396.1–ISG/2–2151: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany to the Secretary of State 1

secret

Sigto 460. USDel believes there is likelihood of requirements developing in NATO countries in period prior to agreement on German [Page 1365] participation in defense, for various types equipment listed Schedule A which might be produced in Germany and which are not included among items we propose permit immediately for NATO countries. Problem particularly likely to arise in respect to components.

British have proposed agreement that three governments shall consider permitting German production against any such needs of NATO or other approved countries and decide each case on ad hoc basis.

In view USDel, general guiding principle applicable to this problem should be avoidance of creating German armament industry unless and until Germans have agreed on participation in defense. On basis this principle believe production of arms and armaments generally should not be considered, however, we believe some provision should be made to permit manufacturer of component parts to extent policy of avoiding creation armament industry not vitiated.

How to accomplish this objective presents serious problem on which USDel would welcome advice. Answer may be formula to permit production of components which can be produced without special equipment or techniques, but with same equipment and techniques needed for production for civilian use. (French have proposed such formula to apply to components of Brussels list items after agreement reached on German participation.) However, such formula might prove difficult to administer and probably would require continuing advice military production experts to insure fulfillment of objectives.

There is similar problem re components of items forbidden at Brussels in period after German participation agreed.

USDel discussed these problems with Byroade whom we understood to agree creation armament industry in advance of participation should be avoided and therefore production arms generally should not be allowed, but that some provision for production components would be desirable provided it would not contribute to creation German armament industry in immediate future and would not endanger effective implementation basic prohibitions after German participation agreed.

Would appreciate further instruction.

  1. Repeated to Frankfurt and Paris.