762A.5/11–2351: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State
Actel 20. For the President and Acting Secretary from Acheson.1 In my talks here this week with Eden and Schuman, and finally with Adenauer, I think we have succeeded in moving some of our German problems forward. No spectacular decisions were made but as you know none were expected at this time.
We were able to resolve all the remaining questions concerning the agreement on general relations with the Germans so that this document is now agreed with Adenauer and is ready for signature whenever the related agreements about troops and other matters are ready, and when the agreements for a German defense contribution are concluded. We have therefore been able to issue a communiqué jointly with Adenauer which will make his trip seem a success and will thus strengthen his hand in his efforts to tie the Federal Republic into the west.
Much less progress was made on the thorny problem of security safeguards on Germany, but we were at least able to outline the fundamentals of this problem to Adenauer and there is at least a hope that he may be stimulated to make a voluntary offer on Germany’s part to [Page 1610] refrain from the production of certain important military items. We expect to discuss this problem further among the three of us at Rome after the French Cabinet has considered it again and after the Chancellor has given his views to the High Commissioners.
It has proven impossible thus far to get beyond the barest fundamentals of the question of the German financial contribution for defense. The British and French have agreed, however, to an immediate exploration of the problem by the Allied High Commission with the Germans on the basis of a German defense budget for their next fiscal year (beginning April 1) of approximately 13 billion marks, to be used both for the cost of Allied troops in Germany and the German share in the cost of the European defense community. This is of course merely a negotiating figure. This entire problem will likewise be the subject of further talks in Rome.
Finally, Eden and Schuman agreed with me on the text of a so-called security guarantee, a declaration to be made by the three governments whenever all the German agreements come into force. This is largely a repetition of the statement made in the Foreign Ministers communiqué in September 1950 wherein we stated that we would treat an attack on the Federal Republic or on Berlin as an attack on ourselves. It additionally stated our intention to maintain troops there which Adenauer considered of great importance in Germany. This point is so worded, however, to insure that final determination on this matter rests with us. I believe this solution will tide us over until such time as Germany can ‘be formally linked to the North Atlantic Treaty.
The meeting between Adenauer and Eden, Schuman and myself was entirely in good atmosphere. I believe the fact that the four of us met on a basis of equality is of greater importance in Europe than any of the specific agreements reached at the meeting and hope that it will serve to speed along conclusions of the remaining negotiations with Germany and the finalization of European defense arrangements. Adenauer had held talks with each of us before the meeting and had already discussed most of the matters of concern to him. His primary concern seemed to be the present fear in Germany that the big powers might conclude a deal with Russia on the unification of Germany at the expense of the interests of the Germans themselves. On this point I believe he received satisfactory assurances from each of us. Likewise we had reached agreement with him prior to the formal meeting that he would not press for any change in the present position of our three governments as regards Germany’s eastern territories. He had raised this point publicly in a recent speech in Germany and had pressed the High Commission for some commitment which would help him in view of the pressure of the refugee problem in Germany. All three of us were firm on this point. I informed the Chancellor that the position [Page 1611] established by Byrnes in his Stuttgart speech2 that this was a matter to be dealt with in the final peace settlement would remain unchanged.
Adenauer seems prepared to push remaining conventions on such matters as status of forces and their logistical support to a speedy conclusion. It was understood among the four of us that every effort would be made to complete all of the remaining agreements with Germany by the end of the year. These would, of course, only go into effect upon Germany’s commitment to join the defense effort. The time schedule for completion by the European nations, including Germany, of a treaty to establish the European defense force is not as optimistic, primarily because of the difficult financial problems involved. We are all searching for methods of expediting this effort. We will of course be working on this problem at Rome.
- The source text bears the marginal notation “Copies sent White House 11/26/51.”↩
- For the text of Secretary Byrnes’ speech on U.S. policy toward Germany, given at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, p. 496, or Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 152–160.↩