Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/4–351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

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Paris, April 3, 1951—2 p. m.

5881. From Jessup. At tripartite mtg this morning Parodi and Davies indicated initially willingness accept mention on agenda of Atlantic Pact and American mil bases in foreign countries.

Jessup said his personal view was that West cld not accept this subject for agenda. He pointed out Gromyko’s ref to “decision” to be taken on this subject by Foreign Mins. He noted essentiality of differentiating between discussion of present international situation and decision by four Foreign Mins on NAT Treaty which was permanent part of peace machinery. He called attention to fact that other than three Western powers involved in NATO and USSR not member.

Parodi promptly saw the light, but Davies continued point to difficulty of refusing mention subject on agenda. Davies opposed Jessup’s tentative suggestion that Gromyko might be told privately today to tell his govt that West wld not accept NAT base item on agenda. Davies said he wld have to consult London.

Alternative methods handling Sov item were discussed. It was agreed: (1) West wld ask today for further reply from Gromyko on new complete agenda presented yesterday; (2) Consideration wld be given to future moves including proposal to counter-balance Sov item with one referring to Sov support of armed aggression or something of same type; (3) To obtain our govt’s position on whether we were ready to face deadlock here if Sovs insisted on NAT and bases item.

Ref Deptel 5194,² cancellation of this afternoon’s quadripartite meeting seemed quite impracticable. Mtg will be used to find out if possible Sov purpose in introducing NAT and bases item and Sov reaction to new Western agenda. If Gromyko renews propaganda attack on NAT and bases, appropriate replies will be made.³

[ Jessup ]

1. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Frankfurt.
2. Not printed; it stated that, if the meeting on April 3 could not be postponed, the United States should continue to challenge Gromyko’s willingness to reach agreement and should attack the Soviet military alliance system and its stationing of troops outside the USSR (396.1–PA/4–251).
3. At the 22d session Gromyko said that the April 2 tripartite proposal was unsatisfactory since it did not list the Soviet proposals on Trieste and NATO. Telegram 5911, from Paris, April 3 (396.1–PA/4–351).