Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/8–2651: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Frankfurt, August 26, 1951—11 a. m.

1780. From Liaison Bonn. In two hour discussion with Dayton and Liaison Bonn, Schumacher and Schmid gave views on several aspects contractual negots:

1. Complained to date had not had single bit of info from govt as to the course of the discussions. Fon Affairs Comite had once heard Hallstein and Grewe at beginning of negots. Comite appointed sub-comite for constant contact with negotiators but it had not once been called by Govt. Schumacher took occasion to decry ineptness in foreign affairs of most party leaders except Ollenhauer and Brentano. Even critical own foreign affairs expert Luetkens.

2. Schumacher and Schmid argued strongly defense contribution agreement shld be quite separate from contractual arrangement. If not separated Schumacher said SPD cld not support contractual arrangement since not yet ready to support defense agreement. Amplifying this position, he said if two subjs coupled, impossible to escape inference that Ger was buying her liberty with Ger divisions. Futhermore, though the conditions for a Ger contribution were now well understood by Ger people, thanks to the efforts SPD, this did not mean (as McCloy’s quarterly report indicated) that in opinion of Gers the conditions had been satisfactorily met and they were ready to make contributions now. So far, Schumacher stated, the Allies had given no indication whatever their strategic concept of defense of Western Europe. Until it was clear Allied intention in event of war to defend West with aggressive strategy, he cld not go along with any Ger participation in the defense. (In this connection Blank had informed Liaison Bonn that as result of frequent discussions between Heusinger and Schumacher, latter had been persuaded to abandon thesis that prior to Ger contribution the West must furnish enough divisions to guarantee that war will be carried east of Elbe immed it breaks out. Heusinger, Blank says, has convinced Schumacher that the most that can be asked for is an aggressive strategy of defense). Referring to New York guarantee,² Schmid stated Allies wld have to define their defense obligations more precisely than have yet done.

3. Turning to question Ger sovereignty, Schumacher criticized Adenauer for recent statements that Ger wld soon regain full sovereignty. SPD realized that in connection with Berlin and Eastern relations, it wld he exceedingly difficult to return full sovereignty to Ger. Chancellor’s prediction not only misled Ger people and disclosed own lack of understanding but put the SPD in awkward position since it cld not politically advocate a lesser degree of sovereignty than Adenauer even though SPD fully understood this degree greater than practically desirable. SPD now working out its position and wld soon take occasion in the foreign affairs comite to question the govts position.

4. Turning to occupation costs, both attacked any intent charge cost of foreign troops in Germany to Germans. Referred to press reports that US communication troops in France wld be provided supplies and housing thru central Fr procurement agencies at US expense. Schumacher characterized as impudence (Frechheit) Dutch proposal to station Dutch troops in Germany, at Ger [expense?] and Belgian practice of moving regiments from Liege to Aachen where they were maintained at Ger expense and calling this a Belgian contribution to Western defense. If Ger divisions in Eur army were stationed in France, as well might happen, wld France pay their upkeep and housing? Schumacher and Schmid recognized that until Germany has own divisions to support, its position not entirely analogous to France. Nevertheless made it abundantly clear that if and when they do contribute to Western defense, they will expect same treatment as other participants in matter of occupation costs.

5. With regard to troop convention they called attention to NATO model agreement and particularly to local police and court jurisdiction over foreign troops. They wld expect Ger to exercise the same rights although admitted probably necessary to introduce these rights by stages, taking into consideration (a) “occupation”, psychology of Western troops now in Ger and (b) possibly excessively enthusiastic exercise of new right by Germans if granted too suddenly.

6. Discussing status of HICOM successor which he referred to as Council of Ambassadors, Schumacher asked what wld be resulting relationship. Wld Ambassadors individually represent respective Govts or act only as body? If they acted individually on matters between Ger and one country, wld the cases in which they act as a body be specifically enumerated or wld they, as in case of Versailles, cover all matters claimed to arise out of contractual relation? Schumacher seemed to attach considerable importance to this question. Specifically referred to powers of allies in this matter of Ger reunification. Cld a single member of council block move to reunify East and West Ger by virtue of his position on Council? In this connection Schumacher claimed that Schuman Plan provision requiring consent of the higher authority for extension of Schuman Plan area gave France a virtual veto for fifty years over Ger economic reunion.

7. In field foreign affairs, Schumacher asked whether Council Ambassadors in conducting Gers relations with the East wld act as “trustee” or delegate for Ger, or as separate entity exercising continuance of occupation powers. He made no objection to suggestion that vis-à-vis Soviets Council must act under old quadpartite occupation agreement on own authority and not for Ger Govt.

8. On subj of arbitral machinery Schmid explained that his experience and study showed that arbitral tribunals invariably worked to disadvantage weaker states since there were few purely legal questions not affected by political considerations. Tribunals willy-nilly had to take these into account with result their decisions tended to preserve polit unbalance between the politically stronger and weaker litigant. Hence SPD favored conciliation over arbitration. However, Schmid indicated arbitral tribunals cld play useful role in settling legal dispute once conciliation had disposed of political factors in the dispute.

9. Schumacher discussed at length question of allied right to intervene in internal Ger affairs in event of threat to democratic order in Ger. Recognized advantages in including this right in contract, but felt they were outweighed by disadvantages. Believed no real threat in foreseeable future either from extreme left or right that cld not be handled by Ger Govt. Only real danger to Democratic order in Ger that he cld foresee wld be attempt by new Ger milit order to seize control from civilians as in case of Schleicher. In such a case the Allies, if they had the power, and the will, wld intervene whether or not their right to do so was spelled out in the contract. If they didn’t have the power and the will, wouldn’t intervene whether or not they had the right. He recognized that specific right of intervention in event of attempted coup d’état might be deterrent to any cooly calculating revolutionary, but believed only fanatical extremists wld dare so risky an operation and such fanatics wld not be deterred by anything written in contract.

10. Finally, Schumacher asked whether it might not be possible at this stage for the US to set forth its views on the new contractual arrangement publicly in such a manner as to bring pressure on the Fr to desist from their more unreasonable demands. Schumacher did not specify what these unreasonable demands were nor did any other participants in the conversation.

Bonn Liaison comment. Throughout the conversation Schumacher was comparatively reasonable. He indulged in no polemics and with the exception of frequent digs at the Fr and Adenauer was relatively mild in his comments. Nevertheless he left no doubt whatever that the SPD wld strongly oppose any contractual arrangement that did not genuinely provide for “normalization”, as he called it, of Ger’s position. [Liaison Bonn.]

McCloy

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. Regarding the tripartite security guarantee given to the Federal Republic by the three Western Foreign Ministers at their meeting in New York in September 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.