762.0221/8–1851
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
Dear Dean: I have read with interest your letter to M. Schumanand Mr. Morrison.2 Most of the matters it covers were discussed with Byroade on his recent visit here, as he doubtless reported to you. The letter raises several important points, however, on which I want you to have my views directly in preparation for the coming meetings.
1. Emergency Powers. One question to which I have devoted much thought is whether under the agreements the Allies should retain any ultimate right to intervene if the basic democratic order is threatened in Germany. With the contractual relations we must clearly [Page 1176] and definitely renounce any right to interfere under normal conditions; but if basic political developments should later threaten the stability of the Federal Republic as a democratic state, this would affect the security of the Allies, and I feel that we must have some final authority to deal with the situation.
No one can say today how great the risk of such developments may be, but the German social and political structure is clearly not yet stable or firmly based. The social fabric is still torn by basic tensions and discontents resulting from the Nazi period, the refugees, the war and its aftermath, etc. The lack of civic courage to speak out against totalitarian groups is most noticeable and the gradual emergence of more intransigent attitudes is apparent. They will probably become more pronounced rather than less as the date for a German contribution approaches. If the steadying influence of Adenauer were withdrawn and economic conditions took a turn for the worse over the next few years, it is not inconceivable that we would see in Germany a strong nationalist development. I am not saying any such course is probable, but the risks inherent in this basic instability seem to me too serious to ignore. We have a tremendous investment in our victory and occupation in Germany and our future could be instantly and directly affected by any defection in Germany.
I have talked with a number of Germans about this question and the great majority recognize this risk and consider that the Allies should keep some ultimate power to protect the Federal Republic against major domestic subversion from the right or left. If such changes should occur, I feel we should step in, or at least have the right to step in, for our own protection, because a Germany so directed would certainly endanger the security of the West. Essentially, our policy aims to solve the German problem by firmly integrating her politically, economically, and socially into a European community, and while the institutions for this purpose are in the formative stage, some special safeguard seems to me necessary.
Furthermore, I feel that a reservation of such authority or a clear declaration has three positive advantages:
- (1)
- By providing a legal basis for action, if the need should arise, it would avoid objections based on the lack of a right to intervene and might facilitate decisions to act in time.
- (2)
- Our guarantee of support for the democratic order would strengthen the courage and will of the German democratic forces to combat the rise to power of anti-democratic forces while that would be effective. In view of their experience in the last twenty years, the civic courage of even well-intentioned Germans is likely to be low, if they are uncertain whether such elements will prevail. Moreover, it would act as a deterrent to those who might otherwise be tempted to adhere to such groups.
- (3)
- Such a declaration might well lead the other European nations to a more ready acceptance of a full German partnership. The French, [Page 1177] the Belgians, and the Dutch all have good reason to be doubtful of German democratic tendencies, and of noncontinental attitudes toward Europe and Germany. British policy which, over the years, has tended to favor German strength as an offset to France, has tended to generate some distrust, and the European countries become very uneasy when the United States appears disposed to follow a somewhat similar attitude, or at least to disregard these dangers. The United States point of view is more imaginative and more constructive, but it can lead these European countries to a realistic and effective solution of the European problem only if it takes into account these attitudes. If these countries felt that the United States was as much interested in the political stability of Europe as in its military strength, and was determined that no new political adventure such as Nazism would be tolerated, I believe they would show more boldness in going forward toward European unity.
The formulation of such a provision is not easy. The power must be clear but must obviously be limited to extreme situations, and must avoid reflecting on the standing of the Federal Republic. It might take the form of a guarantee of the existence of the Bundes-republic, or a reserved power, or a declaration of our intention not to permit a totalitarian coup, if a contractual power were thought to be too great a political burden for the German Government to assume in the face of a strong opposition. Your letter speaks only of retained power to protect the security of our troops in Germany. That concept seems to me too ambiguous to meet what I have in mind. If taken literally, it would not justify action in the face of basic political changes which did not immediately affect their physical safety. What is needed is the express recognition that a serious breakdown in the political field would justify action if it endangered our general security.
I realize this is a fundamental point and seems to run counter to Department thinking but I have given much thought to it and have slowly come to the conclusion that we should reconsider our position in view of what I feel are the serious hazards we face if we do not do so. I may add that German individuals whose judgment I respect (and even some whose judgment I do not) have in impressive numbers conveyed to me their concern over the way things might go here if it were felt no intervention by the Allies was likely even if a totalitarian coup were effected.
2. Timing of German Contribution.
Your letter to M. Schuman (end of paragraph 4) expresses the hope that initial defense preparations in Germany can begin before “the final and formal act of establishment of the European force.” This statement seems to me to be open to misunderstanding. For the reasons stated in detail in my earlier cables, and in my discussions with Byroade, I am convinced that any efforts to work out an interim basis to begin the German recruiting outside the provisions of the European [Page 1178] Defense Forces Treaty would defeat their end. In my opinion the German contribution must take place under the Treaty creating the European Defense Forces but need not await the ability of the Commissioner to assume the exercise of his functions for training, etc.
In other words, while the Commissioner and other institutions of the European Defense Community are being organized and preparing for their operations, the recruiting of Germans, and their training under the direction of SHAPE, can and should begin. It seems to me just as clear, however, that the German recruiting and training must await the signing of the Treaty and its ratification, at least in Germany. If other countries should be slow in ratifying, I believe we could insist on initial German recruiting without waiting for ratification in these other countries. I think, however, that it would be most unwise to attempt to start such recruiting of Germans until the Bundestag has ratified the European Defense Treaty in order to establish the basis on which the German contribution would take place.
Of course, the Germans could be permitted before that time to do any preparatory work preliminary to the raising of troops. Indeed the Paris conference will be doing some of the planning work in conjunction with the work on the Treaty.
For the reasons already explained in my cables, I do not believe that this course will result in any loss of time which could otherwise in fact be avoided. Indeed I believe that this will be the most expeditious way to bring about the German contribution. A piecemeal approach will only play into the hand of Schumacher and throw away our best cards.
3. Time Schedule for Decisions.
When Byroade was here we advised him that, in our best judgment, the contractual arrangements and the EDF Treaty could be completed for submission to the Bundestag by December 15. After our conversations he cabled you recommending that November 15 should be set as the date for the meeting of Ministers to arrive at the final decisions regarding contractual arrangements and the defense contribution. At that time I hope I made it clear to him that while this might be all right as a target, it might be optimistic in practice. The schedule proposed in your letter has set the meeting of Ministers for the last part of October and thus has further shortened time by about three weeks.
Frankly I think that this schedule is likely to prove too tight. Assuming that the three Ministers arrive at decisions on the outstanding points on contractual relations at the meeting on September 15, you must bear in mind that it will still be necessary to draft the various conventions and agreements with our Allies and to negotiate them with the Germans. According to the schedule in your letter, only three or [Page 1179] four weeks would be available for this process. In view of our experience in working out much simpler documents with the Germans, I think that this is much too short a period to expect to complete the actual drafts of these agreements. It would seem to me wiser to hold the meeting of Ministers in the middle of November or at least after the NATO meeting instead of before, in order to allow at least several more weeks to negotiate with the Germans as well as to let the new ideas “settle” in Germany with the ebullient nature of German public opinion. I consider this last to be most important.
I am fully aware of the need for expedition in completing the contractual arrangements and the EDF Treaty but I also believe that this is a situation, within limits, in which “the more haste, the less speed” may well apply. If we give the Germans the feeling that we are under extreme pressure to reach agreements, they are tempted to raise their demands to an unreasonable extent and thereby to retard the ultimate agreement.
I think we should keep the pressure constantly on the French and the Germans with respect both to contractual arrangements and the European Army, but if we attempt to force action so rapidly that they do not have adequate opportunity for orderly discussions within their governments and parliaments, I think we will not really hasten the final outcome but may create obstacles of our own making.
Above all it is essential not to let the Germans receive the impression that we must have agreement at all costs. To do so will only play into the hands of the opposition to Adenauer and force him to adopt unreasonable positions. We must make it clear that we do not seek German participation at any cost but only on the basis of reasonable principles to which they must adhere. All cards are not in their hands. Germany will greatly need our continued assistance in many forms before they reach a stable condition. To give them a contrary impression will prejudice both a sound political and a sound military solution of the German problem.
The above thoughts are not new. We have endeavored to put them before the Department in several different forms, but I cannot escape the feeling that they have not been given the weight or consideration at home which I feel they deserve.
I have just received the memorandum to the President on which the NSC decisions appear to be based and I see in it no evidence that these considerations, which I feel to be supremely important, were presented.3
Sincerely,
- Marginal handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: “No reply necessary as substance discussed with McCloy cleared with GER.”↩
- Dated August 9, p. 1164.↩
- For text of the memorandum to President Truman from Secretary Acheson and Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett, dated July 30, see p. 849.↩