Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

396.1–ISG/2–1651: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

London, February 16, 1951—7 p. m.

Sigto 452. At Steering Committee meeting February 15 Reinstein outlined US understanding of situation re German production arms as set forth numbered paragraphs 1–4 Sigto 439, February 12² and introduced revised draft instruction to HICOM re JMS [Ger?] production based on this understanding. Draft would permit HICOM authorize.

(1) Production for NATO and other approved countries (including Germany) of Schedule A items, except those forbidden at Brussels, when agreement reached with Germany on German participation in defense.

(2) Production of some component parts of forbidden items if same can be produced without special equipment or techniques.

(3) Construction of capacity for authorized production.

(4) Would indicate responsibility of HICOM, with advice military experts, for further definition forbidden items, subject to approval by three governments.

Reinstein indicated “some component parts” obscure and needs further study and definition. Re paragraph 4 reference telegram, Reinstein indicated Brussels list needs completion; control of atomic energy development and prohibition of civil aircraft production should be added to safeguards since they are necessary to make effective prohibition of atomic weapons and military aircraft.

British agreed with US understanding except reserved position re prohibition civilian aircraft production, expressing doubt that Occupation Powers could modify Brussels list except for obvious omissions e.g., atomic energy control. British proposed in addition to proposals USDel draft, that provision be made for special consideration if NATO country requires Schedule A items, other than items forbidden at Brussels, from Germany in advance of decision on German participation indicated this proposal based on view that decision on German participation may be long delayed.

Reinstein non-committal re this proposal, though expressing thought that components might be problem (will discuss this point further in separate telegram).

French had not consulted their NATO/people and not prepared agree or disagree with US-British position.³

British to prepare revised draft which will be airpouched soonest; USDel to prepare paper on position re atomic energy and aircraft.

1. Repeated to Frankfurt and Paris.
2. Ante, p. 1357.
3. At the steering committee meeting on February 20, the French Delegation agreed with the American-British position “that Schedule A items other than those forbidden at Brussels may be produced in Germany when agreement reached on German participation in defense without awaiting further action by NATO on nature and size of German contribution.” Sigto 459 from London, February 21 (396.1–ISG/2–2151). For a further report on the steering committee meeting, see Sigto 458, infra.