Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 97

United States Delegation Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, November 21, 1951¹

secret

[Paris,] November 23, 1951.

PAR M–1

france	united kingdom
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman	Foreign Minister Eden
Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann	High Commissioner Kirkpatrick
Ambassador Bonnet	Mr. Frank Roberts
High Commissioner François-Poncet	Ambassador Harvey
M. Parodi
M. LeRoy
M. Alphand

united states

• Secretary Acheson
• High Commissioner McCloy
• Ambassador Bruce
• Mr. Perkins
• Mr. Byroade

Mr. Schuman welcomed his colleagues and asked if they wished to discuss Austria first. It was agreed that discussion of Austria would be postponed until Thursday, and it was agreed to begin by discussing the High Commission’s Report.² Mr. Schuman called on Mr. McCloy, as Chairman of the High Commission, to report on its behalf.

Mr. McCloy said he would not summarize the report, but he thought the Foreign Ministers would be interested to know that the principal background to the report, all the High Commission[er]s agreed, is the necessity for speed. Speed is necessary, he said, in order to come to decisions so that the Germans can prepare and carry through the legislative program of substantial proportions which will be required of them.

He said that the General Agreement had now been agreed with Chancellor Adenauer except in a few respects.³ The High Commissioners had made it quite clear to Chancellor Adenauer that the collateral agreements must be signed at the same time as the General Agreement, but work on them has been slow. This is partly because they are complex, but also because major emphasis has been concentrated on the General Agreement. Mr. McCloy said he thought, however, that the Chancellor accepted that all the conventions and agreements went together.

He said that Chancellor Adenauer had attacked the desire of the Three Powers to maintain reserve powers and had urged that they be incorporated in the contractual arrangements. However, Chancellor Adenauer had finally accepted that our position was based on government instructions. Two major issues had arisen. The first related to the Allied Power to declare a state of emergency. In view of the drastic nature of this power which will create some difficulties for Adenauer in the Bundestag, he had asked that there be review of our use of the power. While the High Commission did not consider that any body should be authorized to review the propriety of a declaration of a state of emergency, they did think that there might reasonably be a review of its continuation. The second point related to the discussion of a unified Germany. At the last meeting of the High Commission, Adenauer had indicated he included in the term Germany the territory east of the Oder-Neisse. By raising this issue, Chancellor Adenauer had effectively stopped discussions with the High Commission. However, the High Commission thought that what he wanted was an indication that while Germany’s boundaries remained a matter for settlement in a peace treaty, Germany was not precluded from exerting her aspirations for the return of the eastern territories. Traveling to Paris, Chancellor Adenauer had given Mr. McCloy a draft which referred to the Atlantic Charter, indicating that the settlement of German boundaries should be “in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter”.⁴ Mr. McCloy said he thought this was not acceptable but perhaps some such phrase as “in a spirit which will tend to minimize national tensions and frictions” might be acceptable to the Allied Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Acheson said he was sympathetic with Chancellor Adenauer’s problem with respect to the declaration of the state of emergency. He said a review procedure would be useful to Chancellor Adenauer in dealing with the Bundestag, but was unlikely ever to be used. Either the Three Powers would be working closely with the Federal Republic and anxious to give up emergency powers as soon as possible or they would be in conflict with them and would not wish to return powers to the Federal Republic. He said he thought the NAC was the logical body to review action by the Three Powers. The use of the emergency powers would arise out of the threat to Western security. However, any NAC action must be by unanimous decision. The Germans could explain they thought the emergency was over. We would have to state our reasons for believing it continued. We would therefore have to yield if we were acting in an arbitrary manner since Western public opinion would not support our continuing a state of emergency. If we said nothing in any provision on this subject about voting procedure, a unanimous vote would automatically be required since this is normal NATO practice.

Mr. Eden agreed with Mr. Acheson’s suggestion, noting that the Germans should be free to appeal only thirty days after the declaration of the emergency. He thought this arrangement would be satisfactory to us but wondered if it would be satisfactory to Adenauer.

Mr. Schuman said he thought it might be difficult to convene the 12 or 14 NAC members. He therefore suggested that review be made by the Chairman of the NAC, SACEUR and the Chairman of the Council of Europe. He said, however, that if Chancellor Adenauer would agree to Mr. Acheson’s proposal he could accept it. He raised another point which was that since Mr. Acheson’s proposal involved the Germans being judged by a body of which Germany is not a member this might inspire the Germans to ask to be admitted to NATO.

Mr. Acheson said he did not see that this procedure would give the Germans any basis for claiming a right to NATO membership.

Mr. Eden said he did not think it would make any material difference since the Germans could find some other pretext to ask for NATO membership. He said he felt the NAC to be the body most concerned with this sort of problem. He suggested that the Council of Europe Chairman might be a Swede and, being neutral, might not wish to participate in the sort of decision which would be required.

Mr. Schuman said he would agree provided the agreed procedure did not provide a basis for arguing that Germany is entitled to become a member of NATO. It was agreed that the High Commission would draft appropriate language and discuss the language with Chancellor Adenauer on Wednesday night.

The Ministers then turned to the discussion of the problem raised with respect to German boundaries and German unification. Mr. Acheson said it was impossible to refer to the Atlantic Charter. In the main, the understandings were clear, but we cannot commit ourselves at this time. This can only be done in the peace treaty. However, we do not ask the Germans to commit themselves. It will be difficult to find an appropriate form of words including the point about a settlement of frontiers which does not create friction, but this, he thought, is what should be done.

Mr. Eden agreed with Mr. Acheson with respect to the Atlantic Charter. He also thought it would not be easy to find a formula regarding some former parts of Germany the U.S. and U.K. had agreed to detach. Koenigsberg and East Prussia were among these. With respect to others, we had reserved our position. We must be careful not to give the Germans a basis for saying we have opened up issues on which we previously had taken firm positions or given commitments.

Mr. Schuman said that the French Government saw no reason to change decisions which had been taken on Germany’s western boundaries. He said we did not want the Germans asking that elections or plebiscites be held. This would raise trouble in some cases and would be quite meaningless in some circumstances.

Mr. Acheson suggested that we might say the final determination would be made in the peace settlement, thus not reflecting on decisions which had already been taken.

Mr. Eden suggested it would be better to say that final determinations would be made in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Protocol which says that they will be made in a peace settlement. Otherwise, he said, he was apprehensive. All sorts of problems, in addition to the Oder-Neisse Line, would become subject to discussion.

Mr. Acheson said he would hate to refer to Potsdam and give it new vitality.

Mr. Eden said we must avoid making it look to the Germans as if all the Eastern frontiers are open questions and we have gone back on our commitments.

Mr. Schuman said we must, however, help Adenauer avoid giving the impression he is abandoning the Eastern claims. We must help him, but not get ourselves in trouble.

Mr. Eden said he thought Adenauer would have abandoned nothing if he had accepted our original draft. He is trying to get a commitment from us which we should not give him.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the statement required must refer to the final peace settlement, the necessity of lessening friction and the international commitments of the Three Powers. He noted, however, that we must not give a basis for German fears that there are secret commitments about her frontiers.

Mr. Schuman suggested that perhaps a very vague formula such as “without prejudicing a final settlement at the time of the peace treaty” might be the best solution. He said he was not happy about the reference to national frictions and tension since one party could create friction or a feeling of friction. This would be a source of difficulties rather than a solution.

Mr. Eden asked if Chancellor Adenauer wished to frighten the Poles.

Mr. Acheson said Chancellor Adenauer told him at lunch he wished to reassure the Poles.⁵

Mr. Eden said that, strictly speaking, this subject is not properly one for the General Agreement. Could not, he suggested, Chancellor Adenauer make a statement of his position with respect to Germany’s frontiers.

Mr. Maurice Schumann said that Chancellor Adenauer’s position differed from ours.

Mr. Schuman said he thought a solution could be found provided it did not include language such as “in order to minimize tensions”.

Mr. Eden said he preferred to say nothing, since much use would be made by the Germans of anything we said, and there would be a bad reaction in Poland and elsewhere. He suggested a formula which began “the Three Powers and the Federal Republic agreed that a peace settlement including the final determination of frontiers freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies is an essential aim of their common policy”. He thought nothing more was required.

Mr. Acheson suggested that a phrase such as “which should lay the foundations for a lasting peace” was necessary.

Mr. Schuman then amended a proposal suggested by Mr. Acheson and the Ministers agreed on the following text:

“Article VII

1. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic are agreed that a peace settlement for the whole of Germany which should be the foundation of a lasting peace freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies is an essential aim of their common policy.

They further agree that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a peace settlement.

2. Pending the peace settlement, the Three Powers and the Federal Government will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the Western European Community.

3. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic agree that a unified Germany shall be bound by the obligations of the Federal Republic under this Convention and the related Conventions and the Treaties for the formation of an integrated European Community, as adjusted according to their terms or by agreement of the parties thereto, and shall likewise be entitled to the rights of the Federal Republic under these Conventions and Treaties.

4. The Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic on all other matters involving the exercise of their rights relating to Germany as a whole.”

Mr. Eden said he thought it would be useful to discuss what would be said to Chancellor Adenauer about this topic. He thought it might be best to say nothing since it might be possible to persuade him that nothing need be said in the General Agreement.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that since Chancellor Adenauer had raised the question we must make it quite clear that we were talking only about the four zones of occupation and not the territory east of the Oder-Neisse.

Mr. Schuman said it should be understood that we are replacing the High Commission text and not providing a new basis for discussion between Chancellor Adenauer and the High Commission.

Mr. Acheson said the High Commissioners should see Adenauer tonight with a new text and could, he hoped, agree it with Chancellor Adenauer. Mr. Schuman and Mr. Eden agreed provided it was understood that the text could not be altered but was final.

Mr. McCloy said that if there were no objections to other parts of the General Agreement on the part of any of the Foreign Ministers the High Commission’s proposals would have been approved and no points need be raised with Chancellor Adenauer except the two which had been previously discussed. He noted that Chancellor Adenauer had asked that if agreed the General Agreement be initialed in Paris.

Mr. Schuman said that he had a problem with respect to Article IV and its footnote. Before initialing, he wished to know how we were going to complete Article IV.

Mr. McCloy suggested that we keep the footnote until this problem is worked out and the High Commission is in a position to agree what security restrictions there should be with Chancellor Adenauer.

Mr. Schuman said he did not think the Ministers could initial an incomplete text.

Mr. McCloy said it might be possible to prepare a memorandum of understanding which, among other things, would indicate that the General Agreement might be modified in the light of the related conventions when they were completed.

Mr. Schuman said that it would not be acceptable to have merely an Allied understanding with respect to the inclusion of security restrictions in the contractual arrangements. If they were not mentioned in the General Agreement we might be precluded from raising the question with the Germans.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the Ministers not initial the General Agreement but agree [on] a memo with Chancellor Adenauer. Alternatively, he thought they might merely note the nature of their approval of the General Agreement in a communiqué issued jointly with Chancellor Adenauer which might also make clear that its final acceptance by the three governments could come only when the related conventions had been accepted.

Mr. Eden agreed.

Mr. McCloy said he wanted to inform the Ministers that with reference to the problem of the declaration of the state of emergency it had been made clear to the Chancellor that the High Commission would insert in the contractual arrangements a provision enabling military commanders to take reasonable measures for the protection of their forces in situations not so serious as to require the declaration of a state of emergency. He cited as examples the chambering of bridges for demolition and preparations involving communications, transportation, etc. We would have a contractual right, he said, to take these pre-emergency measures. Our military commanders in Germany are drafting a text which we do not yet have. It is not necessary that this text be available here in Paris since Chancellor Adenauer knows that it will be inserted in one of the related conventions. However, it might be useful if in their discussions with him the Foreign Ministers noted their knowledge of this point and their agreement that it was necessary to have such a provision in addition to the provisions of Article V of the General Agreement.

Security Guarantee

Mr. Acheson read and circulated the U.S. proposal for an Allied declaration respecting German security to be issued at the time of the completion of contractual arrangements. This draft was agreed by the three Ministers. Its text is as follows:

“On the occasion of the entry into force of the conventions establishing a new basis for the relationship between France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on the one hand and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other, the Three Powers—

(a) Declare that they consider the integrity of the Federal Republic and Berlin an essential element of the peace of the free world.

(b) Reaffirm that they will treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves, and

(c) Declare that they will maintain armed forces within the territory of the German Federal Republic and Berlin for such time as they deem necessary, having regard to their special responsibilities in Germany and the world situation.”

[Here follows the record of the last part of this meeting in which the Foreign Ministers discussed German security controls, printed page 1715.]

1. Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Paris for the sixth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. Supra.
3. The draft General Agreement is Annex A to the High Commissioners’ report.
4. No copy of the draft under reference has been found in Department of State files.
5. Acheson, Bruce, McCloy, and Byroade had had lunch with Adenauer at the U.S. Embassy at 12:30 on November 21, according to McCloy’s records of the Foreign Ministers meetings, but no report on the subjects which they discussed has been found in Department of State files. (Bonn Mission files, lot 57 F 24, McCloy project November 1951)