762.0221/9–2551: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1
2014. Subj is security controls in contractual arrangements, incl mil, industrial, scientific research and atomic energy controls. Purpose this tel is to give our views on procedure re these subjs and explanation of [Page 1702] Fon Mins instrs of Sept 13 (Tripartite D–32) and understanding with Brit and Fr where necessary.
1. Statement re application of undertaking to police forces (para 7a(i) does not affect possible creation additional police forces provided they are not of mil or paramil character.
2. We have discussed with Defense and with Brit and Fr procedure for implementation Fon Mins directive para 7a(ii) that industrial and research prohibitions shld be defined by experts at govt level, and have agreed, subj to confirmation by Brit and Fr, the mtg of govt reps should begin not later than Oct 1, probably in London. We are consulting with Defense re instrs for US Rep and Defense representation on US Del. Fon Mins agreed governmental reps wld work closely with HICOM in defining prohibited activities. Consequently we anticipate that it may be necessary for governmental reps to visit Ger in course of negots to consult with HICOM or for appropriate HICOM reps to come to London. Travel orders USDel will be written to permit travel Ger. We cannot tell you anything more definite on this now but will keep you informed of any developments.
3. AEC developing recommendations re character and scope atomic energy controls in consultation with Dept, which will be furnished to you later for use in discussions with Brit and Fr and subsequently Gers.
4. Agmt re administrative arrangements (7a(iv) of instrs) represents substantial concession by Fr in dropping their original position in favor of agency with broad supervisory and control functions. Agreed wording represents elaboration of US position without in our view compromising essential features. Allied body provided for this para is to be under direction of Ambs, both tripartitely and unilaterally. It will not be independent agency, nor will it have consolidated staff. We are anxious to have effective means of observing Ger compliance with contract in security field, but equally anxious to avoid continuing unduly extensive or intensive surveillance or exercise of controls on pattern of MSB.
5. There was no specific understanding whether HICOM shld inform Gers re content of Brussels list in advance of report by experts. Our view is HICOM shld proceed to discuss matter with Gem and shld give them Brussels list whenever subj is reached in course of negots or is raised by Gers. If Gers ask definition items HICOM wld of course inform them that definitions being developed. HICOM cld listen to and report to govts and governmental reps any views which Gers might wish to express on this subj.
[Page 1703]6. As indicated para 20 of instrs, Fon Mins agreed there shld be no reaffirmation in contractual arrangements of Fed Rep commitment re allocation of raw materials.3
7. In our view, with which Defense concurs, Fed Rep shld not be required to agree that mil installations may be constructed only as necessary to carry out approved NATO plans. Mins did not discuss this proposal.
8. Last sentence para 7b re civil aviation was inserted at insistence of Fr. There was no specific understanding re its implications. In our view provision which it requires will be covered by undertakings required pursuant to 7a (i) and (ii), i.e. by Fed Rep undertakings not to create mil or para-mil forces outside agreed Western defense contribution and not to mfr aircraft.