740.5/2–1051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt 1

top secret
priority

5599. Eyes only for McCloy. Since receipt Bonn’s tel 507 Feb 3, rptd Fkft 594, Heidelberg 20,2 State and Defense have been analyzing carefully info exchanged and questions raised in course of four mtgs betw HICOM Mil Comite and Fed Rep Delegation. We have also read urtel 6650 Feb 103 and Bonn’s tel 524 Feb 9.4 Re part 2 Bonn’s 524 we do not [Page 1015]agree with Kirkpatrick’s statement HICOM–Fed Rep discussions in complete deadlock and believe discussion of certain subjects can profitably be continued. General lines of proposed statement for Feb 16 mtg seem consistent with views Deptel 5301 Feb 15 and this tel (we have not yet received full text of tripartite statement).

In gen we consider comments contained Deptel 5301 Feb 1 shld govern our actions for present. It is apparent Mil discussions cannot proceed much further until specific answers to some major questions are forthcoming. We believe Fed Rep is entitled to this info which shld be provided through Occ Powers. You are therefore authorized to inform Ger del that we view present talks as exploratory and upon their conclusion Occ Powers will wish to consult betw themselves and, as appropriate, with NATO before making certain specific replies or concluding any agreements with Fed Rep. You shld therefore request Ger del to proceed with current discussions on points not yet covered having an important bearing on broad Allied decisions, e.g. financing, production, sources of Mil equipment. Upon conclusion of discussion these subjects HICOM shld compile an agreed report on Ger proposals for consideration by three govts. Three govts shld arrive at joint answer in a manner to be determined and shld inform NATO at an appropriate time of the status of negots together with any necessary requests for additional guidance required to reach agreement with Fed Rep. Fol such consideration HICOM shld inform Fed govt of agreed conclusions.

This procedure wld necessitate a rather lengthy recess of present discussions. This delay cld be explained publicly by pointing out fact that initial mtgs were purely exploratory in nature and Occ Powers on one side and Gers on other are now considering info exchanged. Despite Ger statements in fourth mtg, we wld hope they might be working out certain internal Ger recruitment and administrative problems (urtel 6650 Feb 10 encouraging in this respect). As pointed out paras 2 and 3 Deptel 5301 we believe polit discussions with Gers shld go ahead as rapidly as possible and shld in fact be considered to have priority over mil talks. It is apparent Gers are not prepared to reach any definitive agreement on mil subjects pending receipt info on matters of higher mil org and indications new polit relationship will be generally acceptable to them.

Although some public speculation has arisen both here and in Ger whether Eisenhower’s report6 represented a fundamental change in our policy on Ger participation in western defense, we do not consider this to be the case. Eisenhower’s comments are clearly in line with our [Page 1016]policy in this field. He has in effect highlighted publicly certain conclusions re the tactics of implementing this policy which had become apparent even before the Brussels mtg and which were generally accepted there, although not publicly stated. His statements underline the necessity for a “package” arrangement with Gers covering broadly both political and mil relationships.

For your info Brit Emb has shown State copy of HICOM report transmitted by UK High Commissioner (addressed to Standing Group) raising certain questions brought out by Gers in mil comite mtgs. We discussed briefly possible procedures for handling such reports and agreed to consult further. State and Defense are exploring this problem and will keep you informed. Believe procedure suggested para 2 above will assure adequate govtal consideration of such questions and also offer opportunity to iron out answers tripartitely before pushing them into more cumbersome NATO machinery. Appreciate your comments.

Acheson
  1. This telegram, drafted by Calhoun and cleared by Lewis, Knight, and the Department of Defense, was repeated to Bonn and Heidelberg, eyes only for Hays and Handy.
  2. Ante, p. 1005.
  3. Ante, p. 1013.
  4. Ante, p. 1011.
  5. Ante, p. 1002.
  6. For the text of General Eisenhower’s report to members of Congress on February 1 concerning his tour of Western Europe, see Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1951, pp. 245–251.