peace” campaigns and wholly fictitious nature of “spontaneous” demonstrations by indigenous captive or deluded populations in favor of peace. Pertinent evidence might be presented by witnesses from Sov-controlled areas, including polit refugees and defectors, called upon to testify to system of control, agitation and terrorization prevailing in Sov Zone and other satellite areas. Acquittal of defendants might in effect be interpreted palpable proof that accused are not real culprits but were stooges coerced or deceived, by instigators and agents beyond reach of court, to engage in activities true purpose of which they failed to perceive.

Foregoing suggestion contingent, of course, on Ger authorities undertaking entire responsibility for conduct of trials. Any indication that trials are even suggested by occupation powers wld be fatal and invite misleading and damaging comparisons with well-known Sov-Commie mock trials of Mindszenty pattern. Assume you agree with us that very discussion of idea with appropriate Ger representatives wld require utmost diplomacy and caution. Same applies to handling of publicity aspects.

Wld appreciate your earliest reaction.⁴ [Kellermann.]

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Kellermann and cleared with Byroade, Calhoun, and Phillips.
2. Not printed.

3. Not printed; it reported that on April 25 the Federal Cabinet had approved the following decision:

   • “1. Plebiscite against remilitarization and for conclusion of peace in 1951 being conducted by SED, authority in power in Sov zone, is intended through camouflage of its subversive aims to undermine free democratic basis of Federal Republic. Execution of this action constitutes an attack on constitutional order of federation.
   • 2. Associations engaged in carrying out this action, particularly committees expressly organized for purpose, are directed against constitutional order and therefore under Article 9 para 2 of Basic Law prohibited by force of law.
   • 3. Land govts are in accordance with Article 5 of law concerning cooperation of federation and Laender in matters relating to protection of constitution requested to suppress every activity of such associations in connection with plebiscite.” (762A.00/4–2651)

4. On May 5 Bonn reported that Bitter von Lex, the State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of the Interior, had indicated the police action against the plebiscite “would be primarily preventive in nature.” Lex anticipated “few, if any, court cases concerning individuals and perhaps a few admin court cases concerning action taken against orgs.” Since the Federal Government was advancing the arguments suggested in telegram 7273, Bonn found it unnecessary to mention them, and concluded “psychological impact of Fed Govt ban supported by all FedRep Laender plus preventive police action appears here sufficient to completely stymie whole SED–KPD plebiscite effort in FedRep.” (Telegram 828, May 5, 762A.00/5–551)