740.5/12–2951: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1
3868. This morning I had breakfast with Chancellor Adenauer and Blankenhorn and Hallstein at Chancellor’s invitation.
1. The Chancellor said that conversations yesterday and before on EDF2 had at least served to define sharply differences in various member states views on subj. He feels necessity for pressing forward vigorously to agreed draft of treaty, but does not think his sense of urgency is sufficiently shared by his colleagues. Instead of departing tonight as he had expected, he will probably remain through tomorrow so that there can be further mtgs. He will attempt to secure a written statement from the Mins defining areas of agmt and disagmt.
2. Adenauer believes that French, Gers and Itals shld be able to reach a substantial accord at this mtg except for security controls and Ger financial contribution mentioned below. Such an accord wld then isolate the Benelux countries. Adenauer then believes that US and UK shld attempt to induce the Benelux countries to moderate their position and reach a compromise acceptable to all concerned. However, no such compromise shld be at expense of cardinal points which Gers and French consider essential to creation of a real EDC.
3. One of matters which cannot be concluded at this mtg is security controls although Adenauer hopes to discuss this privately with Schuman and possibly also with Pleven while he is in Paris. To my surprise he did not appear to think that this shld prove too difficult. He said that a good deal of confusion had arisen in relation to it because of many places and comites where it had been dealt with.
4. A second and much more important matter which cannot be settled at this mtg is Ger financial contribution. Adenauer said that he felt very strongly that Ger’s econ and fin capabilities shld be examined by the Wise Men3 so that same criteria wld be applied to Ger as had been case with the NATO countries. In addition, such findings by Wise Men wld make his own sitn vis-à-vis his Parl and people much more understandable to them. He continues to maintain position that [Page 982] any arrangement which wld be regarded by the Ger people as a continuation of occupying costs of foreign armies wld be completely unacceptable to them. That is why he wld prefer that support few: US and UK forces shld be made from the EDC common budget.
Adenauer said that he must tell me quite frankly that present procedures for handling this question were not adequate and wld cause a long delay. He wants to bring this matter to Mr. Harriman’s attention and to that of the other Wise Men, but does not know procedurally how to do so. Unless something of the sort proposed by him were done, he thought our negotiations wld bog down.
5. Adenauer said that time might come when Ger, Italy and France wld have to have a showdown with the Benelux countries, and if so, he trusted that US wld back stand of former group on EDC. However, if the Benelux countries persisted in being obdurate and the other three countries shld decide to go ahead regardless of them, it wld pose difficulties in the Ger, French and Ital Parliaments which cld make ratification very difficult.
He was uncertain how much of Belg position was bluff and how much was confusion. He wondered if the Belgs were hoping to receive some sort of special treatment, such as they had in connection with the Schuman Plan. He thought it likely that the Dutch might be to some degree influenced by supposed Brit hostility to the EDC, and perhaps in this respect the Brit shld be induced to aid in matter.
6. If present FonMins mtg fails to make all decisions of principle nec for implementation of the conf’s work, he expects to ask for another ministerial mtg in Jan.
He does not believe that it will be possible to get a draft treaty signed by the govts by Feb 1, but considers that it is possible, if Benelux nations prove more reasonable than they have to date, to show such progress toward agmt by Feb 1, as to make creation of EDC a certainty, subj, of course, to final ratification by the various Parliaments.
As to timing, his estimate was same for contractual arrangements.
7. Adenauer has been very impressed by Pleven and thinks it extremely important that all of these negotiations be terminated if possible while Pleven is in office.
He believes that as quickly as possible French Govt shld take the initiative in a serious proposal for a polit federation in Eur.
He said that he had no doubts about ratification of the Schuman Plan by the Bundestag and expected a majority of 40 to 50 votes.
8. The entire conversation was marked by the Chancellor’s strong conviction of necessity to tie FedRep to Western world irrevocably through media of Schuman Plan, EDC and a Eur fed polit structure. As to a def contribution from Ger, he does not contemplate any alternative [Page 983] to the EDF which he said must be constituted. It was clear that he saw no other way to solve such probs as security restrictions, support of US and UK forces and an adequate financial contribution to def, and the demand for equality of treatment. He clearly feels he must carry the EDC through in view of his domestic polit sitn, fear of many Gers of revival of natl militarism, and his own settled policy to build a Eur community.
- This telegram was repeated for information to London and Bonn.↩
- Chancellor Adenauer and his advisers were in Paris for the meetings of the EDC Ministers described in the editorial note, supra.↩
- The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee; for documentation on the Committee, see pp. 1 ff.↩