762A.5/3–1751: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1


7481. Subject: Ger defense contingent. Bérard yesterday informally advised me that predicated on his own recent visit to Paris and subsequent discussion with Theodor Blank he has distinct impression mutually satis solution will be evolved for present divergent Ger Fr views re Ger defense contingent and particularly differences concerning unit size and command. Stated Blank had indicated his hopeful view was based on report which Adenauer and he had reed from De Maiziere that definite progress is being made at Paris mtgs.2 Bérard stressed importance which Fr and Adenauer and Blank attach to creation true Eur army as real step toward Fr–Ger rapprochement. Further indicated Fr prepared and believes Ger similarly ready make concessions in view political importance achieving Eur army concept rather than adhering to rigid proposals their respective mil experts. Also indicated chief Fr concern is not so primarily with regard to actual unit size or other technical factors but rather to safeguard [Page 1030] against any possible recreation of a Ger army. Fear of latter possibility is apparently chief Fr objection to NATO concept. Particularly emphasized that as time is important requisite for obtaining Fr–Ger agreement on major broad aspects of matter US shld refrain from urging haste or exerting pressure either here or in Paris or via NATO. Stressed that Fr consider Eur army is most far-reaching factor for genuine Eur integration and development better Fr–Ger relationship far surpassing Schuman Plan toward achieving this all important end. Further urged that since creation Eur army realistically depends on Fr and Gers it shld so far as feasible be left to these two elements to work out satis solution. Bérard conceded US cld probably force a solution on Fr but was certain Fr people wld ultimately recognize and resent such pressure thereby long range purpose of better Fr–Ger relationship wld be defeated.

Expressed hope I wld therefore counsel against haste or pressure on US part in this matter and in favor of giving Fr further opportunity play major role in working out satis solution with Gers. Bérard thought this would be facilitated through discussion being handled primarily by non-mil reps with political considerations playing import role rather than sole emphasis on technical mil aspects. Have not checked with Blank correctness of Bérard’s report of AdenauerBlank attitude. I stated that US position had consistently been to permit full opportunity for Paris negots to produce results and provided negots are not too protracted and results are militarily practicable this wld presumably continue to be our attitude. I naturally made no commitment which wld preclude our resuming active role any time we consider Fr–Ger efforts not producing desired results and in meantime to do nothing here which cld appear to be putting pressure on Fr, particularly in regard to units which issue can be better settled in Paris. I feel this is practicable as a number of issues remain which can be explored here without any deliberate dragging of feet.

  1. Repeated to Paris for Bruce and MacArthur and to London for Spofford.
  2. For further documentation on the meetings at Paris concerning the European Defense Community, see pp. 755 ff.