740.5/12–1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State 1

secret   priority

3560. Re Embtels 3484, Dec 11 and 3464, Dec 10.2

1. We informed Alphand that we were extremely disappointed in two memos on security controls sent to us during his absence in Strasbourg and asked whether memo represented results of Cabinet reconsideration that Schuman had agreed to in Rome. Alphand replied that he and François-Poncet had pressed FonOff and Cabinet to realize that excessive restrictionism reflected in memorandum wld prejudice policy of bringing West Ger into Eur community on basis of equality and that EDC concept offers only real safeguard against resurgence of Ger natl militarism. They had not yet had much success.

2. According to Alphand, even sympathetic members of Cabinet including Pleven, are primarily concerned with presentation to Fr Parl. They do not yet fully understand safeguards in EDC and doubt whether a convincing presentation cld be made to Fr Parliament and Fr people without substantial specific restrictions on production in addition. Hayter of Brit Emb says Parodi in recent conversation with him stressed repeatedly that while US and UK might be most concerned over aircraft and naval vessels, Fr and Russians were worried about tanks. Alphand said that number of Mins were only seeking “some restrictions” and he seemed reasonably optimistic about his govt at least substantially reducing list of heavy weapons. He is obviously worried about reaction of FedRep on acceptance of EDC and urged that we continue to press for reduced list and for re-examination when EDC is in operation.

3. We are less sanguine than Alphand as to willingness of Fr to make concessions until Adenauer speaks directly to Pleven. Fr officials, including Alphand, have a gen feeling that Adenauer will make a deal with them accepting restrictions that we are now seeking to eliminate. Sauvagnargues argues that in his view FedRep shld be approached before Three Powers reach final position making concessions [Page 1738] going beyond position Germans might accept. He points out that Adenauer accepted limitations upon Ger sovereignty inherent in gen agreement and is willing to explain this to Ger people as required by particular situation in which Ger finds itself. Chancellor in his view can make the same explanation on retention of security controls. Another difficulty is the constant reminder that US and UK accepted restrictions on heavy equipment in Washington and even now are seeking restrictions on production of items in Ger which are of primary interest to them and some of which are equally inconsistent with EDF concept.

4. Sauvagnargues states that nothing can be gained by further exchange of notes and that tripartite discussions offer only means of reaching agreement. However, we are inclined to believe that in any memo accepting requested talks it wld be useful to set out US position. In our view reply shld not be a, refutation of points in Fr memo but more an explanation of reasons why we consider it imperative to have a relaxation of present restrictions. Fol points might be included:

(a)
Agree with necessity to insure that Ger is not again free to utilize its productive capacity for armament to further natl designs against its neighbors but point out that much more serious threat of Sov aggression against Eur makes it imperative that Three Powers not impose excessive limitations which in effect prevent Ger productive capacity from serving Eur.
(b)
Agree that Fr Parl and Fr people are justified in questioning again permitting industry in Ger to be devoted to armaments but point out that Ger Parl and German people also have right to expect to participate in Eur def community without unwarranted restrictions once they have accepted solemn undertakings in EDF treaty and demonstrated their willingness to carry them out.
(c)
Agree that consideration shld be given to possible Sov reaction to def production in Ger but point out that failure to find means to obtain use of resources in Ger for def wld be in interest of Sovs and against those of Western nations and that best means to demonstrate defensive purpose of Allied actions is to integrate defense contrib from Ger firmly under common Eur control.
(d)
Urge that in interests of equality West Ger shld be called upon to make a defense contribution from its own resources equivalent to those carried by other West nations. Excessive restrictions may enable Ger to benefit from a preferred position for econ development and for capture of world markets.
(e)
Underline that US in its proposal of Nov 21 was seeking to find a Three Power agreement which wld most contribute to full support of EDC by Parliaments of all participating countries, to positive and lasting safeguards against Ger aggression, to binding Ger irrevocably to free nations and to defensive strength of North Atlantic community.

5. Dept is aware that there are two schools of thought in FonOff with respect to security controls. It is now clear that the more restrictive [Page 1739] school of thought represents the official govt position, at least for the time being. We believe that in our tactics in dealing with Fr on this issue we shld not attempt to meet the more restrictive school head-on, but shld reassure them regarding our overall intentions and explain that we understand their preoccupations, while at same time pushing such arguments as will assist the more liberal school to prevail eventually.

Purpose of reply on above lines wld be to strengthen hand of those in Fr Govt sharing our views to win over support of moderates by a better understanding of safeguards inherent in EDC and by a demonstration that failure to take fullest advantage of EDC jeopardizes success of present Fr policy to reach a solid understanding with Ger. We shld show ourselves sympathetic to devising means to meet real problems of presentation to Fr Parl and Fr people. Adenauer accepted continuance of Ruhr Auth until Schuman Plan institutions were actually set up and functioning. A similar approach may be useful in obtaining Fr agreement to a later substantial reduction in security controls. It may also be helpful for EDC treaty to set out principle of interdependence for armaments among participating nations binding executive of community to arrange specialization of production so that no one nation cld independently support armed forces effectively.

6. With ref to Fr memo forwarded in Embtel 3464, Brit Emb informs us that Brit Govt intends to drop request that Fr keep Monnet’s commitment to TCC.3 According to Hayter, Plowden stated TCC no longer seeks this info. We nevertheless hope that a survey similar to one requested by TCC can be undertaken in connection with preparations for production orders to be placed in Ger immed upon ratification of EDC treaty.

7. Brit Emb informed us today that UK has accepted Fr request for tripartite talks. Pls advise.

Bruce
  1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
  2. Telegram 3484, p. 1732; telegram 3464, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1733.
  3. For documentation on the work of the NATO Temporary Council Committee (TCC), see pp. 1 ff.