398.10–GDC/8–1051: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
106. AGSec from Slater. Verbatim text.
[Here follow paragraphs 1 and 2 in which McCloy reported on the discussion of a draft Federal law amending the German criminal code and on the disposition of claims and suits against JEIA.]
(3) HICOM report concerning new relationship to be established between Allied Powers and Ger (ref HICOM/P (51)69 final;2 Dept to Frankfort 968, rptd Bonn 62, London 838, Paris 851, of 7 August3).
[Page 1512]Council approved with minor amendments, HICOM report on new relationship to be established between Allied Powers and Ger for immediate transmission to govts (Reber bringing amended copies for Dept’s use with him). On my proposal both Kirkpatrick and Bérard agreed to forward, independently of report, US proposed text of general agreement for info their govts. I also suggested that, in order to save time at later stage, standing sub-comite appointed by special comm should (i) proceed with drafting of appropriate provisions embodying sections of HICOM report on which there was tripartite agreement, for use after Foreign Ministers decisions had been made, and (ii) continue discussions on those matters of detail on which tripartite agreement had not been reached. Bérard was hesitant about accepting this proposal until he had consulted his govt, but thought it might be possible to carry it out a little later on. Finally, Council agreed to issue press communiqué stating that report had been approved and dispatched to govts.
After these decisions had been taken, I initiated exchange of views between 3 High Commissioners on question of whether and to what extent there should be, in connection with establishment of new relationships between Allied Powers and FedRep, any provision which would make explicit Allied determination to act to protect fundamental democratic character of govt of FedRep in event of serious attack upon it. I said that in past few weeks US element had made effort to sound out representative Ger opinion, including that of newspaper publishers, clergymen, politicans, businessmen, and govt officials, on this subject and that, although there were differences of opinion as to type of provision which should be made, 90 to 95 percent of those contacted felt that there should be some reservation of power by Allies to intervene in face of serious threat to democratic order. Some opinions favored making provision subject of contractual arrangement; others, feeling it wld be unwise for Federal Govt to be involved in such reservation of Allied Power, favored unilateral declaration by Allied Powers, i.e., announcement by Allied Powers of a kind of “Monroe Doctrine” on preservation of democratic order in Ger; still others felt there should be no explicit reservation of power, but that right of Allies to intervene should be recognized; and finally, another group believed that Allied intervention should take place only at request of Federal Govt.
I said that for my part I had given serious consideration to question whether or not some statement of Allied intention or reservation of power should be made which wld act as deterrent to extremists of right and left in Ger and, in next few years, wld serve to protect newly established democratic order in FedRep until such time as Federal institutions were strong enough to stand by themselves and resist attacks against them.
[Page 1513]Kirkpatrick said that whatever representative Germans might express in writing, he doubted whether there was any substantial number who wld advocate in public retention of Allied power to safeguard democracy. If Allies reserve such power they wld have to do it unilaterally, because they cld not expect Chancellor and Bundestag to accept such reservation. There were two considerations which he thought should influence Allied judgment in this matter. In the first place, there was danger of overloading negotiations with Germans on contractual arrangements with so many reservations that whole operation would fail. Allied reservation of sovereignty should be based on what was absolutely vital to Allied security and interests, and not on what was desirable. In second place, he wondered whether formal retention power to safeguard democratic order was practical politics. From his experience, he had impression that most important practical influence on maintenance of democracy in Ger wld be continual presence of Allied troops in Ger. So long as there were large Allied forces in Ger he thought there wld be little disposition on part of Ger public to follow political leaders to whom Allies were opposed.
Bérard said that while he cld not speak for his govt, Fr political opinion generally agreed that at the stage of introducing the new relationships with Fed Govt, Allied Powers wld have their last opportunity to take positive steps for preservation of democracy in Ger. If Allies did not reserve power to intervene to protect Democratic order, it wld be too late to do anything about it after contractual arrangements were put into effect. French impressions as result contact with rep Gers were similar to those reported by US element. He felt that if in adopting contractual arrangements Fed Govt accepted Allied right of intervention in event of serious attack on Democratic order, it wld not have to face attack except from reactionary elements of Ger public. He went on to say that statement by Allied Powers, and especially by US, of intention to intervene in threats to Democracy, wld make it clear to Ger public both in East and West Zones that, whereas US and West powers are actively resisting threat from East, they do not identify themselves with undemocratic objectives of reactionary elements in Ger and Eur who for number of years have been combatting Communism. He considered that such assertion of determination on the part of Allied Govts, and particularly US, to support Democratic govts in Eur wld greatly serve to prevent Ger public opinion being misled on this point in future.
In concluding discussion, I said I appreciated Kirkpatrick’s point that presence of Allied troops in Ger wld have salutary influence, but was not sure whether it wld be sufficient deterrent against attacks on Democratic order. I said I did not contemplate any interference with the internal affairs of Fed Govt, any reservation of power simply for sake of holding back power. I thought if Allied powers stated intention [Page 1514] to reserve power to intervene in cases of clear and present danger to Democratic order in Ger, they shld couple with this statement of intention to do everything possible to cooperate with FedRep in maintaining econ, social, and polit stability so that it wld be clear that Allies were genuinely concerned about preservation of Democratic community in Ger and were not merely holding back powers.
4. Next meeting.
5. August at Bonn Petersberg. Date of Berlin mtg will be reconsidered next week with probable change to 6 September. [Slater.]