Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/1–352: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, January 3, 1952—5 p. m.

3957. Personal attention of Secretary. Distribution as determined by Secretary’s office. Subject is European defense forces. Ministerial meeting concluded Sunday made considerable progress.²

Over and above other progress, a highlight of meeting was agreement on federal structure for EDC, as well as on desirability of eventual overall federation of six countries. Ministers (reaffirmed their agreement that initial assembly should study federal reorganization of EDC, placed deadline on completion of such study, and undertook as well to recommend to their governments an immediate study at governmental level. Split between French, Germans and Italians on one hand and Benelux on other, which characterized meeting otherwise, was not evident in regard to federation.³

Balance this message sets out summary of accomplishments in seven major areas in which unresolved EDF issues can be grouped. Immediately following message sums up positions of each country and suggests action to move conference forward as rapidly as possible.

1. Composition of EDC forces.

Ministers agreed on all but two issues concerning forces to be included in, and units to [be] excluded from, EDF. (Among excluded units are those in Indochina and Korea.) Status of internal defense forces and deep-seas navy left uncertain. All but Belgians agreed on European status of internal defense forces—that is, their inclusion in EDF. Question of who shld exercise operational control over such of these forces as SHAPE does not take command of, raised more difficulty. French, Germans and Italians favored European control no different from that exercised over any other part of EDF. Belgians and Dutch wanted operational control over internal defense forces to remain wholly national. On deep-seas navy, ministers noted that tendency was to exclude it from EDF, but did not formalize an agreement. Both questions were remanded for further study by experts. On first, advice of SHAPE is to be solicited.

2. Use of forces and relations NATO.

Germans and French agreed that Council should have power to direct use of EDF. But majority by which Council might do so not settled. Benelux position not clear. Matter remanded for further study by experts. Relations with NATO not discussed, altho fact that forces wld come under SHAPE clearly accepted.

3. Institutional questions.

Ministers agreed that EDC will have four institutions: Executive, Council of Ministers, Assembly and Court.

(a) Executive and Council: On basis of French concession, it was agreed that Executive was to consist of number of commissioners and a president. Everyone agreed also on supranational allegiance (rather than allegiance to govts) of president and commissioners. Unresolved issues:

(i) Number of commissioners. Dutch and Belgians favored six; French, Germans and Italians thought fewer, perhaps three, would work with greater efficacy.

(ii) Powers of president. Dutch and Belgians thought these should be restricted pretty much to formal ones, and that Executive should act by majority vote. Germans, French and Italians favored giving president preponderant voice thru power to coordinate work of commissioners and give policy guidance.

(iii) Distribution of powers between Executive and Council. Belgians proposed, with Dutch concurrency, to limit role of president and commissioners practically to that of an executive secretariat of Council, and charge latter, acting by unanimity in all matters of importance, with directing EDC activities. French, Germans and Italians felt Council should have role of taking major political decisions and acting as a check, but president and commissioners should be responsible for day to day operations. This effort to meet Belgian-Dutch position was as far as French, Germans and Italians thought they could go, since,

• —binding Council by rule of unanimity in all matters of importance would make meaningless any grant of powers to EDC, as each govt could at every step decide that EDC is not to exercise a given power and net effect would therefore be a coalition relying on coincidence of policies of several govts rather than a community capable of independent action, and
• —vesting all or substantially all power in a six-man body acting thru another multiple-member body would—even in absence of rule of unanimity—render EDC operations so cumbersome as to make EDC in fact weak and ineffective combination no matter what powers are nominally given to it. Belgians showed some willingness to compromise by giving a measure of leeway to Executive. Experts are to study these matters further.

(b) Assembly: Constituent role in studying federal structure, which was given to Assembly in Strasbourg, was confirmed by ministers in Paris. French, Germans and Italians pressed for larger role, argued Assembly should at very least have power to approve budget and require resignation of president and commissioners. Belgians at first opposed giving any powers at all to Assembly, but again indicated some willingness to compromise, agreed Assembly might have power to dismiss Executive. French, Germans and Italians further met Belgians by dropping insistence on any further Assembly power except share in approval of budget. This matter remanded to experts.

(c) Court: No serious issue under this head.

4. Duration of treaty.

Everyone was agreed that in fact end of this treaty in form in which now drafted would come with federation, which ministers undertook to hasten thru study assigned to Assembly at Strasbourg, as well as thru simultaneous governmental study. In order not to give EDF appearance of temporary expedient in comparison with Schuman Plan, the Germans, French and Italians insisted on treaty of fifty-year duration and opposed Dutch-Belgian proposal to make EDF treaty coincide in duration with NAT.

No decision, as discussion of this matter, like that on distribution of power between Executive and Council, brought out fundamental conflict between Dutch view of EDF as loosely knit coalition under larger coalition of NATO, and French Ger and Ital view of it as entity of great value, both immed and long-range, both to Eur and to NATO, which it can truly strengthen only if it is itself strong.

5. Fin Arrangements.

Fin problems were discussed at considerable length but few agreements reached because of hasty recommendations from Fin Mins which were rejected by Schuman and Adenauer because they involved discrimination against Ger in initial period by having all mil budgets of NATO members remain national while Ger’s contrib wld be under Eur control; and they gave nearly all real authority to Council acting by unanimity.

All dels agreed that fol establishment directly-elected bicameral assembly capable of levying taxes, existence of federal budget approved and executed by community institutions wld create no further difficulties of principle.

Disagreement persisted on period prior to creation of such an assembly. Gers and French agree on fol program:

(a) There shld be common financing from first day. Gers and French consider it essential that Eur institutions have responsibility for determining and carrying out expenditures from the beginning. Until EDC services ready to undertake all fin functions directly, treaty itself for EDC executive cld delegate their actual exercise to appropriate existing agencies. However, community institutions wld have latitude to makeshifts and modifications in existing programs where necessary to improve rapidity and effectiveness of buildup pre-community wld be required to respect contracts already let any member states.

(b) Contributions of member states for first year shld be set forth in transitional convention of treaty. Contributions of NATO members shld be based on TCC exercise; Ger contribution to be fixed on same criteria. Gers wld like TCC to make recommendation on Ger contribution. (French wld probably not object but at present feel bound by commitments to settle this matter in Bonn; they are also worried that TCC might confuse principle of common financing from first day by getting into issue of use of Ger fin contribution and limiting it to cost of Ger-origin forces and to expenditures in Ger.)

(c) Member states should be able to deduct non-EDC def costs (such as Indochina and support costs of US and UK forces in Ger) from total contribution before paying into common fund. First year’s deductions to be stated in transitional convention of treaty; new deductions for subsequent years to be approved by council. (Gers wld like support costs to be taken over by EDC as common responsibility. French will not consider this because of agreement with US and UK concerning Bonn contractual negots.)

(d) For second and any subsequent years of transitional period contributions shld be fixed by individual countries negotiating individually in new TCC or similar NATO exercise. Transitional convention of treaty shld state that these contributions cannot be less than those of first year plus a 5 percentage of any increase in national income. This provision designed to prevent failure of one parliament to vote funds from paralyzing effective action on budget.

(e) From end of transitional period full-fledged common budget shld be in effect. (Gers hope it will be end 1953.) Budget should be prepared by executive and approved by qualified majority of council and of assembly. Contributions by member states to be based on fixed percentage scale agreed by unanimous vote of council during transitional period; states should be obligated to make these payments.

(f) External assistance in end-items shld be negotiated by, and go directly to, community for distribution. Position not yet clear on counterpart of military-support aid of offshore procurement, which are to some extent determined by balance of payments needs and other non-def considerations and negotiated by individual govts.

Ital del in general supported above principles. Pella, like other Fin Mins, does not like prospect of disclosing full details of his mil budget to Eur auth and does not like obligation to account to someone else for actual expenditure of funds.

Benelux position differs from above proposals on 2 essential points:

(a) Benelux oppose common financing from first day for any expenditures necessary to fulfill national programs within framework MTDP. For this reason, they propose that from now until end of medium-term def program, national programs of NATO countries shld continue to be executed on national basis without substantial modification. Common arrangements wld apply only to Ger, which has no NATO program and to unsubstantial expenditures for headquarters buildings, etc.

(b) In absence of a directly-elected Eur assembly capable of levying taxes, Benelux insisted final say on any common budget arrangements must be national. For this reason they proposed that unanimous approval of council be required for both contributions and expenditures, even after end of medium-Ger plan, at which time they accept existence of a common budget to be administered by executive.

French-Ger proposal for TCC–NATO determination of contributions in transitional period goes considerable distance in mtg Benelux position.

6. Common armament and procurement program.

Existence of a common armament and procurement program depends on community having power to administer and spend funds. Other issues (such as extent of attempt at standardization, duty to consult national govts in placing orders, power to ensure that priority is given by manufacturers to filling EDC orders) do not arise before power to spend is established. Except as possibility of common procurement program implicit in common budget question, former was not discussed at this mtg since common budget issue still unsettled.

7. Territorial org of EDF.

This question was discussed by Def Mins. It was agreed that EDF mil district commands shld exist at local levels and consist largely of personnel of nationality of country in which district located. It was further agreed that these commands wld exercise certain local supply, procurement and other housekeeping functions and perform training and recruiting and admin of reserves. Issue arose over whether these mil districts shld be responsible to EDC exec directly or through an intermediate command at national level, as Gers and others wish. This intermediate level wld be a command encompassing each member state headed by an officer of the nationality of the state in question. French strongly opposed existence of this intermediate command level. No decision reached.

Bruce

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg, for the eyes only of the Chiefs of Mission.
2. Regarding the meetings of the Foreign, Finance, and Defense Ministers of the six nations participating in the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, held in Paris, December 27–30, see the editorial note, p. 980.
3. The agreement on a federal structure for the EDC and an eventual overall federation of the participants was emphasized in the conference communiqué” cited in the editorial note, ibid .