740.5/12–2251: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1
3751. Deptel 3478, Dec 132. Mtg on security controls took place Dec 21 with Parodi (Fr), assisted by La Tournelle, Seydoux and Sauvagnargues; Sir Oliver Harvey (UK), with Lincoln of Brit FonOff and Hayter and Price; and myself, Gen Hays, Tomlinson and Herz for US.
Discussion yielded important Fr concession on heavy weapons, but they insisted on contractual arrangement approach. If this fails, they will meet us again to discuss matter further.
Parodi will advise Schuman to impress upon Adenauer on Dec 27 at EDC FonMins mtg Fr parliamentary difficulties in event Adenauer does not cover this question by contractual arrangement.3 Brit and ourselves undertook to furnish Fr prior that date our govts comments on Fr views developed in conversations today. If matter not resolved by Schuman–Adenauer talks, HICOMS if agreed by US and UK wld make effort at earliest opportunity to settle affair contractually.
Parodi dwelled repeatedly and emphatically on history these negots, substantially along lines Fr memo (Embtel 3501, Dec 114) complaining that Fr had made concession after concession, first at Brussels, then at Wash, then at London, always with view to making security controls acceptable to Gers. Now it is time to consider acceptability also to Fr Parliament and Fr public opinion. He insisted that Schuman’s position before Fr Natl Assembly wld be “precarious” and approval of EDC treaty by Fr Parliament very doubtful if Fr Govt [Page 1742] not in position to give assurances that beyond safeguards contained in treaty there wld be other safeguards to prevent Ger from acting independently in pursuit of natl policy objectives.
Parodi objected to principle of lowest common denominator of tripartite agreement before embarking on negots with Gers; recalled that Gers themselves had originally, and again subsequent to Petersberg discussions, shown themselves ready to recognize Fr susceptibilities; spoke of false position of western powers if they allow FedRep to “blackmail” them in connection with def contribution; expressed opinion that maintenance of effective controls by contract wld in some way make Ger contribution less objectionable to Soviets; and dwelled on impracticability of exercising controls through EDC since def commissioner wld be derelict in duties if he took any other criteria into consideration than non-discrimination and greatest efficiency in placing community orders.
Gen Hays and I explained that as far as form of undertaking is concerned, our preference for unilateral declaration and legislation is based on assumption contractual arrangement not obtainable. If Schuman can get Adenauer to accept latter, that wld be satisfactory. If he can elicit from Chancellor some other mutually acceptable formula, our govt wld also consider it sympathetically; but time is pressing and speedy agreement a necessity. Too much time already lost.
We seconded Harvey’s argument that as between contract and declaration plus legislation difference is ephemeral. Basically, allied strength in Ger wld be determining factor. We reiterated US view that lasting security for Fr cannot lie in discriminations but would stem from fact that within EDC individual nations cld not be self-sufficient.
Gen Hays explained procedure that wld be acceptable to Chancellor (Bonn’s 801 to Dept Dec 195).
We made it plain that if there is to be non-discrimination within EDC, and if there is to be appropriate production in Ger to allow for adequate Eur def effort, heavy weapons production must be allocated by def commissioner to all participants, including Ger, with effective safeguards preserved by circumstance that orders for components in certain cases cld be spread among various countries. The same might apply to production of tactical aircraft.
Parodi thereupon announced that Fr wld be willing to drop their insistence on heavy weapons limitations except upon (a) gun barrels in excess of 105 mm., (b) propellant chargers. This wld allow production complete tanks in Ger, and also of ammunition of all calibers but with imported propellant. Explosive charges of shells could be produced in Ger, propellant (gunpowder) being the only component [Page 1743] of shell that wld be excluded. Fr added that according to HICOM studies, Ger wld in any event even with greatest exertion be unable to produce propellants before 1954. When we inquired why, under these circumstances, specific prohibition in this field would be needed and why control cld not be left to EDC allocation, Fr replied that they needed assurances that no productive capacity would be created by way of Ger investment, as result of which def commissioner wld be unable at later time to refuse place orders for such items in Ger.
It is my own belief that above represents only concession Fr intend to make and that moreover their preoccupation with Parliamentary situation here is by no means unwarranted or exaggerated.
Harvey is recommending to his govt that following contemplated discussion between Adenaeuer and Schuman we should if then necessary instruct High Commissioners to make forceful effort to persuade Adenauer of importance having contractual arrangement rather than declaration. I recommend the same.
If impasse shld thereafter continue, we wld have stronger position in attempting persuade Fr to come along with us. Although in view of intervening holidays it will be difficult to obtain immediate Wash reaction to above, I hope reply may be available here on Wed, Dec 26, so that it can be communicated to Fr before Adenauer arrives for EDC discussions.6
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩
- Ante, p. 1736.↩
- For documentation on meetings of the EDC Foreign Ministers beginning December 27, see pp. 755 ff.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1735; for an informal translation of the French memorandum under reference, see telegram 3484, December 10, p. 1732.↩
- Supra.↩
- In response to this telegram the Department of State advised Bruce that it believed direct discussions between Schuman and Adenauer would be the best method for dealing with security safeguards. Bruce was also advised that the United States would “be favorably disposed toward any agreement which … did not establish serious impediments to Ger production of equipment for ground forces.” If the discussions did not produce agreement the United States “would agree reluctantly to pressing Gers for contractual undertaking.” (Telegram 3645 to Paris, December 22, 740.5/12–2251)↩