Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

962B. 60/1–1851: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Frankfurt, January 18, 1951—2 p. m.

5922. PEPCO. Though Chancellor’s reply to Grotewohl letter (Bonn’s 459, January 13 sent Frankfort 518²) not entirely satisfactory from psychological point of view and apparently anticipated by Soviets and GDR (Berlin’s 957, January 16 sent Frankfort 1080³), it marks advance in that it (a) represents document agreed to by all Bundestag factions except KPD (Communist), (b) aligns FedRep behind allied unity formula as expressed in letters of HICOG’s to Chuikov⁴ and (c) thus re-enforces our public position on German unity in any forthcoming CFM.⁵

Unfortunate response so long delayed, but Chancellor caught between his own initial rebuff of proposal, ground swell of public sentiment in favor Germans talking among themselves (our opinion polls reveal 60 percent Germans favored principle of talks as proposed by Grotewohl), and intransigent attitude of Socialists that door should be slammed on any discussions with GDK Communist. Kaiser, Minister All-German Affairs, and Wehner, Socialist CHM Bundestag Committee All-German Affairs, have informed us privately that document ran through 29 drafts and that toward end pressure on Chancellor to give somewhat conciliatory reply rose steadily from laender and municipal officials throughout FedRep. Under circumstances, and considering its multipartisan nature, document perhaps best that could be expected but it suffers from defect that its non-conciliatory tone and its enumeration of conditions are being interpreted in West German press as tantamount to rejection of talks which might have advanced German cause. Our press summaries will continue report on this as editorial reaction develops further.

Under tripartite position agreed by PolCom, we intend to continue to treat whole subject gingerly and to seek leave impression of nonintervention in matter which up to now we have regarded as German affair. HICOG’s thus not making any formal or polemic statements. British have commented response in harmony with previously expressed UK position and on behalf McCloy we have issued brief statement that Chancellor’s statement in line with HICOG’s free-election proposal to Chuikov, which remains unanswered by Soviets. French tell us they will probably have no comment. We plan no political move (such as reiteration offer negotiations electoral law on HICOM–SCC level) to exploit response or carry forward Kaiser’s new call for free all-German elections to a national assembly wherein Germans may talk and draft new constitution. Our overt media and our PAO’s have been instructed to support Adenauer–Kaiser lines by emphasizing desirability free elections, improvement conditions within Soviet Zone, and freely elected national assembly as alternative to Grotewohl formula but not, preliminary to CFM, to overstress our prior offer to negotiate electoral law with Chuikov. We do not feel it expedient at this time hammer away either on electoral law offer or unity theme, as such might tend freeze our position before CFM, but we recognize, of course, that we must continue identify ourselves with German unity. We intend remain mute on Oder–Neisse border issue and Adenauer suggestion that Volkspolizei Bereitschaften be disbanded. Latter matter will be subject separate cable.

On balance, must be conceded that Grotewohl letter, aided by almost unprecedented propaganda campaign of great variety and flexibility, made definite impact on West Germans and proved again that blood thicker than ideology in respect attainment German unity. Other side of this coin is that broad popular response to Grotewohl proposals, which connotes latent disposition to effect unity through compromise and rapprochement, indicative of trend toward neutralism reflected in recent opinion polls. Soviets have obviously not exhausted possibilities open to them and we may expect follow-up designed exploit measure of West German dissatisfaction with Adenauer reply, which, however, Soviets may tend to overestimate or overplay. In any event, we are not yet through woods on this issue and must follow closely in developing tripartite positions for CFM. Soviets obviously attach great importance to all-German talks, or convocation all-German constituent council within framework Grotewohl proposals, before CFM, towards ends, we suspect, of (a) tapping mainspring German desire for unity, (b) developing “German voice” to exploit as sounding board before and during CFM (Berlin’s 897, December 30, sent Frankfort 1016⁶), (c) gaining color of recognition for GDR, and (d) challenging Adenauer–Kaiser position (implicit in Chancellor’s reply) that German unity responsibility of Four Powers rather than of Germans.⁷ Propaganda emphasis will probably remain on latter point, together with corollary that Adenauer line dictated by allies (especially US) for purpose appealing to German nationalism, chipping away at our authority and prestige, and coercing us into CFM. Entire “Grotewohl episode” insidious example of Soviet political-propaganda move designed further isolate us from German people.

McCloy

1. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, and Vienna.
2. Supra. The text was released on January 15, at a press conference.
3. Not printed; it reported the reaction of the East Zone press to Adenauer’s reply and commented that the speedy negative Communist reaction indicated “tenor Adenauer’s answer anticipated by SED and initial party line fully prepared.” (962D.60/1–1651)
4. For text of the High Commissioners’ letter to General Chuikov, transmitted in telegram 121, May 25, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 641.
5. For documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory Talks for drawing up the agenda for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, see pp. 1086 ff.
6. Not printed.
7. Next to part (d) Calhoun had written in the margin of the source text “sensitive point”.