396.1–WA/9–351
Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State
In the past several months I have had a series of discussions with you concerning the general nature of the course which we must pursue in terminating the occupation in Germany. One of the fundamental problems which has repeatedly concerned us has been the question of retaining emergency power in order to preserve democracy if it is threatened in Germany. In view of the fact that a decision must now be made as to our position on this question, I feel I should formally summarize the factors involved and make a final recommendation.
This is perhaps the more desirable since Mr. McCloy in a personal letter to you dated August 181 has particularly recorded his conviction that the emergency power referred to above must be kept. Speaking for myself, as well as for all the senior members of my staff, some of whom have seen long service in Germany, I wish to record my disagreement with the general philosophy and conclusions advanced by Mr. McCloy on this subject.
There can be no question but that the objectives sought by those who work on German problems, whether in Germany or here in Washington, are identical. Our goal is to obtain the type of German nation in the future which will not again cause the United States to be plunged into war, but will instead freely cooperate with the West. We are striving for a Germany in which the fundamentals of democracy as we see them will be retained and in which the freedom and protection of the individual in every sphere will be upheld. We hope for a government which will be able to withstand pressures from either the extreme Eight or the extreme Left and which will not again allow the military to assume control.
In furtherance of these objectives, we have brought about in Germany, partly by order and partly by persuasion, the establishment of governmental and political forces which are democratic. From local levels to national level, the mechanics for safeguarding against totalitarianism are in being.
Mechanics are not enough, and we have therefore devoted an enormous effort to influencing the spirit and minds of the German people, to “reorienting” them, so that the machinery would be in safer hands. However, we dropped our reserve power based upon supreme authority in this field on the coming into being of the Occupation Statute in 1949,2 as we felt the objectives to be achieved could be obtained more [Page 1193] readily by cooperation than through a reservation of our sovereignty. The project has been successful in so far as such an approach can be successful in a short number of years. It is our desire to continue this type of activity in Germany to the extent funds are available. Foreseeing that appropriated funds for such a purpose will greatly diminish in future years, we have started to enlist the support of private organizations and private funds to carry on our work in the future. We are thus dedicated to continue through public and private funds our efforts with the German people to the extent of our capabilities and to the extent that positive results are being obtained.
Any attempt to “protect”, by reservation of supreme authority derived from the unconditional surrender of Germany, the progress made in the establishment of democratic forms and the democratic spirit would, however, in my opinion be an error of historic proportions. I believe this would be true even if we were proposing to end the occupation under the most “normal” circumstances. It is especially true under the existing special circumstances.
Present tension in the world has led to a situation where we believe that Germany must be prepared for effective defense in our own interests. It has been generally agreed that the defense of Europe is not realistically possible without the addition of German strength, both economic and military. These facts have unavoidably stepped up the political time table which calls for a termination of the occupation of Germany. It is illogical for us to expect that Germany’s strength will be added to our cause without her being accorded the greatest possible equality. In any event, military strength exacted by a suzerain is no strength at all. To be worth anything in a crisis, it must be the strength of an equal and a convinced ally. We should therefore plan to return full control over foreign and domestic affairs to the Germans, with only such exceptions as are made necessary by two results of Soviet policy: (1) The division of Germany and (2) the existence of a security menace outside the Federal Republic. We should pursue this plan as the one best designed to bring about wholehearted German cooperation with the West and to eliminate so far as possible all grounds for irritation and interference which can only lead in future to the rise of extremist nationalism in Germany.
The power in foreign hands to declare a state of emergency for any reason is a serious infringement of German sovereignty. It can be justified only as it relates to the two exceptions noted above. It should be severely limited so as to be applicable only in cases of external attacks, or of disorders likely to weaken our readiness to meet external attack. Thus limited, it can be justified to, and accepted by, an ally, whereas an ally cannot accept the power of foreigners to protect him against himself. Such a reservation of authority would stick out like a sore thumb among the arrangements which the military menace compels [Page 1194] us to make. However, because the Government of the Federal Republic has no constitutional power to declare an emergency, it may additionally be agreed that such authority be used by the Allies in the case of the overthrow of the constitutional (democratic) order, but only at the request of the Germans. To go beyond that would be a basic mistake, because (1) it would permit and possibly encourage interference in domestic affairs; (2) it would weaken the position of any German government agreeing to it; (3) it would be a prop which would appear to shore up, but would in reality weaken, German democratic elements by leading them into complacency, and (4) it would be a standing rallying point for German zenophobes and totalitarians.
I am well aware that there is risk in not retaining express power to protect democracy by declaring a state of emergency. This is a risk which will exist for many years. It is a risk to which some of Germany’s European neighbors may be especially sensitive. But we must realize that the danger to German democracy will perhaps be greatest after five or ten years. I find it difficult to believe that we can keep our legal powers in Germany for that long a time, and the immediate adverse consequence of retaining a power of intervention would only be equalled by the ultimate adverse consequence of giving it up under the pressure of rising German nationalism. We cannot hope to retain such power and expect at the same time to convince the Germans that they are equals and should cooperate with us. This is particularly true of those Germans who yet remain to be won over to democracy and cooperation with the West. Our greatest guarantee in the immediate future will be the presence of our armies and the menace of Soviet imperalism, two prime political factors. In the long run, the best guarantee will be to bind Germany securely to the free world and to demonstrate to the Germans that their democratic regime has the world’s confidence and friendship and has won strength and successes.
I understand that Mr. McCloy feels that perhaps 90 per cent of the German people would agree to our retention of this emergency power to intervene for the preservation of democracy. It may well be that large numbers of them will now say privately that the future would be safer under such an arrangement. I feel completely sure, however, that very few if any German leaders would publicly take such a position and that when this issue would be debated, the demagogues and nationalists would have no inhibitions and no difficulty in stirring up a profound public reaction. This would be the more easy as it could be pointed out that the Treaty with Japan contains no such provision and that the West apparently puts more trust in Orientals than in Germans.
I should also like to emphasize the danger of drift. Many things show signs of “going sour” in Germany now. This is natural in an in-between [Page 1195] period when the talk is of ending the occupation but the acts and powers are still those of the occupation. The present drift must be ended soon and decisively if it is not to generate so much acrimony and so much doubt of our good faith and good intentions as to put in jeopardy the alliance we seek. The break with the past must be clear and permanent.
There is much more at stake in this decision than the question of a few German divisions. We have publicly started on a course of adding German strength to the West and there is public expectation in Germany that this will be accompanied by equality. If, because of failure on our own part, or failure to obtain tripartite agreement, we are now to show our unwillingness to accept the Germans as equals, we risk starting on a course that could result in the loss of all Germany, and perhaps more. We cannot expect them freely to contribute to defense if we indicate publicly our distrust in their ability to handle their own affairs and retain the ultimate right to handle them ourselves. We cannot expect the Germans to be enthusiastic members of our club if we retain a “safety first” attitude which would continue to be a form of control over their domestic development. If we adopt such a course, I am firmly convinced either the Germans would resentfully comply, for a short time only, with our plans and policies or, what is much more likely, would reject the package we offer as politically impossible. In either case, we risk the danger of being turned against by the German people as a whole. The future prospect for democracy in Germany would surely be imperilled by such a development.
I am firmly of the opinion that the whole success or failure of our efforts to obtain our dual objectives of adding German strength securely to the West and obtaining a stable and lasting democratic system in Germany may rest on your decision on this one fundamental point.
I have discussed this matter at length with various senior officials of the Department who have indicated their general agreement with me on this subject.
- Ante, p. 1175.↩
- For the text of the Occupation Statute for Germany, signed at Washington on April 8, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 179.↩