Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

396.1–ISG/2–1251: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

London, February 12, 1951—7 p. m.

Sigto 439. As reported Sigto 434,² British and French apparently substantially in agreement with concept Department proposal re schedule A items (war materials) which Germany may produce immediately for export to NATO countries. There is also agreement that directive should be given HICOM re action to be taken re arms production once agreement reached on German participation in defense. However, French apparently believe implementation must depend on prior NATO decisions, perhaps in some detail.

On basis their understanding paragraph 7(d) council deputies report December 13³ approved at Brussels, French delegate proposes wording such as follows for understanding on this subject:

“When competent organisms NATO have formulated recommendations on nature and importance of contribution to be demanded of German armament industry and on basis such recommendations, HICOM may grant authorizations toward production of materials listed schedule A, with exception (unless and until governments decide otherwise) of items forbidden by recommendations approved by Ministers in Brussels or any specialized productive, testing or training equipment or components associated with development, production or use these items.”

Our understanding of situation re German production is as follows:

1. NATO recommendations approved at Brussels provide that Germany should not produce certain military items (heavy military equipment, military aircraft, naval vessels other than minor defensive craft, atomic, biological and chemical weapons and long range missiles). Pending development other arrangements, occupation powers responsible for defining and enforcing this decision.

2. Paragraph 7(d) Council Deputies report indicates subject to agreed safeguards, German production should contribute to greatest possible extent to support of German forces and such other phases of common defense as reasonable and within capabilities. We understand this to mean that Germans should produce all desired items they can, for German forces and NATO countries, except prohibited items, subject to whatever decisions on standardization may have been reached and subject to any decisions made by NATO on supply grounds.

3. Statement in paragraph 7(d) that appropriate agencies NATO should recommend nature and size contribution German armament industry not intended to mean that NATO agency will necessarily make detailed decisions on what should be produced in Germany or that authorizations for Germans to produce permitted armaments should await recommendations or any further action of any sort by NATO agencies. This of course does not mean that Federal Republic would not submit to NATO information re its production program, which would be subject to same review as programs of NATO countries.

4. Occupation powers retain right to maintain control of production in Germany of non-military items which they may decide necessary in order to implement prohibitions covered by NATO recommendations. On this point our understanding US position that only additional prohibitions should be (1) production in Germany of all aircraft should continue be prohibited rather than only military aircraft as recommended by NATO, (2) atomic energy development should continue be controlled as under Law 22,⁴ with whatever revisions or relaxations may be agreed by occupation powers, rather than only atomic weapons prohibited as recommended by NATO. Please confirm.⁵

Understanding (3) above apparently contrary to interpretation paragraph 7 (d) of French delegate ISG. However, we believe their concept incompatible with objective (2) above. Under French concept positive decision by NATO agency would be required before NATO country order could be placed in Germany, whereas under our concept order could be placed unless it conflicts with NATO decision. Also involved is problem of what Germans may produce for own forces. Under French concept apparently DPB would have to decide that Germans should produce specific item, e.g. rifles, whereas under our concept HICOM would automatically authorize them produce rifles for their needs, provided any standardization agreement complied with and provided NATO has not taken specific decision rifles should be produced elsewhere.

This aspect of problem in turn leads us into problem of controls if any, to be exercised over German production during period when we retain at least theoretical control, i.e. after agreement reached with Germans on German participation but before inception contractual arrangement. Will HICOM in this period examine specific German needs and authorize production accordingly or will it give Germans blanket authorization produce any quantity of any items they are permitted to produce up to their own determination of their needs? We are inclined lean toward arrangement along latter lines. Germans will not be permitted produce weapons at all until agreement reached with them on German participation, when presumably we will be very close in point of time to inception of contractual arrangement, end of controls, and restriction German production through understanding with Germans. Incidentally, two future stages, (1) when we retain at least theoretical control German production permitted items and (2) when we have given up such control, probably correspond roughly to two future stages of German relationship to NATO contemplated in Department’s circular airgram January 25.⁶

Reinstein hopes discuss these problems jointly with Byroade and HICOG February 13 and 14.⁷

Cleared with USDep.

1. Repeated to Frankfurt and Paris.
2. Dated February 8, p. 1350.
3. For documentation on the NATO Council Deputies report of December 13, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
4. For the text of Allied High Commission Law No. 22, “Control of Materials, Facilities and Equipment Relating to Atomic Energy,” dated March 2, 1959, see Laws, Regulations, Directives and Decisions, vol i, pp. 61–70
5. In Tosig 420, February 14, to London, the Department of State confirmed the understanding as requested in this paragraph (396.1–ISG/2–1451).
6. Not printed.
7. The U.S. Delegation reported further that Reinstein was not able to discuss the substance of this telegram when he was in Frankfurt but that the brief conyersation he had with Byroade and Gerhardt “indicated they felt telegram was along right lines.” Sigto 449, February 15, from London (396.1–ISG/2–1551).